Beijing's New Approach to Taiwan

Beijing is shifting its approach to Taiwan. Over the course of 2025, it has intensified legal and cognitive pressure toward its small democratic neighbor, advanced a strategy of political warfare, and adapted its military posture. Several factors have informed this shift. Personnel changes within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have played a role. Political developments within Taiwan also likely contributed. And behind all these considerations are the position of the United States under the new administration of President Donald Trump. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has often pointed out, U.S.-PRC relations are “one of the most important bilateral relations in the world” (世界上最重要的双边关系之一) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2024).

This is the first time PRC authorities have opened a criminal investigation into a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker. But it is not the first time that the PRC has sought to use lawfare to harass Puma Shen or his family. In October 2024, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) added Puma Shen to a list of “diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ activists,” according to the announcement. In March 2025, the TAO relaunched a webpage (originally introduced the preceding year) for reporting “malicious acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and accomplices persecuting fellow Taiwanese” (‘台独’打手、帮凶迫害台湾同胞恶劣行) (TAO, August 2, 2024). And in June, the office unveiled sanctions against a company owned by Shen’s father (TAO, June 5). This latter measure is part of Beijing’s long history of using intimidation and coercive techniques against the family members of its critics in an attempt to silence them (The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2018; Council on Foreign Relations, November 23, 2021; Human Rights Watch, May 4; Amnesty International, accessed October 31).

PRC authorities have used law enforcement to pursue additional targets this year. In June, a separate Public Security Bureau, this time in Guangzhou, offered a reward of renminbi (RMB) 10,000 ($1,400) for information leading to the apprehension of 20 retired and active personnel in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). This was the first known instance of PRC public security authorities targeting Taiwanese military personnel via law enforcement framework (China Brief, July 25).

The legal basis for the bureau’s investigation into Puma Shen include provisions of the PRC’s Criminal Law (刑法) and the Opinions on Punishing Diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ Activists for Crimes of Secession and Inciting Secession (关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见) (China Law Translate, June 21, 2024). The latter opinions were drafted collectively by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice and released in mid-2024. Laws invoked in other cases include the Cybersecurity Law (网络安全法), the Counter-Espionage Law (反间谍法), and the Anti-Secession Law (反分裂国家法). The PRC has little ability currently to enforce its laws extraterritorially in Taiwan. But as with other legal instruments drafted to apply beyond the PRC’s borders, these opinions have symbolic force and psychological weight. And while they may have little effect on dampening Puma Shen’s individual efforts to enhance Taiwan’s resilience, they may well affect the considerations of others who might wish to speak out against Beijing.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) now fears that the next step Beijing could take is to leverage Interpol and issue an arrest warrant for Puma Shen (CNA, October 30). This would not be unprecedented. The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security has issued a number of “red notices” in recent years, not against criminals, but against critics of its regime (Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2017; Safeguard Defenders, October 23, 2024; Red Notice Monitor, February 24; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, April 25).

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also appears to have changed its approach in recent months. In 2024, the percentage of aerial sorties by the PLA Air Force that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait was not markedly higher than the previous year. The same was true for the frequency of peak incursion periods. Analysts have argued that this plateauing could indicate that the operational capacity of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command Air Force had reached its limits (China Brief, January 17). PLA activity so far in 2025 has not provided dispositive evidence of this thesis. Instead, there has been a notable slowdown in recent PLA air and maritime activities around Taiwan, according to Ma Cheng-kun, director of the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). [2] Not only have the scale and frequency of activity around the Taiwan Strait decelerated, but August—a typical peak time for drills and exercises—was relatively quiet this year.

One potential reason for this change relates to personnel changes. In March, Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong (何卫东) disappeared (his expulsion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was confirmed on October 17) (China Brief, October 17). He had been responsible for planning and executing the PLA’s exercises encircling Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to in August 2022, after which he was promoted to CMC vice chair. Following his promotion, He oversaw the military’s Political Work Department, which emerged as a key driver of the PLA’s gray-zone operations. But his tenure also coincided with heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the election in Taiwan of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president for a third consecutive term, and worsening relations with the United States, including over Taiwan. He’s downfall may not be a direct result of his handling of PLA activities toward Taiwan, but Xi Jinping may not have appreciated heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait and a lack of success in intimidating Taiwan’s public.

Since He’s disappearance, the CMC’s other vice chair, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), likely has had more influence over the PLA’s approach to Taiwan. Ma Cheng-kun argues that Zhang is more pragmatic than He, and sees buying time to build capabilities as a priority, instead of escalating tensions through persistent gray-zone operations. New capabilities have been detected in recent months, which lends credence to this argument. Some have been deployed for testing and others used for training. These include a Type 072 tank landing ship, pontoon-style landing barges, a Chinese-flagged tug boat circumnavigating Taiwan, and large roll-on/roll-off cargo ships repositioned to Fujian Province, across the strait from Taiwan.

