China's Build Up of Nuclear Forces

China is currently embarked on a massive build-up of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. From a low-level force structure designed to support its strategy of minimum deterrence, China is now striving to establish a nuclear warfighting capability that would enable it to bolster its massive conventional forces with a substantial theater nuclear force, backed up by expanded nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). China’s objective, in the event of war, is to win a quick victory with its conventional forces, and to deter the use of U.S. nuclear weapons by threatening the employment of its large theater nuclear forces.

China is seeking to be the preponderant power in the western Pacific and to displace the United States as the region’s leading power, undermining U.S. security guarantees, and weakening America’s ties to its Asia-Pacific allies. To achieve this geopolitical dominance in the Western Pacific, China is altering its nuclear doctrine and undertaking a major buildup of its nuclear forces.

China’s longtime official nuclear strategy had been based on minimum nuclear deterrence. In its 2003 Defense White Paper—and repeated at the Second Preparatory Committee for 2005 NPT Review Conference—it said, “China has always exercised utmost restraint towards developing nuclear weapons, kept its nuclear arsenal at the minimum level only for self-defense.”[3]^,[4]

China’s adoption of limited nuclear deterrence, according to these advocates, would allow it to:

By adopting limited nuclear deterrence and fielding forces to support it, China would move beyond threatening retaliation after U.S. nuclear use. It could instead be able to tailor nuclear responses, strike U.S. regional bases with limited attacks, attrit key U.S. military assets, win early battles, and deter further U.S. nuclear escalation. This approach could help China achieve regional political-military objectives while avoiding the large-scale damage that broader escalation could bring.

Giving credence to the premise that China has changed its nuclear strategy from minimum to limited nuclear deterrence is by its development and deployment of the very accurate, low-yield, nuclear capable DF-26.

According to the 2024 DOD report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the DF-26 can conduct precision strikes against operational- and tactical-level targets in the Western Pacific while limiting collateral damage. This capability improves China’s ability to send deliberate nuclear signals and strengthens its coercive leverage across multiple domains.[16]

The fear is that China, by establishing escalation dominance in the Western Pacific, specifically around a potential conflict over a Chinese conventional invasion of Taiwan, could erode/revoke an American extended nuclear deterrence guarantee to Taiwan, and make a conventional invasion attempt more likely.

As of 2022, China has deployed 214 DF-21, DF-17, and DF-26 nuclear capable theater range missiles,[17] while the United States has zero theater range missiles, having removed its nuclear Tomahawk Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) from the Pacific (and world-wide) in 1991. By 2036, China is projected to have deployed 350 nuclear capable DF-17 and DF-26 nuclear-capable theater range missiles. [18]

Overall, China currently possesses over 600 nuclear warheads on theater and intercontinental land-based and sea-based missiles, and on bombers. By 2030, China is expected to field over 1000 warheads,[19] 1500 in 2035,[20] and is projected to reach strategic nuclear parity with the United States in that same year.[21]

The Chinese nuclear buildup will degrade the credibility of U.S. extended security guarantees in Asia. It was the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity with the United States by the time the SALT Agreement in 1972 that caused European allies to worry that the United Stares would not risk Detroit to save Dusseldorf. Soon, American Asian allies may doubt that the United States may be willing to risk Tampa for Tokyo.

With the increasing Chinese nuclear threat reaching a critical point about 2035, it appears the United States has a just-in-time remedy to meet this existential danger. As part of FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress directed the Department of Defense to produce the W80-4 nuclear warhead for the Tomahawk SLCM, and to ensure that the system achieves IOC no later than 30 September 2034.[22]  Though planned as a conventional only weapon to be deployed in Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, the U.S. Army Typhon Laucher would be technically capable of firing a Tomahawk Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), with the same nuclear warhead as the sea-based version as well.

This projected U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles in response to the Chinese threat very much parallels an American success story in reaction to a nuclear threat 50 years previously from the Soviet Union.

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union

In the 2030s, China

The U.S. deployment of Pershing II and GLCM INF missiles in the 1980s eliminated the Soviet unilateral advantage in theater nuclear missiles. Subsequently, the Soviets agreed to sign the INF Treaty, which removed the nuclear war fighting capability danger posed by the SS-20 missiles.

