Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Greenert has adopted the lingo of marine navigation to bring organization to his thinking about fleet priorities.  His “Sailing Directions” provide top-line guidance, with occasional “Navigation Plans” to indicate programmatic implementation of the Sailing Directions. Then there are the periodic “Position Reports” to take stock of how well the Navy is doing in pursuing his priorities. 

Recently, the Navy released his “Navigation Plan for 2015-2019” in order to “…describe how Navy’s budget submission for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015-2019 pursues the vision of CNO’s Sailing Directions.”  Essentially a summary of priorities for the budget cycle currently in play, the document reveals the clear priorities of this CNO, and sends a message to the American people and their representatives about how the Navy will do its best to remain combat ready and forward deployed in the face of both fiscal austerity and uncertainty.

There is a lot to like in Admiral Greenert’s plan.  The addition of industrial base concerns to his list of programmatic priorities signals the leading edge of concern that our manufacturing and repair base must be carefully watched, lest we lose forever the capacity to expand when the need is present.  Additionally, his continuing emphasis on the electromagnetic spectrum and cyber demonstrate clear understanding of how high-end war will be conducted in the future.  Finally, his emphasis on undersea dominance imposes costs on potential adversaries from a warfare area in which the U.S. already enjoys considerable advantage.

But the decline of the U.S. submarine fleet from 55 attack boats today to 41 in 2028 undercuts Admiral Greenert’s undersea emphasis. A shrinking “Silent Service” is emblematic of the Navy’s (and the other Service) conscious decision to favor capability over capacity. 

Described by the CNO as “building appropriate capability, then delivering it at a capacity we could afford”, there is “betting on the come” quality to this approach, one in which the Navy sacrifices numbers (ships, submarines, aircraft) in order to ensure those platforms that remain are technologically advanced and field the latest weapons and sensors.  Presumably, when the economy improves and fiscal order is restored to Washington, the resulting architecture would “fill out” with numbers (returning again to the emphasis on an industrial base that could support such increase).  All things being equal, this approach privileges war-fighting over war deterrence, which the Navy has for decades asserted  is the by-product of numerous ships forward deployed in peacetime. In fact, peacetime presence (and its deterrence/assurance qualities) has served as a significant force sizing rationale for the Navy.

But all things are not being held equal, and the CNO addresses this by asserting an increase in presence. Greenert’s plan would boost presence in the Asia-Pacific from approximately 50 ships in 2014 to about 65 in 2019. In the Middle East, the Navy would go from around 30 ships today to around 40 in 2019. 

This increase in presence in the two major employment hubs the Navy currently occupies can be accomplished through a variety of means. 

The Navy could build more ships, and according to the recently released 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan, this is exactly what is planned. 

The Navy could forward station/forward deploy additional ships to these operationally relevant regions. This is also planned. 

The Navy could implement innovative crewing concepts that rotate crews rather than ships, which provides a net increase in operational availability (presence) per hull.  This strategy is part of the Littoral Combat Ship concept of operations, in which three crews rotate through two hulls, one forward deployed and one based in the U.S., with the “off-crew” undergoing rigorous training in high fidelity shore-based trainers. 

Finally, the Navy could extend deployment lengths of its ships, something I will return to later in this piece. From all appearances, the Navy is doing what is required to ensure it maintains presence “where it matters, when it matters”. 

But these plans are built on troubling assumptions, and there will be unanticipated long-term costs.