China and New Start: Reading the Strategic Situation

The expiration of the New START Treaty is looming. This arms treaty limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers. It’s one of a long list of arms treaties designed to prevent an arms race and without renewal, it will expire in February 2021. The sticking point to renewal is that the Trump administration wants China to also be subject to the Treaty. China has so far refused to enter into these negotiations. To understand China's position, let’s examine what influences may impact their strategic nuclear considerations.

According to Dr. Vipin Narang, China's nuclear posture appears to have always been an assured retaliation posture. Narang mounts a solid argument and explanation for this with his 'Posture Optimisation Theory'. He argues that China’s relatively small nuclear force, geared towards counter-value targets (population centers) and soft counter-force targets (non-hardened warfighting capability) in addition to its declared 'no first use' policy add weight to China's nuclear forces being utilized solely for deterring a nuclear attack or deterring nuclear coercion through assured retaliation. The pre-requisites for an assured retaliation posture are a survivable second-strike capability and the ability to penetrate enemy defenses. Improved U.S. surveillance, modernization of nuclear structure, and enhanced cyber-capabilities coupled with advances in missile defenses may degrade China's ability to assure retaliation. China may be anxious that the U.S. could have or develop the capability to execute an effective first strike and intercept any remaining ICBMs that survived the strike, making its small nuclear force impotent. The requirement to ensure that its nuclear forces are still able to deal a blow to the enemy after suffering a nuclear strike, in the face of advances in technology, provides effective reasoning for why China may not be content with limitations.   

Now we move to China’s present geopolitical situation. Through its aggressive and assertive actions, China has managed to surround itself with potential adversaries should a global conflict arise. If there was a global war, China might find itself fighting on many fronts with little to no allies.

In light of recent events, India is the first country that springs to mind. China and India have been embroiled in a border dispute in the Himalayas for decades. Recently this again turned deadly with troops facing off in the inhospitable conditions. India poses a tangible threat to China. It has the second largest population in the world, it’s the largest democracy and holds annual naval exercises with the US, India is a nuclear weapons power and has deployed the Agni-III Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) capable of striking Beijing. India has also recently received its first delivery of five Rafale nuclear-capable aircraft from France with a further 31 pending. While China’s military is larger than India’s, it must enter Xi Jingping’s calculus as a risk to his Western borders. India is also a valuable customer to Russia, deploying advanced Russian made fighter aircraft, tanks, air-defenses, warships and conventional submarines. This leads us to China’s northern border.

Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which it is currently modernizing. Many of these are non-strategic nuclear weapons deliverable on a range of platforms with the capability of striking multiple Chinese targets. Contrary to popular belief, the Russian/Chinese relationship is not a solid and reliable alliance. This is a partnership at best, and I would not predict Russia to put itself in the firing line and risk devastation, economic and otherwise to support China's interests. China and the Soviet Union maintained a solid partnership in the early years of the Cold War, but this soured significantly after Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956. To illustrate my point regarding China's reluctance to enter New START negotiations, in 1969, China and the Soviet Union were engaged in a border conflict where the Soviet Union threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China. China had become a nuclear power five years earlier, but its force was far inferior to the Soviet Union’s to an even larger degree than it is today. China backed down in this conflict as it unwillingly agreed to talks with the Soviet Union. Regardless of current arrangements and the quasi-partnership that Putin and Xi are engaged in, Russia will continue to be viewed with suspicion of China's northern approaches.

To China’s East is the power of the United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea. Also to the East is Taiwan, which is not technically allied with the U.S. but is fortified with advanced U.S. military equipment including tanks, air-defenses, artillery, helicopters, warships, and fighter aircraft. China comprehends that any conflict involving these states to its East runs a high risk of U.S. military involvement. The U.S. extends its nuclear security umbrella to Japan and South Korea as well as maintaining a troop presence in these countries. This extended nuclear deterrence means that China risks a U.S. nuclear response in the event of a conflict with these states. North Korea further compounds these risks through its aggression towards South Korea. If a war broke out on the Korean peninsula, China would undoubtedly enter the war if there was a risk that North Korea was going to lose. China is fearful of the concept of a U.S. backed government on its doorstep, which is why it continues to support Kim Jong-un’s Stalinist state.           

We now move to the South China Sea, where China has built and fortified islands and flouted international law. China has been increasingly combative in this region, which only acts to push states closer to the U.S. and likeminded countries as opposed to Chinese coercion and aggression. The South China Sea is a major global trade route, but it’s especially important for China, with the major ports of Hong Kong and Guangzhou requiring access to it. If China was denied access to the South China Sea, its economy would be impacted considerably. Conversely, if China controlled access to the South China Sea, it would negatively impact the global economy but provide China with unchecked exploitation of the natural resources within the area. While the artificial islands expand the reach of China’s bombers and missiles and enable the potential for a Chinese ballistic missile submarine bastion, the islands are effectively sitting ducks. Analysts such as Gregory Poling paint a picture that these fortified islands in the Spratlys and the Paracels would be prohibitively costly for the U.S. to neutralize in conflict, but he fails to take into account the non-strategic nuclear option. The low-yield SLBM on selected Ohio class ballistic missile submarines provides the U.S. with more than enough accurate firepower to strike these bases with little to no collateral damage. Yes, the conflict would take a nuclear turn, but if a war was already underway, the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons can’t be discounted.

It’s clear why China would be opposed to limiting its nuclear structure with New START conditions. Whether you're a proponent of 'Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory,' ‘Posture Optimisation Theory’, or somewhere in the middle, China’s geopolitical situation and it’s very modest nuclear forces create a situation where it’s unlikely to enter negotiations or reach a consensus. This leaves us wondering what the U.S. should do about the looming New START expiry?

The Trump administration is right to make an attempt to bring China into an agreement. This is a strategically sound policy. The U.S. should not, however, back itself into a corner over this. If attempts are exhausted regarding China, the U.S. and Russia should extend the treaty as it promotes strategic nuclear stability and acts to prevent an arms race that neither country can afford, given the current global economic climate created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nuclear modernization programs are a crucial but necessary means to ensure a reliable force structure. The U.S. and Russia can avoid adding to these costs with an arms race. 

China is also modernizing its nuclear forces, and according to the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), it’s likely to at least double its nuclear stockpile over the next decade. With China’s current stockpile at around 320 warheads, a New START extension of five years will not neutralize U.S. nuclear superiority. Let’s not forget that NATO allies, France and the U.K. also possess strategic nuclear forces capable of striking Russia and China should the U.S. be attacked. The hedge against China racing forward unexpectedly and attempting to obtain nuclear superiority over the U.S. is the lack of limitations regarding INF range nuclear forces. The end of the INF Treaty creates opportunities for the U.S. to deploy ground-based nuclear-capable missiles within range of China if it needs to, and these are not subject to New START conditions. Possible bases include Guam and states willing to house them on their territory. China’s aggression only acts to increase the number of states in Asia willing to accept an agreement of this nature.     

There are strategic options available to the U.S. without losing another arms treaty. The termination of the INF treaty was Russia's fault and Russia's fault alone. For the U.S. to have maintained this treaty while Russia was violating it, would have been the height of weakness. New START, on the other hand, should be extended while parties are adhering to its conditions. The world is suffering enough with the pandemic, let’s not unnecessarily add a strategic arms race to its worries.              

Adam Cabot has a Masters in International Relations and is currently researching nuclear strategy.