Al Qaeda's Future Threat
Published Aug. 18, 2016 • Read time: 4m
While al Qaeda may soon return to preeminence in the global jihad recruitment competition, it is evolving in the face of existential challenges such as the American post-9/11 counter-terrorism regime, competition from the Islamic State, and a rapidly changing Middle East. al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra (or the al Nusra Front as it’s commonly referred to in the United States), officially rebranded itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham -- “Conquest of the Levant Front” -- in order to appeal to a broader range of recruits and moderate opposition groups in the Syrian civil war. Exposing his face to the camera for the first time, al Nusra’s leader, Abu Muhammad al Julani, declared a soft split from al Qaeda and a moderated agenda to avoid Western scrutiny. His move raises questions about the future role of al Qaeda’s “core” leadership under Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri -- which is increasingly isolated from the Syrian conflict. Given its diminished role, it is increasingly unlikely that al Qaeda’s “core” leadership will retain relevance, leaving two plausible paths for al Qaeda and al-Julani: al-Julani orchestrates a coup, or, as the more involved and charismatic leader, he assumes leadership through a peaceful handoff by Zawahiri.
After half a decade under Zawahiri’s leadership, al Qaeda’s previous growth and success in cultivating prestige has diminished in favor of its individual affiliates. Al Nusra has performed well on the battlefield in Syria, steadily absorbing other jihadist and combatant groups and positioning itself as the most successful antagonist to the Assad regime’s brutality – the primary driver of the conflict. Surprisingly, al-Nusra has held true to the pledge it made to Osama bin Laden’s globally oriented jihadi organization 3 years ago while also declaring its determination to be a central figure in Syria’s post-conflict future. If al Julani chooses to assert the rebranded al Nusrah as the new core leadership, there is little that Zawahiri or his coterie, sheltering from American drone surveillance and strikes, could do to prevent the coup. Much as the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR engendered the birth of modern global Islamic terrorism and gave rise to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, the conflict in Syria could shift leadership legitimacy to al-Julani’s al Nusra.
This is largely due to the Syrian conflict’s centrality to contemporary global jihadism as a recruitment and training hotbed. Through lack of proximity to the fight and not being known as a dynamic combat veteran who can unite disparate factions towards a larger goal (something Al Qaeda’s own leadership history suggests is the recipe for success), Zawahiri could find himself on the outs like many other leaders of movements forced (willfully or not ) abroad from the conflict central to their movement. The reality is that Zawahiri needs al Nusra more than al Nusra needs al Qaeda.
Being well-educated in global jihad movement politics, Zawahiri would understand this dynamic well. To stave off a putsch, Zawahiri could be grooming a successor in al-Julani, who many view in the same light as Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden captured followers through his charismatic leadership and involvement in the heaviest fighting during the Afghanistan jihad. He rode that cult of personality to his death, continually gaining pledges of bayat despite his having gone to ground following the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. His eluding of American forces in Tora Bora only further heightened his mystique and mythos -- but that mystique did not transfer to Zawahiri upon bin Laden’s death.
Al Qaeda’s future, and that of the global jihadi movement, will be written in Syria. Having a charismatic figure who has been in the thick of the most defining conflict of the decade could provide the resurging terrorist organization the edge it needs to succeed in a new Middle East. If al Qaeda desires to regain preeminence over ISIS, it will need a more dynamic leader, and al-Julani is currently the best option. At the moment, it seems that both sides have hedged their bets and chosen neither path, but such a tenuous arrangement cannot continue without long term loss of appeal in recruitment and damage to both organizations’ success within the Syrian conflict.
Matthew Kriner formerly served as the Director of Political Affairs at the Israeli Consulate to the Southeast United States. Matthew will be studying at IDC Herzilya for a MA in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security.

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