The Lesson of 1986 for the Pentagon's New Autonomous Warfare Command
Last updated 06:31 AM EDT • Read time: 4m
This week, the Pentagon announced plans to establish a new four-star Autonomous Warfare Command to bring greater focus, authority, and resources to drones, robotics, and autonomous systems that are rapidly changing the character of warfare.
It is a significant step, and one that has a familiar ring to it.
Forty years ago, Congress confronted a similar institutional challenge. Special operations forces had proven increasingly important to how America fought, but responsibility for them remained fragmented across the military services. They lacked the unified leadership, dedicated resources, and institutional influence necessary to succeed.
Congress responded with the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, establishing the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and giving special operations forces something they had never had before: a four-star command with the authority to organize, equip, and advocate for the mission over the long term.
Today, the technology is different, but the underlying question is much the same. When a capability becomes central to how America fights, how should the Department of War organize itself to ensure that capability gets the attention and expertise it deserves?
I had the privilege of serving as Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee during that effort, working alongside Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn. At the time, the Department of Defense was still organized largely as it had been after World War II. The military services trained separately, planned separately, purchased separately and, too often, fought separately. Failures from Desert One to Beirut and Grenada exposed confused chains of command, poor coordination, and institutional rivalries that endangered American lives.
The Pentagon’s senior civilian and military leadership vigorously opposed many of the changes Congress proposed. Yet lawmakers persisted.
After years of hearings, analysis, and debate, our committee approved the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 19-0. The Senate passed it 95-0, and the House 383-27. Within months, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and acquisition reforms inspired by the Packard Commission followed.
This was one of the most consequential periods of defense reform in American history, and it remains the very foundation of the joint force America relies on today.
But forty years later, the Pentagon still has unfinished business.
Acquisition, requirements, budgeting, and management remain burdened by too many layers, too much process, and too little accountability. Meanwhile, the pace of technological change is accelerating. Drones, robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems are transforming warfare faster than traditional processes were designed to accommodate.
The Department of War’s current leadership deserves credit for recognizing those challenges and tackling them head-on. The decision to create an Autonomous Warfare Command reflects an understanding that these capabilities may now require dedicated leadership, resources, expertise, and career paths of their own.
That is very similar to the logic behind USSOCOM.
But the experience of 1986 also offers an important lesson about what comes next.
Administrative action can begin reform, but lasting change requires Congress. Goldwater-Nichols and Nunn-Cohen endured because Congress put those reforms into law, giving them permanence beyond any single administration or Pentagon leadership team.
The Autonomous Warfare Command could become an important part of the next era of American military power. Forty years ago, USSOCOM showed what can happen when an increasingly important mission is given the resources it needs to succeed.
The opportunity now is to apply that lesson again.
Major General Arnold L. Punaro, USMC (Ret.), is CEO of The Punaro Group and a nationally recognized expert on national security, defense, Congress, the Pentagon, and business leadership. He spent 24 years in the U.S. Senate, serving as Director of National Security Affairs for Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) and later as Staff Director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In that role, which he held for 14 years, he helped shape major defense and intelligence legislation and oversaw defense programs, policies, and senior civilian and military nominations.