Strategy Needs a Comeback

The Lesson-Learned from Ukraine

As the war in Ukraine moves towards a potential negotiated settlement, the next step for military and policy leaders is to catalogue “lessons learned,” with an eye towards competition with China. There is already no shortage of published “lessons learned” from the conflict, and they are predictable: drones are the future, the battlefield is transparent, and the grey zone is where conflict is won or lost. Missing from the discussion is the most important and overlooked lesson learned for the United States (“U.S.”) after being caught surprised by Russia’s unprovoked invasion: strategy needs a comeback. Indeed, the shortcomings of prior U.S. strategy in Ukraine must be utilized as a charrette to engage in better competition with China.

It is too soon to judge President Trump’s efforts towards peace in Ukraine (indeed, the terms are presently being negotiated). But for the prior administration, the war in Ukraine laid bare U.S. strategic shortcomings and offers invaluable lessons for the next conflict. As the U.S. drafts a new National Security Strategy and plots the best course of action towards China in the Indo-Pacific, Ukraine serves as an invaluable strategy exercise. For U.S. strategists, the Ukraine conflict demonstrates three vital needs: 1) the need to understand strategy as distinct from political aims; 2) an appreciation of how human nature drives conflict; and 3) a better understanding of an opponent’s center of gravity. Each of these lessons from Ukraine are fundamentals of strategy. But in a world of liberal democratic theory, it is easy to lose sight of essential strategy truisms.     

Broadly, scholars see strategy as an “intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy . . .”,[i] “creating asymmetric advantages that can be exploited to help achieve one’s ultimate objectives despite resource and other constraints,”[ii] and a “presidential formulation of an overarching statement of national purpose . . .”[iii]  In other words: it’s the big plan which orchestrates government efforts towards the national interest.  The U.S. always struggled with strategy. U.S. leaders often utilize an “ad hoc” approach, best represented by President Clinton rejecting strategy as even a constructive concept.[iv]  Combine this with the West’s inherent technology bias, and strategic art seems antiquated. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “end of history” narrative inflicted further damage on the practice of strategy. The narrative stoked overconfidence in the irreversible rise of the West and its values, while underestimating the inherent dangers and fragility of our world. This confluence of factors led to an atrophy in the practice of strategy.

Lesson-Learned 1: Strategy Is Distinct from Political Aims

The initial lesson-learned is also the most essential building block: have a strategy. American leaders often offer platitudes of political ends, typically based on democratic peace theory (“free and open,” “democratic,” “peaceful”), which masquerade as strategy. Such objectives may be laudable goals, but in no way describe an alignment of ends, ways, and means. Indeed, the initial Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed a dearth of U.S. strategy as leadership vacillated between strategic extremes.

Initially assuming Ukraine would fall quickly, the U.S. administration offered President Zelensky a flight out of the country.[v]  Not long afterwards, President Biden aimed for his reelection to run through Kiev, cutting ads highlighting his clandestine visit.[vi]  And in between was strategic confusion. As U.S. forces in Europe sought mission guidance, it was clear events were driving approach. A vignette from the author’s own experience was receiving guidance from the chain of command stating national leaders had no appetite for the training of Ukrainian forces. Days later, as Ukrainian forces continued their successful defense, President Biden appeared on live television and stated the U.S. would train Ukrainians. In short, the only discernible strategy was to avoid association with a losing cause and to bandwagon success.

Eventually, U.S. leaders sought to articulate something resembling strategy (such as GEN Milley’s “four nos”) but still lacked “a clear vision or end state.”[vii]  The lack of strategy resulted in a middling approach which could be analogized to keeping a patient perpetually in critical condition vice performing life-saving surgery or allowing them to pass.  The U.S. moved very slowly to provide advanced weaponry to Ukraine, then imposed restrictions, before slowly easing restrictions over time.[viii]  Through it all, the war was treated as a “crisis to be managed,” not a conflict with clear objectives.[ix]

The seemingly obvious need for strategy cannot be overlooked. Strategy giants of history dwelled on the formulation of strategy because it runs counter to human nature’s aversion to rigorous and analytical thinking. Sun Tzu wrote: “The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all!". Such advise runs counter to the American “wait and see” tradition.

