Been There, Done That: Lessons From Past Interventions

President Trump’s shifting statements on Venezuela - alternating between suggestions of prolonged U.S. involvement and signals of a rapid exit - underscore a familiar dilemma in American statecraft. Whether Washington ultimately stays, leaves quickly, or attempts something in between, the United States once again faces the enduring challenge of how military pressure, political authority, and economic stabilization intersect in moments of intervention.

If the objective is lasting strategic success, one that improves outcomes for Venezuela while advancing U.S. national security interests, the administration should consider some lessons from American history. Since the Mexican–American War, the United States has undertaken more than 17 major military interventions overseas. While history does not repeat itself, it often rhymes, and many hard-earned lessons have faded from public memory.

Across these cases, durable outcomes and a “proper transition” has tended to rest on several recurring elements.

In Iraq, the consequences of neglecting this reality were stark. “Order No. 2” disbanded the Iraqi military and security services, creating a vacuum quickly filled by criminal networks, insurgents, and Iranian-backed militias. As one officer put it at the time, the decision created “450,000 enemies on the ground.” Security failures also underscored another recurring lesson: stabilization must be nationwide. Control of the capital alone is insufficient, especially in a country as large and fragmented as Venezuela.

Second, closely related to basic security is the question of what a politically legitimate new government would look like – or, at the very least, how it would come into being. In every American intervention, questions of “what comes next” have been paramount. As World War I unfolded, the reconstruction of Germany was a constant concern. During World War II, the political reconstitution of governments - which included managing elections and more - in Germany, Italy, South Korea, and Japan proved central to long-term strategic success.  The current U.S. intervention in Venezuela is obviously not comparable to the world wars. It is far more analogous to the Cold War and post–Cold War interventions in Latin America, where the challenge was the reconstitution of fallen or failing governments.

The bottom line is this: sustained attention to the formation of a legitimate new government is essential. Absent such focus, one set of cronies is likely to be replaced by another.

Third, U.S. interventions have consistently required setting the conditions for jump-starting the affected economy. In Venezuela, plans to stabilize and rebuild the economy must be developed and communicated rapidly, with credible expert involvement from the outset. Some level of humanitarian assistance will almost certainly be necessary – not only to meet immediate needs, but to establish early connections with civilians and signal American goodwill. At the same time, secure conditions must be established to reduce the risk of infrastructure sabotage and capital flight.

The overriding objective should be to prevent economic collapse and to generate a virtuous political-economic cycle in which improving economic conditions reinforce political legitimacy. In this respect, Venezuela may possess an important advantage relative to many historical cases of post-conflict reconstruction. Unlike Germany, Japan, or Italy after World War II, Venezuela has not been physically destroyed. Instead, its economy has been hollowed out by years of mismanagement under a socialist dictatorship. As recently as the turn of the century, Venezuela was among the wealthiest countries in Latin America, suggesting that recovery, while difficult, is not starting from zero.

Fourth, we need to consider unity of command in the theater. A sprawling, uncoordinated “interagency process” in which agencies talk past one another, fail to share information, and neglect to integrate expertise is a recipe for failure. This does not mean that diverse expertise is unnecessary; on the contrary, it’s essential. But that expertise must be integrated through a coherent structure that brings together economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities without fragmenting authority or diffusing responsibility. Historically, where unity of command has been absent, it has been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to track progress or address persistent problems.

The current intervention in Venezuela is neither America’s first nor likely to be its last. Americans are optimists by nature, but optimism cannot substitute for planning or organizing toward better outcomes. Military interventions do not naturally evolve into successful political transitions. We should avoid a repeat of Libya (also oil-rich), where Hillary Clinton infamously remarked, “We came, we saw, he died.”

The intervention in Venezuela should not become a never-ending war, nor should it involve imposing an American political model or open-ended state-building. But the first step toward a more favorable outcome – a prosperous country that neither fuels the drug trade nor drives mass migration to the United States – is to reject the notion that the past has no relevance to the present.

As the late strategist Fred Ikle noted, there has always been an intellectual difficulty in connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose. We must now think seriously about the political, diplomatic, and technical support required to facilitate a stable transition and avoid predictable failures.

Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy. Her book, War and the Art of Governance, examined 15 historical cases of US Army military interventions and the political outcomes that followed.