The United States Air Force is making a major commitment to the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA, formerly called Loyal Wingman), planning to procure 1,000+. These unmanned aircraft (drones) would be controlled by a combination of artificial intelligence and remotely controlled by airborne fighter pilots. This approach has major potential consequences particularly in the context of decades of low U.S. procurement numbers for manned fighter aircraft and the deployment of no new bombers after 1997. The average age of U.S. Air Force manned fighters is more than 31 years and U.S. Air Force bombers average 48 years. The total number of U.S. Air Force aircraft is the lowest in its 78 year history. The average mission capable rate for U.S. Air Force fighters has declined to 64%.
The issue is not the utility of long-range stealthy drones designed to fight in high intensity warfare. These should have been introduced two decades ago to augment manned fighter aircraft in strike warfare. Unfortunately, they were not procured because of chronic defense underfunding. However, there are potential problems in using CCAs the way the Air Force now plans. The stated mission for the Air Force CCA is “air superiority.” The ability of the CCAs, particularly those inferior to existing stealth manned fighters, to accomplish this mission is uncertain. Air superiority generally requires advanced aircraft. An attempt to do this on the cheap with drones may fail and it may end up costing more than is now contemplated. Thus, the scope of the Air Force’s commitment to the use of drones for the air superiority role is questionable.
The United States has made major investments in strike drones for use in low intensity conflicts. In these conflicts, the drones were controlled by pilots operating on the ground. The drones were low performance and had very long duration in the air. By contrast, high performance drones have been tested but thus far the tested versions lack combat capability.
Lieutenant Colonel Jay A. Stout, (U.S.M.C. ret.), a former fighter pilot who later served as “an unmanned aircraft expert” points out that:
Consider that the loyal wingman must be roughly the same size as a manned aircraft if it is to perform the same missions. This is because it will have to carry enough fuel to reach the same area of operations, as well as the same payload: bombs, missiles, and sensors. And it will need a powerful—and expensive—engine. The robot does not have to carry a human, but it does have to carry all the bits and pieces that make it function without that human. And it must have a unique (read, pricey) communication suite to maintain contact with its flesh-and-blood overlords.
Moreover, it must possess the same performance characteristics as the manned aircraft it supports—that is, it must be able to go as fast, as far, and as high. And if it is going to be useful against China, it must have some degree of survivability or stealth.
In 2025, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) introduced into service the StormShroud, its version of the CCA, called an Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP). Its role is electronic jamming to improve the survivability of the Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35B in the penetration of advanced integrated air defenses.[1] An RAF official was quoted as saying that the role of the ACP in the future could include “…targeting and attack; communications relay; and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.”[2] Notably absent from this list is the role the U.S. Air Force is buying them for – air superiority.
The Air Force is keeping much about its CCAs classified. Based upon what is publicly available, except for the range of the CCAs which is slightly longer than the existing manned fighters, the CCAs lack almost all of the necessary characteristics that Colonel Stout listed. There is no question that they are much smaller than existing U.S. manned aircraft. (Reportedly, the YFQ-44A CCA is half the size of a F-16, the smallest current U.S. fighter.) They are clearly much more stealthy than the pre-stealth F-15 and F-16 fighters but substantially less stealthy than the F-22 and the F-47 both of whose main mission is air superiority. The payload of the CCAs appears to be significantly lower than for the manned aircraft.
Most of the CCAs now being developed around the world are subsonic and some have a very long-range. For example, the U.S. Navy is reported by Combat Aircraft to be considering a variant of MQ 28 Ghost Bat, an Australian drone aircraft. It reported that the AI driven autonomous Ghost Bat currently ranges “as far as 2,000 miles,” is subsonic but highly maneuverable.[3] However, the types of CCAs the Air Force is developing (the YFQ-42A and the YFQ-44A) are designated as fighters and have a combat radius only slightly greater than current manned fighters.
The following data concerning current and projected fighters, including CCAs, have been released in a 2025 infographic by the Air Force:
According to this infographic, the combat radius of the CCAs is somewhat greater than that of the F-15E(X), the F-22 and the F-35A. The F-47 has a significantly longer combat radius of 1,000+ nm. Hence, operating as a controller of CCAs (at least the first generation version) will negate all of the strike radius enhancement of the F-47 absent air-to-air refueling of the drones. A refueled F-47 will have substantially greater range than refueled CCAs. (Air refueling capability is in short supply.) The F-47 will only be able to use its full range if it is not operating CCAs.
