Anti-Strategy in Ukraine

NATO has an Anti-Strategy problem, good intentions for Ukraine but highly flawed planning. Translated into practice: Washington outsources escalation management to Moscow. It allows Russia to dictate the actions and reactions to its invasion and occupation of Ukraine on its own terms. Moreover, NATO’s support for Ukraine in its war with Russia exhibits loose threads, critical asymmetries, and gaping holes in the NATO fabric. Of the loose threads the most errant is Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the “illiberal democrat” who empathizes with Vladimir Putin, obstructs Ukraine support, and supports Russia’s war effort through Hungary’s continued dependence on Russian oil and gas. The most jarring asymmetry juxtaposes the assertiveness of the frontline states such as Poland, the Baltics, and new NATO members Finland and Sweden, against the hesitant caution of the core NATO powers including the United States, France, and especially Germany. Among the gaping holes none is more glaringly self-evident than the hole where a unified strategy for victory in Ukraine should be.

What about the asymmetry? There is a seam in Europe dividing the frontline states from the core NATO powers—Germany, France, and the United States—that runs roughly along the old NATO-Warsaw Pact divide. Those who lived under Soviet rule and domination such as the Baltic States and Poland advocate for policies that degrade and exhaust Russian military capabilities as much as possible. Having spoken to several Polish and Baltic defense officials at the WSF event, many confided their desire to insert forces into Ukraine, but are being restrained by Germany and the United States. The security of these Eastern European countries is directly connected to a Ukrainian victory rather than a frozen conflict that prolongs instability. Finland, once a part of the Russian Empire and a target of Stalin's 1939-40 plan to return "lost" provinces to the Soviet Union, shares this historical legacy. The newest NATO member, Sweden also shares a visceral distrust of Russia and is a strong proponent of a definitive Ukrainian victory.

Meanwhile, the United States has been hesitant, even reluctant despite its bold rhetoric. American aid packages and military support to Ukraine have been piecemeal and subject to delays and bureaucratic hurdles, consistently one step behind Ukraine’s needs. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was off the table and then Ukraine got them. Next the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) was off the table; then Ukraine got them. The U.S. provided Abrams tanks only after the UK offered Challenger tanks and Germany allowed Leopard II tanks to be exported to Ukraine only on the condition that the United States committed to providing Abrams. It was only in August 2023 that the United States allowed the transfer of European-owned F-16 fighters to Ukraine, the first F-16s arriving a year later. The United States continues to impose restrictions on Ukraine’s use of American weapon systems, handicapping Ukraine’s ability to retaliate effectively against Russia’s relentless assault.

The frontline states are less risk adverse than the traditional NATO powers, despite the likelihood that any escalation would take place on their territory. In fairness, those traditional NATO powers are also the nuclear powers, and as such are imbued with the existential responsibility of avoiding nuclear war. Their reluctance to escalate is understandable even if this asymmetry is eroding alliance resolve.

These loose threads and the asymmetry between the NATO frontline and nuclear powers leave a gaping hole where a strategy should be. Tellingly NATO’s Ukraine webpage omits strategy. None of the frequently asked questions refers to a NATO strategy. On August 24 this year former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “We must continue to provide Ukraine with the equipment and munitions it needs to defend itself against Russia’s invasion. This is vital for Ukraine’s ability to stay in the fight.”  “Staying in the fight” is not a strategy; it is the epitome of the Anti-Strategy. The closest thing to a strategic goal for Ukraine was U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s April 2022 assertion that, “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” Despite Austin’s statement, rather than leading NATO the United States has equivocated, not wanting Ukraine to lose the war, yet unwilling to take the risks associated with Ukraine winning. “We will be with you for as long as it takes,” the U.S. says, but Ukraine hears whispers of “unless it takes too long.”

This Anti-Strategy approach dominates NATO today. It consists of a series of fragmented and reactive measures, rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy to effectively counter Russian aggression in Europe. At risk is democratic solidarity and the incremental erosion of a whole and free Europe. NATO’s disjointed and feckless actions unguided by a unified vision rely far too heavily on economic sanctions to pressure Russia. While these measures have hurt the Russian economy, their impact on Russia's strategic calculations have been limited, revealing the inadequacy of economic tools absent the real threat of hard power.