Applying this lesson-learned to China, the geography of the Indo-Pacific requires an emphasis on a well-defined strategy before conflict erupts. Due to the massive land borders in Eastern Europe, the U.S. could afford to vacillate on strategy. U.S. Special Forces could exit the country and later reenter if hypothetically directed. Logistical support to Ukraine could be stopped and started at will. Ukrainian forces could slip out the back door and train in friendly border nations before easily returning to the fight.

The Indo-Pacific offers a starkly different environment. Direct or indirect support to Taiwan would require overt U.S. and allied commitments which do not allow the luxury of a wait-and-see approach. Given the size of Taiwan, the conventional conflict may be more focused and intense. Alone and likely blockaded, Taiwanese forces will “sink or swim” without the benefit of clandestine logistics or ongoing Western training. There will be no non-attributive middle road. Instead, U.S. political leadership will face the choice of whether to cross the Rubicon. Whatever path is chosen, it better have a strategy.

Lesson-Learned 2: Human Nature and History Will Drive Conflict  

The American mind struggles to grasp deep-seeded historical grievances against neighbors. Sitting securely behind two vast oceans as a superpower, American citizens cannot appreciate the national trauma of territorial land loss from internecine struggle. Understanding geopolitical context from alternate human perspectives, including the fear and desire for prestige which drives an adversary, is crucial for the U.S. formulation of an effective strategy. A clearer understanding of how Russia understands Ukraine would have allowed the U.S. to observe clear predictors and to have crafted an effective strategy. This lesson-learned is invaluable as policymakers consider the way forward with China and Taiwan.

For Putin, the unattributed but apocryphal statement “Russia cannot exist without Ukraine” is a helpful summary of the Russian perspective. Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are a “triune” people in the eyes of Putin.[x]  While Putin’s version of history is clearly self-serving and illegitimate (compatriot leaders do not bomb their own countrymen), it would be a grave mistake to discount the visceral emotional value Russia places on Ukraine. Viewing it as the birthplace of both their imperial nation and religion, Putin’s obsession with Ukraine should not be surprising.

Thus, while Western observers were surprised by Putin’s willingness to sustain high levels of casualties to continue prosecution of the war in Ukraine,[xi] strategists should in fact have been surprised aggression did not occur sooner. Thucydides, the so-called “father of strategy,” told us “fear, honor, and interests” perpetually drive war and lead nations into conflicts for which they are unready.[xii]  Famed strategists share Thucydides pessimism towards human nature, including Carl von Clausewitz, the “Father of Modern Military Strategy,” who understood war as part of a trinity which includes “primordial violence, hatred, enmity, which are to be regarded as blind natural force . . .”[xiii]  Messy histories don’t fit neatly into Westphalian borders.     

Such a fundamental insight informs effective strategy. Applying the lesson-learned to China, U.S. strategists should not be surprised if China displays erratic and borderline irrational behavior towards Taiwan. Indeed, the China-Taiwan relationship bears significant resemblance to Russia-Ukraine. Both conflict zones are driven by intransigent opposing viewpoints on historical identities and regime legitimacy. For China, Taiwan falls within its perceived historic borders – a territory it believes to be crying out for reunification with the motherland.[xiv]  China’s historical grievance with Taiwan morphs the issue into so much more than mere control of an island with microchips. The issue becomes one of “national pride and so deeply embedded in the psyche of the PRC that the CCP has left itself almost no room to fail.[xv]

Thus, for both China and Russia, the very existence of their neighbor is a threat. While such thinking is largely alien to the American mind, understanding its reality drives effective strategy. Comprehending the fear and honor driving an authoritarian regime toward “reunification” gives U.S. planners leverage. Rather than be surprised by naked aggression based on historic grievances, U.S. strategists can be well prepared. Such planning does not legitimize the unlawful actions of a blood-thirsty authoritarian. But to plan effectively the Western mind must understand alternate perspectives rather than engage in bromides about freedom and democracy. With Taiwan, like a Jiu-Jitsu player who neutralizes an opponent’s strength by anticipating and harnessing their energy, U.S. strategists should proceed clear-eyed about Chinese motivation and resolve. After all, the easiest strategic move to counter is the one easily predicted.

