The Relentless Regularity of Irregular Warfare

Cadets conduct mission planning during West Point Irregular Warfare Group’s Unconventional Warfare Exercise

The Pentagon definition is more nuanced than most; according to the Department of Defense’s Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy “Irregular warfare is a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” This definition does not dwell on specific tactics, techniques, or tools. But ambiguity and ambivalence still reign. 

It is not for these reasons alone that irregular warfare is a favorite fighting mode of our adversaries Russia and China. They do not share the binary paradigm of war and peace that the West embraces—a paradigm in which we are either at war or at peace. On the contrary both Russian and Chinese strategic thinking are strongly influenced by a belief in permanent and comprehensive struggle against any and all opposed to their own authoritarian world views. China’s Three Warfares include media war, psychological war, and legal warfare. Russia’s New Generation Warfare combines conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare across the full conflict spectrum. These doctrines show candidly and clearly how our adversaries marshal all the elements of their national power in a never-ending battle against what they perceive as the hegemonic, corrupt, and declining Western liberal, rules-based world order. All domains are within the battlespace, every resource is a weapon, and there is no distinction between civilian and military. 

Through brutal enforcement sprinkled with authoritarian ideology the Chinese Communist Party and the Kremlin’s gangster regime have cultivated “whole of government” and even “whole of society” approaches to great power competition. This is an important aspect of irregular warfare, and while Western countries can’t emulate China’s or Russia’s forced alignment of all the elements of national strength, they can certainly more effectively deploy their diplomats and aid workers whose contributions can be significant. This is not a novel insight; indeed, it is a lesson we have learned and unlearned in fateful cycles, and one which, over well over a half century ago, George Kennan recognized in his writings on political warfare. 

Even more significant than the Pentagon’s definition is the following statement found in the Irregular Warfare Annex: “IW is a persistent and enduring operational reality employed by non-state actors and increasingly by state actors in competition with the United States.” Understood as a ubiquitous condition of life in an adversarial environment irregular warfare describes much more than a set of tools, tactics, and techniques; it describes a continual, comprehensive environmental attribute, permeating interaction between adversaries. Irregular warfare here is characterized as the perpetual struggle for dominance between great powers. If we think of irregular warfare not as a suite of tools, tactics, and techniques, but as a structural attribute of coexistence, we might be more innovative in developing our own approaches, and more effective in competing with these determined and relentless adversaries.  

Irregular warfare differs from all the other warfares; it is neither a means nor an end, but a condition. It resembles the Chinese concept of unrestricted warfare which views conflict—including violent conflict—as a constant, rather than as an aberration. Recall the optimistic aspiration of the 1970s and 1980s—peaceful coexistence. It was not a tool, tactic, or technique, but rather an imagined steady state in which the United States and the Soviet Union would live indefinitely at peace despite their differences. Irregular warfare far more accurately characterizes the condition of states seeking dominance or at least autonomy in an environment with predatory competitors. As a condition of the human predicament, we should not assume that irregular warfare can ever be won or eliminated. It is something we must become attuned to, and for which we must develop innovative and effective tools, tactics, and techniques. 

All conflict is ultimately a struggle over the terms of coexistence (either between states, political parties, or individuals), and who gets to make the rules for coexistence. For the indefinite future—and possibly forever—that struggle will take place in the gray zone of irregular warfare. Recognizing its ubiquity and permanence is the first step toward developing the tools, tactics, and techniques to prevail in the gray zone of irregular warfare and will definitely serve our purpose if we wish to set the terms and make the rules.

Michael Miklaucic is a Senior Fellow at National Defense University and the Editor-in-Chief of the PRISM journal. The opinions expressed in this article are his and are not official statements of policy or opinion National Defense University or the Department of Defense.