The announced range of the YFQ-42A and the YFQ-44A CCAs will be less than the reported range of the F-22 with stealthy external fuel tanks now under development. Reportedly, “Each tank would increase fuel capacity by more than 2,200 liters, extending the range to more than 1,400 kilometers without refueling.” (Emphasis in the original). This translates to about 855 nm compared to 700nm+ for the CCAs. Stealthy external fuel tanks may be added to the F-35 increasing its strike range in a similar fashion. Hence, using the F-22, F-35 and F-47 to control CCAs in air-to-air combat will eliminate most of the value of the increased combat radius these systems would otherwise have unless the drones are range extended by air-to-air refueling and the manned fighters are not. Ground control of the CCAs would facilitate the use of the full combat radius of the stealthy manned fighters. However, it is more relevant to the strike role than the air superiority role.
Moreover, what will happen to the CCAs’ ability to perform their mission if the controlling aircraft is forced to abort its mission or is shot down?
The Air Force has not revealed whether the CCAs are capable of supersonic speed. All of the manned fighter aircraft are. The reported maximum speed for the F-22 is about Mach 2.25 and Mack 1.6 for the F-35. The F-47 has a maximum speed of over Mach 2. Indeed, a 2022 report by John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor of Air and Space Forces Magazine, indicated that the Next Generation Air Dominance Fighter (NGAD, now called the F-47) had an “…upper ceiling of about 65,000 to 70,000 feet and a top speed of about Mach 2.8.” A supersonic capability for the CCAs appears unlikely. There is a report that the YFQ-44 is subsonic (Mach .95) with a 9-g maneuver capability. There are also reports that the YFQ-42 is high subsonic. The F-22 and the F-35 are capable of supercruise – maintaining supersonic speed without the use of a high fuel consuming afterburner that reduces range. Lockheed Martin has said that the F-22 has a supercruise speed of Mach 1.78. It also stated that the F-35, while not technically having supercruise capability, has the ability to fly for 150 miles at Mach 1.2 without afterburner. This will probably somewhat increase when its new engine (the core upgrade) which will reportedly provide a 6%-10% thrust increase becomes operational. It is unlikely that the CCAs will have the advanced adoptive cycle engines since the Air Force did not include them due to cost in its plans to upgrade the F-35, which reflects a decision made in the same time frame the CCA concept was developed.
While the Air Force has not said if the F-47 has a supercruise capability, it almost certainly will have it since is expected to have a much more advanced variable cycle engines not present in the earlier fighters. In addition, it is going to replace the F-22 which has this capability. Hence, if the F-22, the F-35 and the F-47 are controlling CCAs, it is unlikely they can use their supersonic capability and more importantly, their supercruise capability. This may reduce their ability to penetrate the most advanced air defenses and the range of some of the weapons these aircraft carry (e.g., glide bombs and air-to-air missiles).
The Air Force infographic suggests that the CCAs will have about the same level of stealth as the F-35. This is consistent with previous press reporting. It would mean, according to the infographic, that the stealth level is less than that in the F-22 and the F-47. F-35 stealth is reportedly less uniform than that of the F-22. It was intended to be a relatively inexpensive exportable fighter. The F-47 reportedly will also have broad spectrum stealth. Fifth generation fighters lack this capability.
The F-35 is a very stealthy aircraft. F-35 stealth is reportedly significantly better than the Chinese J-20. The radar cross section (presumably against high frequency engagement radars) of the F-35 has been officially described as the size of a golf ball (0.0015 sqm). (Official statements are clearly not designed to allow the exact calculation of the RCS which is being kept secret.) Aviation Week reports that the RCS of the F-35 is -30 dBsm (1.001 square meter). (Another source report .005 square meters.) In addition, Lockheed Martin has said that the stealth levels of the F-35 will be increased in the next 2-3 years. Hence, the first generation CCA stealth levels may be less stealthy than the improved versions of the F-35.
Still, CCAs as stealthy as the current F-35 should be effective against advanced air defenses at least over the next 15 years if the attacks are well planned and executed. Russian 4.5 generation aircraft and the less than 5th generation Su-57 (previously called the Pak FA and the Pak T-50) probably won’t have much of a chance against F-35 level stealth in beyond visual range engagements. However, based on the Air Force’s infographic, CCAs are certain to be significantly more detectable than an F-22 or an F-47 by Chinese 5th generation fighters, improved 5th generation fighters and 6th generation fighters.
The small size of the CCAs in comparison to the manned stealth fighter aircraft should limit the power of the radars they can carry. It is unlikely to be comparable to the radars on the manned aircraft because of the smaller size of the CCA and the limited power their small engines can generate. Hence, the CCAs will likely be more dependent on networking than the manned stealth fighters.