The current Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby characterized the U.S. defense buildup in the 1980s, with the INF missile deployments, as a “most successful period”, and that the INF treaty effectively marked the end of the Cold War.[26]

Regarding today’s situation, Under Secretary Colby specifically said in that the United States was “not seeking to accentuate or increase the focus on theater-range nuclear weapons” but added that “It’s not an exclusion of theater-range systems,” [27] and that the United States should have rational “employable, limited options that advantage us and stand the chance of favorably managing escalation.”[28]

The deployment of nuclear-armed SLCMs and possibly GLCMs to the Pacific region would be an outstanding counter to this aggressive Chinese nuclear expansion and adoption of offensive nuclear war-fighting plans. Perhaps lighting could strike twice, and the great success of the U.S. INF nuclear missile deployments in Europe against the Soviet Union could be replicated 50 years later with Tomahawk nuclear missile deployments against China.

MAJ Dennis S. Nelson (U.S. Army, ret.)

image: Soldiers from the 3d Multi-Domain Task Force (3MDTF) conduct the first Typhon live-fire exercise outside of the continental United States, firing a Standard Missile-6 July 16, 2025, in the Northern Territory, Australia, during Exercise Talisman Sabre 25. The successful strike validated combined joint targeting and command-and-control interoperability between 3MDTF and combined-joint forces, highlighting the strength of the Australia-U.S. Alliance and the ability to deploy advanced, land-based maritime strike capabilities in support of regional security. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Perla Alfaro)

[1] Captain Bernard D. Cole, U.S. Navy (Retired), Island Chains and Naval Classics, Proceedings Vol. 140/11/1,341, Nov 2014. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014/november/island-chains-and-naval-classics 

[2] First Island Chain:  How Geography Cages China's Navy, Geopol.uk https://geopol.uk/concepts/first-island-chain/ 

[3] Yao Yunzhu, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 9 (September 2005).

[4] Yao Yunzhu, Chinese Nuclear Policy and the Future of Minimum Deterrence, Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 9 (September 2005).

[5] Horsburgh, Nicola, China and Global Nuclear Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement, 2015.

[6] Johnston, Alistair Ian, China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security, Vol 20 No 3, Winter 1995-1996.

[7] Haynes, Susan Turner. Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China's Weapons Buildup and Modernization, Potomac Books, 2016.

[8] Academy of Military Science Military Strategy Research Office (PRC), The Science of Military Strategy, p. 147.

[9] Cunningham, Fiona, and Frave, M. Taylor, Dangerous Coincidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation, International Security, 1 Oct 2019.

[10]Fravel, M. Taylor and Medeiros, Evan S., China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure, International Security, 2010.

[11] Johnston, Alistair Ian, China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security, Vol 20 No 3, Winter 1995-1996.

[12] Hu Yanlin, The Future of War Could well be a Limited Nuclear War, Essay Theories on Military Thought, NDU, 1988.

[13] Johnston, Alistair Ian, China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security, Vol 20 No 3, Winter 1995-1996.

[14] Haynes, Susan Turner. Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China's Weapons Buildup and Modernization, Potomac Books, 2016.

[15] Chase, Michael S., Erickson Andrew S., and Yeaw Christopher, The Future of Chinese Deterrence Strategy, China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 5, Jamestown Foundation, 4 March 2009.

[16] DOD report Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-%09SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF 

[17] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer:  Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, Spring 2023. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/cgsr_two_peer_230314.pdf 

[18] Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer:  Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy, Spring 2023. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2024-08/cgsr_two_peer_230314.pdf 

[19][19] Steve Balestrieri, 1,000 Warheads by 2030: China’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Is Growing Fast, National Security Journal, 1 June 2025, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/1000-warheads-by-2030-chinas-nuclear-weapons-arsenal-is-growing-fast/ 

[20] How is China Modernizing its Nuclear Forces? China Power. 10 Dec 2019, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-nuclear-weapons/ 

[21] Robert Peters and Andrew J. Harding, Advantage Over Parity: Assessing China’s Expanding Nuclear Arsenal, Heritage Foundation, 6 June 2024, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/BG3836.pdf 

[22] Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) Congressional Research Service, Updated February 12, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12084/IF12084.12.pdf 

[23] Hines, John, Mishulovich, Ellis, and Shull, John, Soviet Intensions 1965-1985, Volume I: An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet Assessments During the Cold War, BDM Federal, 22 Sept 1995.

[24] Hines, John, Mishulovich, Ellis, and Shull, John, Soviet Intensions 1965-1985, Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, BDM Federal, 22 Sept 1995.

[25] Cant, James Farquhar, The Development of the SS-20: A Case Study of Soviet Defence Decision Making During the Brezhnev Era. PhD Thesis, 1998.

[26] Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the 2026 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, 5 Aug 2026. https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4567089/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-2026-united/ 

[27] Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the 2026 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, 5 Aug 2026 https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4567089/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-2026-united/ 

[28] Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the 2026 United States Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, 5 Aug 2026 https://www.war.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4567089/remarks-by-under-secretary-of-war-for-policy-elbridge-colby-at-the-2026-united/