If military gray-zone operations have reduced in salience in recent months, the same cannot be said for the PRC’s approach in the social media and discourse domains. Influence efforts on social media stepped up on October 18, when the Taiwan Affairs Office launched a Facebook page. Across its first two weeks, the TAO has been active, posting multiple times daily; though most of the comments and reactions under its posts suggest that it will not succeed in winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese (Facebook/TAOspokesperson, accessed October 23). [3] The office has also doubled the frequency of its press conferences and appointed a new spokesperson, Peng Qing’en (彭庆恩), who has been working on Taiwan issues since 1995 (CNA, October 29). In traditional media, the TAO also published a trilogy of articles with Xinhua under the pseudonym Zhong Taiwen (钟台文) to coincide with “Taiwan Retrocession Day” (Xinhua, October 26, October 27, October 28). These changes within the TAO could signal a desire to emphasize the material benefits of warmer cross-strait ties. For instance, Peng, the new spokesperson, remains head of the office’s economic bureau. One of the Xinhua articles, meanwhile, highlighted the positive economic returns that national unification would bring.

These supposed carrots are also coupled with rhetorical sticks. A PRC television drama about Taiwan has recently popularized the phrase “Taiwan’s inevitable return” (台湾必归) (Xinhua, October 24). The phrase has been around for a number of years. Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) used it at a press conference in 2022. And CCTV unveiled a poster featuring the phrase in mid-2024. But its use in the show “Silent Honor” (沉默的荣耀) has driven its promotion, to the extent that it has now been used by an official at the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Its mention came at a press conference hosted by the Office for International Military Coordination (OIMC; 国际军事合作办公室). The OIMC is in part responsible for foreign intelligence and information operations and is directly subordinate of the CMC. [4] The office spokesperson used a question about the TV show to state that “Taiwan’s inevitable return is an unstoppable force. The unfinished cause of our martyrs shall be fulfilled” (台湾必归，势不可挡，先烈们未竟的事业必将完成). He also argued that President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) was positioning himself “on the opposite side of history” (到历史的对立面) and would “inevitably be buried by the tide of history and face the most severe judgment of justice” (必将被历史潮流埋葬，受到正义最严厉的审判) (MND, October 30).

The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (台湾的每条街道都清晰可见). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, the PLA’s military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中国的卫星看看中国台湾的大好河山很正常) (MND, October 30).

Taiwan’s domestic politics has also provided fertile ground for advancing influence. October saw a former spokeswoman for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), Ma Chih-wei (馬治薇), handed a two-year sentence for taking CCP money to run as a legislator in 2024 and providing information to her CCP handlers, including a list of contacts for central government agencies and business cards for personnel involved in national security (UDN, October 16). But perhaps the most significant change this year is the KMT’s recent election of a new party chair.

The arrival of Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) as chairwoman of the KMT could herald a new approach for the CCP. Cheng, who identifies as Chinese (“我是中國人”), received a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping, to which she responded in kind. According to Xinhua, in her letter she called for “opening up a grand future for national rejuvenation (为民族复兴开辟宏伟前程) (China Brief, October 4; Xinhua, October 19). To provide a sense of Cheng’s politics, she used her first interview with international media to double down on her stance that Russia is a democracy and Putin a “democratically elected” (民主選舉產生的) leader (DW, October 30). Her first appointments also indicate her desire to engage with the CCP. At an October 28 meeting with the TAO’s director Song Tao (宋濤), her new vice chair Hsiao Hsu-chen (蕭旭岑) echoed the language from her letter to Xi and criticized Taiwan’s administration. Song responded by saying that they were “Standing at a new starting point” (站在新的起点上).

Cheng is content to call for unification, but her statements to date suggest that she believes unification can be achieved on terms other than those dictated by Beijing. This is not what the CCP means when it talks of unification. As laid out in a recent op-ed by the PRC’s consul in Denpasar, Indonesia, reunification means “fully sharing the dignity and honor of the People’s Republic of China on the international stage” (将来海峡两岸实现统一后，海内外台湾同胞将更能够与全国各族人民一道，充分共享中华人民共和国在国际上的尊严与荣誉) (PRC Consulate in Denpasar, Indonesia , October 25). The Republic of China is not mentioned.

Across legal, military, social, and political dimensions, Beijing has engineered a shift in its approach to Taiwan. It is difficult to gauge what level of coordination exists between the PLA/CMC, the TAO, the MPS, and other relevant parts of the system on a unified strategy. But in each of these areas—with the possible exception of military gray-zone activity (though not overall PLA pressure)—the ratchet has tightened. Whether this constitutes a “new starting point,” in TAO director Song Tao’s words, remains to be borne out. For now Beijing is making its intentions clear, seeing no reason to stop forging ahead in its pursuit of unification.

Arran Hope is the Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation. He was previously a reporter for The China Project, and holds degrees in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge and Columbia University.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

Notes:

[1] Puma Shen has previously written for China Brief (China Brief, February 16, 2024).

[2] The information in this section comes from a paper that Ma Cheng-kun titled “China’s Military Posture Toward Taiwan” delivered at the International Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in 2025: Implications for China and Cross-Strait Relations. The conference, hosted by the MAC, was held in Taipei on October 21, 2025.

[3] Most comments either troll the TAO or contain pro-Taiwan content. And on the account’s first post, by far the largest proportion of engagements were “angry” reactions.

[4] Miller, Frank, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025. p.85.

[5] The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (台湾的每条街道都清晰可见). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中国的卫星看看中国台湾的大好河山很正常).