The Air Force has been silent on the weapons load the CCAs can carry. Their small size clearly indicates that they will be limited compared to the stealthy manned fighter aircraft. Colonel Mark Gunzinger (USAF ret.), Major General Lawrence A. Stutzriem, (USAF ret.) and military journalist Bill Sweetman have written that a wargame conducted by the Mitchell Institute assumed a notional weapons load for the CCA of “…two air-to-air weapons or four 250-pound class Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs).” (Emphasis added). In light of the quality of the work produced at the Mitchell Institute, this assumption should be taken seriously as an approximation of the likely capability of the CCA. There are other sources that say that the CCAs can carry two AIM-120 medium-range air-to-air missiles. If this is an accurate assessment, they can carry substantially fewer weapons than the manned aircraft. On a ground attack mission, the CCAs will not have any air-to-air self-defense capability. Hence, they will be more vulnerable to intercept than the stealth fighters. Flying a counter air mission they will carry only a fraction of the air-to-air weapons of the manned stealth fighters.
Because of the small size of the CCAs, they are not likely to carry a gun and even less likely to mount a future laser weapon. If they are limited to two AIM-120s, they are hardly a “missile truck.” If the CCAs do not have a gun or short-range missiles, they would have little ability to dogfight.
Both the F-35 and the F-22 can carry eight small diameter bombs while carrying two air-to-air missiles internally in the F-35 and four in the F-22. In the counter air mission, the F-35 and the F-22 can carry four and eight air-to-air missiles respectively. This is two and four times as many air-to-air missiles as the CCAs. Thus, it would take four CCAs to match the air-to-air missile load capability of a single F-22. The Technical Refresh 3 version of the F-35 has been modified to carry six air-to-air missiles internally.[4] This version of the F-35 should be certified as combat ready relatively soon. Thus, it would take three CCAs to match a single improved F-35 in its missile inventory, largely negating the supposed cost advantage of CCAs. At this point, it is not known what the F-47 will carry but it is unlikely to be less than an F-22.
The Small Diameter Bomb the CCAs reportedly will carry is a good glide bomb. It has been used by Ukraine in both air and ground-launched versions. The second version, called the Storm Breaker, has much improved sensor capability. It reportedly has a standoff range of 40 nm, a warhead ranging from 37 to 206 pounds and can penetrate three feet of concrete. However, much larger and more powerful bombs are frequently used in combat. If the CCAs can carry four Small Diameter Bombs, they probably can carry two 500 pound bombs and one 1,000 pound bomb. The design of these bombs might have to be modified to fit into the bomb bay of a CCA. No one knows. One thing is clear. Because of the CCAs’ small size, they cannot possibly carry the same weapons load as the stealth fighters or the diversity of weapons types that can be carried internally in an F-35 which in the F-35 Block 4 will be increasing.
The importance of drones has been well established in the Ukraine war and in other conflicts. The CCAs as stealthy as an F-35 will clearly have the potential to execute effective missions against fixed targets in a high intensity conflict. This mission does not require any change in CCA weapons use authority. Launching this type of an attack is similar to launching a cruise missile. CCAs can function as reusable cruise missiles which do not put pilot lives at risk. However, their ability to engage mobile ground targets and engage in air-to-air conflict in a high communications electronic counter measures (ECM) environment is more problematical if they are not give autonomous weapons use authority. (The Chinese are very good at these types of counter-measures and cyber-attack.) So is the CCAs’ capability to perform the air superiority role in a high ECM environment. There is uncertainty concerning the degree of weapons use autonomy the CCAs will have or should have.
The limited air-to-air missile internal carriage in the CCAs restricts their utility in the counter air mission. Two or three of them would be necessary to match the number of weapons that can be carried by a single manned fighter.
Controlling multiple CCAs in a high threat combat environment is not easy. There is no combat experience in doing this. The F-22, the F-35 and reportedly the F-47 are single seat systems. The only two seat Air Force fighter, the F-15EX, is not a credible CCA controller because of its limited survivability against high intensity threats. Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has stated that a manned fighter may be able to control 3-5 CCAs. This may be optimistic. Another source says the Air Force is assuming two. These estimates need to be tested in an intense electronic counter measures environment and against strong adversary threat levels.
In January 2025, then-Secretary of the Air Force, Frank Kendall indicated the goal for the cost of the first version (Increment 1) of the CCA is one-quarter to one-third of an F-35 (roughly $20-30 million for the CCA). Keep in mind that this is a “goal” not a contract price. The reported estimated cost of the Increment 2 CCA is 20% to 30% more than Increment 1. At this point, there is uncertainty about what the cost of the production version is going to be. The CCAs could end up being more expensive than manned aircraft particularly in terms of the number of air-to-air missiles they can carry.
Using the Mitchell Institute weapons loads for the CCA, and assuming the cost matches former Secretary Kendall’s goal, they will provide little or no increase in deliverable weapons numbers for the same number of dollars compared to the procurement of additional F-35s. If the CCAs suffer cost overruns, the number of weapons might even be less.
