America's Overlooked Asymmetric Advantage

Contemporary conflict is increasingly defined by the demands of protracted competition and high-intensity warfare. The increased proliferation of once-asymmetric capabilities, the rapid adaptation cycle of technology, and the convergence of threats across domains have created an operating environment where sustaining advantage depends as much on resilience and mobilization as on initial force deployment. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is nearing its fourth year and highlights how modern conflict can stretch national resources, erode manpower reserves, and require constant adaptation across the military and industrial base. Similarly, Israel’s ongoing conflicts in the Middle East underscores the challenge of sustaining combat power and mobilization over extended periods while balancing simultaneous domestic, regional, and international pressures. While it is impossible to predict the character of future conflicts, such wars underscore the realistic and dangerous possibility of protracted conflict, a scenario which United States military leaders must consider in planning for tomorrow’s war.

In recent American conflicts, reserve forces were primarily used to backfill active-duty shortfalls or rotate into predictable deployments. While this model may have provided a framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, it will not be as effective in a large-scale combat operations (LSCO) environment. A protracted fight against a near-peer adversary will require reserves to do more than replace numbers; they will need to provide combat power, staff augmentation, and specialized skills that the active force cannot generate quickly enough. As the United States military shifts its primary focus away from COIN after decades in the Middle East, LSCO exposes vulnerabilities in how the United States military currently organizes and sustains manpower. Army Majors John Dzwonczyk and Clayton Merkley grapple with this concept and define these combat operations as “ involving two or more general or flag officer-level echelons of command on at least one side maneuvering their commands in support of a campaign against an enemy with comparable tactics and force structure”. While this definition and the concept of LSCO emphasize the centrality of combat, it also implies the massive undertaking of surging production of capabilities, including manpower. There has been much debate and research on the capacity of the defense industrial base, the potential need for conscription, and the reorganization of warfighting units. However, the reserve component has been largely left unchanged. If the United States is to sustain such operations categorized by the definition above, American military leaders will need to adjust how they conceive of sustainment. The term may not only include delivering fuel and ammunition but also assigning and organizing servicemembers to best utilize their skillsets and amplify their strengths.

Mobilization is a sustainment function. In a protracted conflict, it will require a new look on how we integrate reserve forces and align civilian-acquired expertise with military needs to achieve strategic success. A traditional view of reserve forces overlooks the unique skills and experiences reservists bring from their civilian lives. The conceptualization of mobilization must therefore shift from a reactive process of filling gaps to a proactive strategy of aligning reserve talent with the missions where it provides the most strategic value.

Military services have taken steps to address this modernization gap. The Marine Corps Reserve has already begun experimenting with this idea in practice. One initiative created a reserve organization to support the active force’s software development efforts. Similarly, the Army has tried to replicate this move by standing up a similar organization through Detachment 201, ushering current technology executives through an abbreviated training to serve in advisory roles. While this represents a major step forward, creating new organizations alone does not solve the root problem; attracting talent is essential, but aligning and employing it effectively is the greater challenge. Moreover, the discussion of talent must extend beyond technology specialists to include the full range of civilian-acquired expertise that can strengthen the force. True effectiveness depends on aligning reservists with the right missions and supporting them with the policies and tools they need. This requires a cultural shift in how military services perceive the value of reservists. These servicemembers are not simply backfill but are integral contributors to mission success.

A new approach would require military services taking three deliberate steps to increase the potential of its reserve forces. First, military services must treat data collection and analysis as a key operational function. Unlike the active force, many reservists maintain careers in industries essential to national defense. These professional backgrounds provide the American military with expertise that cannot be replicated by training alone and, in some cases, exceeds what the military itself can offer. Yet the defense system lacks a comprehensive framework for cataloging, analyzing, and aligning these civilian-acquired skills with wartime requirements. Current personnel systems capture such data only passively through self-reported profiles. There is a noticeable absence of a deliberate effort to capture valuable data on the skills and experiences of nearly 41% of servicemembers. Military services could establish a process of dual verification, where a reservist’s civilian employer advocates for their professional skills and work experience, while the reservist’s military unit assesses and validates those claims. This system would ensure that critical aspects of a reservist’s civilian expertise are both accurately captured and credibly recognized, creating a more reliable foundation for aligning qualified servicemembers to high-demand, low-quantity job areas and for more robust mobilization planning. The military services must apply the same rigor to capturing and analyzing data on talent and manpower as it does to battlefield activities. Neglecting this potential for data capture is the equivalent of leaving money on the table.

Second, military services should invest in research on existing and emerging skill gaps. Skill gaps arise when available soldiers either lack the necessary expertise or when those with the expertise are already committed to other missions, placing a significant strain on the force. A drawn-out conflict against a near-peer adversary would only magnify these deficiencies. Military services must assess not only where gaps exist today but also how they would evolve under the conditions of a protracted fight. Some shortfalls may persist in scale. Others may compound as adversaries target supply chains, disrupt networks, or generate casualties at rates the active force cannot absorb. Mapping reserve capabilities against these scenarios is critical to identifying where reserve forces with professional expertise can mitigate vulnerabilities before they become decisive. The Air Force has begun its examination of this problem by redesigning elements of its force and identifying where current skill sets fall short of those needed for great-power competition. This approach of identifying evolving skills, assessing gaps, and adjusting training to meet the demands of the future operating environment offers a baseline that other services should emulate. By incorporating such findings as assumptions for future planning scenarios, military services can ensure that skill alignment keeps pace with the demands of protracted conflict.

Third, national security practitioners should expand and emphasize manpower-focused wargaming. Traditional wargames excel at testing concepts of firepower, maneuver, and logistics. However, these crucial exercises rarely stress-test mobilization and talent management. While issues of supply chain security, domestic and allied manufacturing, and critical mineral resourcing are important topics, a protracted conflict will require more than equipment and ammunition. Such a scenario will demand a deep talent pool that is optimally aligned to address key gaps and ensure personnel are employed to their fullest potential rather than simply filling vacancies. Dedicated manpower wargames can test whether reserves are best employed as combat formations or as backfill for headquarters and staffs, evaluate how quickly specialized reservists might be integrated into the defense industrial base, and examine the mechanisms needed to ensure that replacements arrive trained and aligned to mission requirements. Data gathered from these exercises should then provide a feedback loop for military service and how to approach talent organization and reserve mobilization. Testing these questions in peacetime provides clarity on how reserve forces can be mobilized effectively when the stakes are highest.

The United States cannot assume that the next conflict will be short or neatly contained. Protracted conflicts against capable adversaries will demand a reserve force ready to be mobilized and employed in ways that maximize the total strength of service members. Approaching talent organization and data collection as a core fighting function, investing in research to anticipate and close skill gaps, and stress-testing mobilization through wargames are essential steps to strengthen our Nation’s forces and ensure those forces are ready. The Americans we recruit, train, and develop as servicemembers provide a critically underexplored advantage. Realigning reserve personnel away from traditional backfill roles toward approaches that amplify their civilian-acquired skills will provide an asymmetric edge against any near-peer adversary. The reserve component is more than a pool of replacements; it is a strategic repository of talent and expertise that can tip the balance in a prolonged fight if properly harnessed. Failing to prepare today means forfeiting the very advantages the United States will need for tomorrow’s fight.

Ian Whitfield is an Army Reserve officer and a graduate of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or beliefs of Georgetown University, the Department of Defense, or any other organization the author is associated with.