Nuclear Deterrence 70 Years After Hiroshima
Published Aug. 6, 2015 • Read time: 4m
It was seventy years ago today that the United States dropped the “Little Boy” atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima at the height of World War II. While there is some debate over the impact the atomic bomb had on Japan’s decision to surrender, there can be little doubt that the atomic age has ushered in an unprecedented era of great power peace.
With World War I and II costing more than 100 million lives, the seven decades of peace between the great powers that have elapsed since 1945 are a direct result of the immediate destruction and residual radiological effects that were evident to the world in the wake of Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945.
Contrary to the arguments of nuclear abolitionists, nuclear deterrence, a policy developed and modified in the years following the attack on Hiroshima, was central to American security during the Cold War and remains central in American security today. The Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 1-02 defines deterrence as, “The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.” In other words, deterrence is a psychological effect achieved in the mind of an adversary.
Deterrence can be achieved through a spectrum of means such as dissuasion, denial or threat. When deterrence fails, the United States may attempt to compel an adversary to return to the previous status quo.
While critics of nuclear deterrence will use the anniversary of Hiroshima to trot out tired and inaccurate arguments as a means of advocating for further reductions and eventual disarmament, it is important to keep in mind that the nation’s nuclear triad of nuclear capable bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles played a central role in deterring the Soviet Union from using their superior conventional forces to attack the United States and its allies.
Today, those same weapons deter a resurgent and bellicose Russia, which must always think about the ramifications to nuclear stability before it attacks one of its neighbors. North Korea must also take American nuclear weapons into consideration when it decides to rattle sabers and consider crossing red lines. China, which has grown increasingly assertive in the South and East China Seas, can only go so far before it must consider whether its actions will cause a direct conflict with the United States, which may escalate.
Critics of the arsenal are prone to arguing that terrorism is the most pressing threat facing the United States, not a nuclear capable adversary. Although it is true that terrorism is the most likely threat we face, it is certainly not the most dangerous. It is only our nuclear-capable adversaries that pose an existential threat to our way of life.
Thus, for “Global Zero” advocates to argue that because nuclear weapons are not the best tool for deterring terrorists this is therefore reason to eliminate them is like arguing that because flip-flops are not the best shoes to wear with a business suit we should stop making them. Flip-flops were never meant to be worn with a business suit and nuclear weapons were never meant to deter terrorists.
Although the United States possesses the most powerful conventional military the world has ever seen, it has a poor track-record of deterring America’s adversaries. For those who claim that we can eliminate nuclear weapons in favor of precision-guided munitions, I ask to see the evidence that conventional capabilities will serve as an effective deterrent. In short, nuclear weapons exist because conventional weapons have never been equivalent.
At an estimated cost of 30 billion dollars per year, the nuclear enterprise (Departments of Defense and Energy) represents just five percent of the Department of Defense’s budget. When compared to the federal budget, the nuclear enterprise accounts for less than one-tenth of one percent of federal spending. Thus, when abolitionists argue that we can’t afford the nuclear arsenal, they are simply incorrect.
In looking back on the seven decades that have passed since the bombing of Hiroshima, we cannot celebrate the death and destruction that occurred that day, but we can be thankful for the peace and prosperity that resulted from the onset of the atomic age.
Reflecting on the historic significance of today and the use of the atomic bomb, it is important to remember that deterrence works because of the psychological effect it achieves in the mind of an adversary. Thus, it is the thought of suffering the kind of death and destruction that occurred at Hiroshima that gives an adversary reason to pause and helps peace prevail.
Dr. Adam B. Lowther is Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at Air Force Global Strike Command.

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