The National Security Affairs (NSA) department at the U.S. Naval War College, being committed to the Socratic method of learning, would insist – at least when I was teaching there – that there was no “War College answer.”
There were still certain ideas or concepts that you hoped the students would absorb. One of the questions I liked to explore with my students was why countries enter into alliances with each other? At the risk of enraging my former department, let me provide you with the answer I hoped they arrived at…
Countries make alliances with other countries in order to increase their net national security – to increase their ability to defeat mutual military threats while not assuming too much additional risk.
Now, that seems fairly simple! You’d be surprised, therefore – or maybe you would not – how few policy makers actually understand this concept.
Take, for example, the issue of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I argued to a Ukrainian friend that (prior to the current conflict) it made no sense for NATO to entertain Ukraine joining NATO. Ukraine was widely assumed to have little combat power to offer NATO, and the one great attribute that Ukraine provided – a geographic buffer between Russia and the nearest NATO states – NATO got for free without having Ukraine join the alliance. On the risk side of the balance sheet, it was well known – especially after the Russian invasion of Georgia in the 00’s and Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 – that Russia had territorial and security interests that involved Ukraine and was willing to act on them.
In other words, in accepting Ukraine into NATO, NATO would gain extraordinarily little in military capability while incurring significant strategic risk – clear as mud, right? Unfortunately, NATO continued to lead Ukraine on, and, well, 2022…[i]
Now consider Finland and Sweden applying to join NATO. The one thing we have learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that Russia does not pose a credible conventional military threat to NATO. Yes, things might be uncomfortable for the Baltic states, for example, if Russia were to invade them, but with a good deal of their combat power destroyed in Ukraine, and much of the rest of it tied up there, likely for years to come, Russia simply cannot launch a credible conventional military campaign against any other neighboring countries.
This includes Finland. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine demonstrates, once again, that one never really knows how an armed force will perform in combat until it performs in combat, Finland is assessed to have a formidable military capability. And if Russia poses little to no real threat to Finland, it poses even less of a threat to Sweden, with which it does not share a contiguous border, and which also has a formidable military capability.
But Finland and Sweden have both applied for membership to NATO, and NATO seems very eager to have them join. But why, and is this a good idea for all the members of NATO?
Well, both countries have credible and significant military capabilities, so that’s a plus for NATO. Of course, it is a good deal for Finland and Sweden, as they could then count on assistance from NATO conventional military forces in the unlikely event of an attack by Russia. So, a positive for NATO, and a positive for Finland and Sweden.
But what is on the risk side of the ledger? Well, Finland shares a very long border with Russia, and the reason Finland has developed such a capable military is because of the historical military threat Russia has posed to Finland. Does the addition of Finland’s and Sweden’s military capabilities offset the added geographic risk?
Maybe it does. But if Finland has learned from the Ukraine war that Russia no longer poses a credible conventional threat, and if Sweden has learned the same and has Finland as a geographic buffer to boot, why are they so anxious to give up their longstanding neutrality and join NATO?
The answer is because there is one military capability that Russia possesses and they do not, and that is nuclear weapons. Speculation is rampant that if Russia were to start losing any military conflict, they would use tactical nuclear weapons to “escalate to de-escalate” – that is, demonstrate that they are “all in” and the other side had better back down.[ii] The one military capability that Finland and Sweden do not possess that NATO possesses is nuclear weapons.
NATO nuclear weapon capability is primarily provided by the United States, so it is worth asking the United States if they are comfortable assuming nuclear umbrella responsibilities for Finland and Sweden. If “escalate to de-escalate” does not work – that is, if Russia employs tactical nuclear weapons, hoping that NATO backs down, but NATO calls their bluff and uses tactical nuclear weapons as well - then both sides are faced with the potential of escalating to the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Suddenly, not just European territory is at risk, but Washington, DC, and New York City, etc., are at risk as well.
So, lets’ review the entire balance sheet associated with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, from the perspective of the United States:
- Added conventional military capability of Finland and Sweden: good, but not necessary to defend existing European NATO nations, and of no real value in defending the U.S.
- Added risk in adding Sweden: none, really.
- Added risk of adding Finland: low, for years to come, but increasing with time.
- Added risk associated with providing nuclear umbrella: low, but this has always involved being willing to risk major U.S. cities in the defense of European NATO allies. Is adding Sweden – and especially Finland, with its long border with Russia and history of being invaded by them – worth the increased nuclear risk to U.S. cities, low as it may be?
One might also want to ask the European members of NATO if the increased risk of tactical nuclear weapons being employed on their territory is worth the risk to defend two countries that are unlikely to be attacked and could defend themselves if they were. It appears not, however, as all NATO nations[iii], each of whom gets a vote, appear to be rushing to add Finland and Sweden. It is not clear this is in their best interests, especially when, if Finland and/or Sweden are ever attacked by Russia, NATO can always choose to come to their aid, much as they are doing with Ukraine presently, without incurring the risk of having to defend them – potentially with mushroom clouds erupting all over Europe...
Anthony Cowden is the Managing Director of Stari Consulting Services, co-author of Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat, and author of The Naval Institute Almanac of the U.S. Navy.
