U.S., China, and the Middle East Redraw the Map As Russia Falters

The great struggle of this century is unfolding in the invisible domain of code, data, and networks, complementing the traditional battlefields. In some ways, military arsenals matter less than computational dominance, and economic power increasingly depends on who controls the algorithms that guide both markets and weapons systems. The United States and China have emerged as the principal combatants in this new technological order. Yet in recent years, the Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, has become the unexpected third actor, seeking to turn technological innovation into strategic independence. Russia, once a central player in global defense and technology, is now reduced to exploiting instability rather than shaping the future.

Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a defense pact with the United States reflects this evolution in strategic thinking. The Kingdom no longer seeks only military hardware or conventional protection. It wants access to the technological ecosystem that defines modern defense such as data-driven targeting, integrated command systems, and AI-enhanced surveillance. A comprehensive agreement with Washington would bring Riyadh into the digital core of Western security, ensuring deterrence against regional threats while boosting its domestic innovation. For the United States, such a partnership is about much more than arms sales. It is an opportunity to shape the technological architecture of the Middle East in ways that exclude China and prevent the region from becoming a digital dependency of Beijing.

Beijing’s growing influence across the Gulf has already altered the regional balance. Chinese telecommunications infrastructure, especially through Huawei and ZTE, has penetrated much of the Gulf’s smart-city, traditional telecom,  and surveillance networks. Chinese companies are helping design data centers and AI-enabled logistics hubs in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. These projects allow Beijing to collect metadata, influence standards, and embed itself in critical infrastructure. This development represents not only commercial expansion but a form of digital colonization. If left unchecked, it could give China privileged access to the communications arteries of an entire region. For Washington, the challenge is therefore not only to compete economically but to regain strategic control of the region’s digital foundations.

To push China out of the Middle East’s digital control space, the United States will have to do more than issue warnings. It needs to offer alternatives that are credible, scalable, and commercially attractive. American tech firms, with government backing, should lead in providing secure cloud infrastructure, AI research partnerships, and training programs for regional digital governance. The U.S. must make its technology indispensable, not merely preferable. That means integrating defense cooperation with digital capacity building, ensuring that every U.S.-supplied missile system or intelligence-sharing network is tied to an American-controlled data ecosystem. The goal is to rebuild trust through interoperability, not isolation.

This strategy also requires a major diplomatic recalibration. Washington has too often treated digital partnerships as secondary to military or energy concerns. Yet in the modern era, technological integration is itself a form of defense. If American systems run the Gulf’s data architecture, China’s influence will naturally shrink. The U.S. can use its dominant position in cloud computing, cybersecurity, and high-performance AI to create an ecosystem of dependency that favors stability and transparency over control. Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not object to partnership with the West; they object to being told what to do without being given viable technological choices. Offering access, training, and investment opportunities can achieve more than threats of sanctions or exclusion.

Russia’s decline provides Washington with a strategic opening. Once a major arms supplier to the Middle East, Moscow is now crippled by sanctions and technological decay. Its defense exports have plummeted, and its war in Ukraine has drained both its credibility and its inventory. Gulf states that once bought Russian weapons now view them as unreliable relics of a collapsing empire. This erosion of Russian influence leaves a vacuum that China has sought to fill. However, China’s model depends on technology transfer, not trust. The U.S., by contrast, can build enduring influence through security guarantees linked to technological partnership. If Washington aligns defense cooperation with its digital strategy, it can consolidate both military and informational dominance in the region.

For Saudi Arabia, the U.S. defense pact is also a step toward shaping a regional security order in which the Kingdom acts as the anchor. Riyadh wants to position itself as both the guardian of the Gulf and the regional hub for digital innovation. A formal security arrangement with the U.S. would not only deter external threats such as Iran but would also make Saudi Arabia a key node in the global defense-tech network. The pact could include provisions for joint AI research, localized defense manufacturing, and the integration of Saudi cyber command into NATO-aligned security protocols. Such a framework would reduce Chinese leverage over Gulf infrastructure while binding Riyadh more deeply into the Western technological orbit.

From Washington’s perspective, such an arrangement would serve several goals simultaneously. It would stabilize energy markets by securing cooperation with OPEC’s largest producer. It would deny China access to sensitive data and strategic ports that could support its military or surveillance operations. It would also preserve American influence at a time when global alliances are shifting rapidly. Yet to succeed, the United States should look to update its approach. The old model of transactional arms sales is no longer sufficient. Gulf partners now expect joint development, shared expertise, and investment in domestic innovation. If Washington does not adapt, Beijing will continue to expand its footprint through cheaper, more flexible offers that appeal to regional leaders’ desire for autonomy.

To counter that risk, Washington should adopt a policy of technological embedding. U.S. defense exports to the Middle East would come with digital infrastructure packages that tie Gulf data networks to American standards of encryption, interoperability, and intelligence-sharing. Educational exchanges, joint research programs, and public-private partnerships can further cement these ties. By aligning the interests of American corporations with those of its strategic partners, the U.S. can create a self-reinforcing network of dependency that both strengthens allies and isolates China. This is not containment in the Cold War sense, but a form of digital alignment that defines the new era of power politics.

The Middle East’s own ambitions complement this strategy. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are investing heavily in AI, space exploration, and advanced communications, not as clients of foreign powers but as emerging innovators. Their desire for autonomy makes them open to collaboration with both East and West, but wary of domination by either. The United States can turn this cautious pragmatism into an advantage. By helping these countries develop secure, transparent, and interoperable systems, Washington can reinforce its influence without resorting to coercion. A partnership model that respects sovereignty but promotes shared standards will always be more resilient than one based on dependency or fear.

Ultimately, the outcome of this technological race will determine whether the U.S. retains its global primacy or cedes it to a rival that sees the world as a network to be controlled. China’s digital strategy is expansionist but pragmatic. It offers immediate benefits in connectivity and efficiency, but at the cost of long-term control. The United States needs to prove that its alternative, based on openness, interoperability, and trust, can deliver both prosperity and security. The Middle East, standing between the two systems, will be the decisive arena where this contest is resolved.

For U.S. interests and policy, the task is clear. America has to integrate its military, technological, and diplomatic instruments into a coherent regional framework. It should prioritize building defense pacts that are not only about missiles but about data, algorithms, and standards. Washington should also learn to think like a system-builder rather than a protector. In doing so, it can restore its reach across the Middle East, contain China’s influence, and define a new model of alliance that blends security with innovation. The Gulf states, seeking both autonomy and protection, are ready for such a partnership. What remains is for Washington to realize that the next frontier of American power will be written not in treaties or oil contracts, but in code.

Irina Tsukerman is a U.S. national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a security and geopolitical risk strategic advisory, and Board Member of The Washington Outsider Center for Information Warfare.