Lesson-Learned 3: Locate and Exploit Your Adversary’s Center of Gravity

After three-and-a-half years of crippling sanctions, the Russian authoritarian regime looks… stronger than ever. Western observers are surprised by the resiliency of Putin in the face of seemingly insurmountable economic pressure. Such surprise belies a misunderstanding of Russian pressure points and yet another failure in the West’s past strategic approach. Many regimes can survive, and even thrive, beneath economic isolation inflicted from and adversary. The U.S. continues to pull the economic lever, believing it will eventually yield the desired result. And one day, after enough pain, it may. However, a more prudent approach would have been to truly understand the center of gravity of Russian power and have tailored a more effective approach.

Carl Von Clausewitz coined the term “center of gravity” and strategists have rightly been enthralled with the notion ever since. The opponent’s center of gravity is “the hub of all power… on which everything depends.”[xvi]  Theorists from John Warden to Dale Eikmeier provided frameworks to determine and target an opponent’s true source of strength. While significant debate exists over how to identify the enemy’s center of gravity, the concept remains invaluable. And clearly, such analyses were not well-developed in the case of Putin’s Russia. Assuming the will of the regime and support of the Russian people would crumble under economic inflation and recession, economic sanctions were treated as the weapon-of-choice. It appears nobody in the room asked the question whether a culture which self-admits historical comfort with isolationism would respond as desired to economic sanctions.[xvii] 

Indeed, Western observers were surprised to observe the greatest threat to Putin emerged from the mercenary Wagner Group. The Russian Achilles Heel was not the SWIFT banking system, but weak political structures within the government. While private military groups were “taboo” in the post-Soviet era due to systemic government vulnerabilities, Putin nevertheless embraced Wagner for the sake of expediency and thus spawned a point of incredible vulnerability at the center of his war effort.[xviii]  Understanding Putin’s need to expediently expand influence through a mercenary group would have allowed U.S. strategists an opening to jeopardize his center of gravity and resolve the conflict.   

U.S. strategists cannot be faulted for lacking an understanding of Putin’s center of gravity. A decade earlier, Presidential candidate Mitt Romney was ridiculed for referring to Russia as the U.S.’s “biggest geopolitical threat.”  While America’s ruling class believed democracy would inexorably march around the world (perhaps Russia would join NATO!), the Russian threat became a blind spot for policymakers.

This fundamental failure leads to the third lesson learned for the pacing challenge of China: the U.S. must work to gain an understanding of adversaries’ centers of gravity. During the Cold War, the U.S. invested incredible resources in “Sovietologists,” who specialized in understanding Russia.[xix]  Such investment allowed the U.S. to better comprehend Russian attitudes and interests, allowing clear-eyed and effective policy. Similarly, today America needs a phalanx of Sinologists. Understanding China is to understand a proud history, distinctive political system, and unique people who defy stereotypes. Without an understanding of China’s centers of gravity, the U.S. might again find itself careening towards danger.

Conclusion

Fortunately, the failures of U.S. strategy in Ukraine did not result in catastrophe due to Russia’s own lack of meaningful planning. Isolated during COVID, Putin deluded himself into believing Russian forces would be met as liberators. With laughably short-sighted war plans, Putin marched the Russian military into a buzzsaw of Ukrainian resistance. The war in Ukraine became what corporate America might term a “race to the bottom” among the great powers – deteriorating and unsustainable practices among competitors resulting from insufficient strategy. But such a result is far better than a resurgent Putin seizing Kiev with a land bridge to Moldova.

The U.S. may not be so lucky next time as to watch a failed invasion unfold in front of an aghast world, allowing for strategic ambivalence. The next conflict will certainly be defined by drone warfare, AI, and grey zone conflict. But without a larger construct weaving together ends, ways, and means towards an ultimate objective, the best-case scenario is a Ukraine-style deadlock. Hopefully, strategy makes a comeback.

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Lt Col Reid is a student at National War College. He was the Staff Judge Advocate for Special Operations Command Europe during the first year-and-a-half of the Ukraine conflict. The views offered herein are those of the author and do not constitute any endorsement by of the United State Air Force or the Department of Defense.

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