Secretary Kendall indicated that the Increment 2 CCAs would “‘definitely’ not be ‘exquisite’ platforms. In this context, exquisite would refer to much higher-end (and expensive) drone designs, such as stealthy, highly advanced, heavier payload, flying wing uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAV).” Reportedly, “Lockheed Martin’s losing entry in the first increment of the U.S. Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone program was a very stealthy design….”
The use of high end stealth fighters in controlling CCAs has been compared to the role of a quarterback. This analogy may be flawed. Few NFL quarterbacks can outperform the rest of the team in every position. Normally, inferior NFL players are not hired simply because they cost less to the team since the aim is winning games.
Controlling CCAs may not be the best use of the F-47s or the F-22s. Even the F-35 which is much closer in stealth level to the CCAs than the others appears to have capabilities that are well in excess of a CCA. Moreover, F-35 capabilities will considerably increase in the Block 4 and Block 5 variants.
Certainly, the value of eliminating the risk to the lives of our pilots by substituting unmanned aircraft is priceless. The CCAs can be used on missions that are more risky than acceptable for manned aircraft. This is one of the most important reasons for introducing unmanned systems in high intensity warfare. However, as Colonel Stout has pointed out, simply removing the pilot from the cockpit does not remove from risk to the large number of personnel that must be forward deployed to operate the CCAs.
Early in the Biden Administration, Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown floated the idea of “…a ‘clean sheet design’ for a new ‘four-and-a-half-gen or fifth-gen-minus’ fighter to replace the F-16.” The limitations of 4.5 generation fighters are on display in the war in Ukraine. In air-to-air and air-to-ground combat they mainly use standoff weapons. Neither side has achieved air superiority. Yet, this bad idea seems to have evolved into the CCA. Individually, the CCAs appear to be inferior to the F-35 in almost every aspect. The idea behind them is providing “affordable mass.” It represents a flawed effort to defeat China on the cheap.
Certainly, the CCAs will provide more platforms. There is an advantage to mass. However, an F-35 controlling three CCAs will probably be unable to command more weapons than two F-35s available in the same time frame. The individual capability of the CCAs to penetrate advanced air defenses will likely be less than for the F-35s.
The YFQ-42A and the YFQ-44A lack the range to operate fully with the F-47 or even the upgraded F-22 and F-35 with stealthy external fuel tanks and will carry substantially smaller weapons loads. It appears that some important weapons that are carried internally by the F-35 probably cannot be carried internally by the CCAs. The heaviest of the existing precision weapons probably cannot be carried by the CCAs. Overall, the F-35 may be the best platform to manage the CCAs in air-to-air combat because this would allow the more capable F-22 and F-47 to execute the air superiority mission with their full capability. Against fixed targets, the CCAs should be able to operate autonomously. Except for the fact that the CCAs are two way, these missions are little different from a cruise missile attack.
Increment 1 CCAs are “…focused on air-to-air combat…” This may be the wrong primary mission. They would probably be better for engaging ground targets. Large scale CCA employment in air-to-air mode may increase uncertainties about overall Air Force effectiveness in the air superiority role. Advanced communications jamming may be their Achilles heel with regard to attacking mobile targets and in counter air missions.
A low end 5th generation-like CCA may be inadequate to deal with the new Chinese 6th generation fighters even if they turn out to be more like 5th generation plus in their capabilities. In addition, the CCA will have to penetrate the improved surface-to-air missiles that are inevitable. Against these systems, high stealth and speed are important. Against North Korea and Iran, the CCAs appear adequate against adversary fighters and surface-to-air missiles. Russia represents a much more serious threat. The CCAs may be adequate to deal with Russia although manned aircraft are probably better. Depending on CCAs to deter or defeat China is risky.
It would be useful to preserve the option of controlling the CCAs from the ground and assuring that even the first version will have a ground-attack capability. The utility of drones in the ground strike role has been proven in combat. The United States has extensive experience in operating unmanned vehicles in this fashion in low intensity conflict. There is no operational experience for single seat fighters controlling multiple drones in a high threat air-to-air combat environment. If the United States builds 1,000+ CCAs, negating their effectiveness will certainly be a primary objective of our adversaries. While the CCAs will certainly be given jam resistant communications, there are always surprises in combat. While this also impacts the manned stealth aircraft, they appear to have much higher levels of autonomous capability even ignoring the problem of weapons use authority for the CCAs.
The initial deployment of 100-150 CCAs appears to be supportable but they should not be seen as a substitute for adequate numbers of manned aircraft. Reducing F-35 procurement in the FY2026 defense budget is not a good idea. Before the United States makes a commitment of 1,000+ CCAs, they need to be extensively tested against advanced electronic counter measures and simulated high adversary threat environments particularly in air-to-air combat.
Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr. Schneider previously served in DoD as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.
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