Providing military aid to Ukraine is inherently fraught with risk. NATO must navigate the complex challenge of ensuring aid reaches the front lines while avoiding actions that could escalate the conflict to the nuclear threshold. Coordinating a unified strategic response has proven difficult as varied levels of commitment and differing strategic priorities among allies complicate efforts to present a cohesive front. Germany is the most hesitant, but the United States has also been an obstacle. The Biden administration does not seem to understand how Moscow exploits U.S. escalation paranoia with threats of nuclear reprisals. They should understand that Russia’s partners have red lines as well, especially regarding nuclear weapons. Russia’s first use would most likely lead to universal—including Chinese and Indian—condemnation. A senior European defense leader at WSF who knows Russia advises, “Russia is bluffing!” Russia’s effective disinformation and infiltration of right-wing parties in many NATO member states helps obscure these signals, distract attention, and expose vulnerabilities in NATO's ability to effectively counter influence operations. 

Russia's war against Ukraine accentuates divergences in the NATO alliance. If Donald Trump is elected U.S. president those divergences will widen. His previous statements create doubt about U.S. intent and commitment. According to his former National Security Advisor John Bolton, “The odds that he will withdraw from NATO are very high.” Grand strategy will return to Europe in force, and without the United States as NATO’s center of gravity that presents a threat to European unity and peace. These divergences can and do become Russian attack surfaces. They also point to the importance of an ongoing U.S. role in European security as the actor that coordinates and moderates these different strategic perspectives. A U.S. withdrawal from NATO would result in greater tension between these strategic perspectives and make other aspects of European cooperation more difficult to sustain. Germany's leaders don't want to alienate Russia in the long-term. They, along with France and Italy, ultimately seek balance. The Baltics and other frontline states would like to see the Russian Federation dismantled. The consequence may be increased instability and disunity in Europe—a primary Russian strategic objective. That would be most dangerous to Eastern Europe, thus further widening the split from the rest of the continent.

The Warsaw Security Forum revealed significant flaws in NATO's approach to Ukraine. Nevertheless, these types of summits play an important role in bringing together the defenders of the liberal, rules-based global order for increased solidarity, mutual respect, and understanding. Consolidating these core countries is an essential task as they prepare for the coming existential competition between divergent visions of global order. Sadly, for those committed to victory in Ukraine they leave untouched the challenge of finding a way to bypass the loose threads, balance the asymmetries and fill the gaping holes. The camp of Transatlantic restrainers may continue rooting for the Anti-Strategy, but the only pathway to success for Ukraine and European unity is for NATO to have an explicit strategy for victory.

Lieutenant Colonel Jahara “FRANKY” Matisek, PhD, (@JaharaMatisek) is a military professor in the national security affairs department at the United States Naval War College, research fellow with the European Resilience Initiative Center, and United States Department of Defense Minerva co–principal investigator for improving United States security assistance. He has published over one hundred articles and essays in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets on strategy, warfare, and security assistance. He is a command pilot that was previously an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department at the United States Air Force Academy.

Michael Miklaucic lectures at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago and is Editor Emeritus for the journal PRISM, having recently retired as a Senior Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. He previously served in various positions at the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of State, including USAID representative on the Civilian Response Corps Inter-Agency Task Force, as the Senior Program Officer in the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance, and Rule of Law Specialist in the Center for Democracy and Governance. In 2002-2003 he served as the Department of State Deputy for War Crimes Issues and was responsible for U.S. relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), war crimes issues and negotiations in East Timor and Cambodia, and the early implementation of the Sudan Peace Act.

Dr. William Reno is a professor and chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern University. He has conducted fieldwork and interviews in conflict zones across Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East for over thirty years, having authored three books: Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Warlord Politics and African States, and Warfare in Independent Africa. He has published over two hundred articles in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant periodicals, and edited volumes on civil wars, rebels, and military assistance. He is the principal investigator for the US Department of Defense Minerva-funded program studying how the United States can improve foreign military training.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, or Department of Defense. This article was supported by Levy Chair and Ruger Chair funds at the US Naval War College and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under award number FA9550-20-1-0277.