The Strategy of Denial

The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. Elbridge A. Colby. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021.

Colby, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development and a leading official in the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, has the curriculum vitae to provide an authoritative reassessment of U.S. defense strategy. Anchored in theory and bolstered by historical references, the book provides valuable nuggets of information, but it stops short of being groundbreaking—particularly for readers who are already well abreast of Chinese affairs and the principles of strategy.

As the book’s title indicates, Colby asserts that the best military strategy is a denial defense that seeks to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.[2] Colby avers that the U.S. should plan against China’s “focused and sequential strategy,” which he defines as an attempt to fracture the coalition by “sequentially isolating and subjugating enough vulnerable members” to cripple the coalition’s credibility and compel disaffiliation.[3] Specifically, he argues the U.S. should deny China’s ability to seize and hold key territories within China’s top three targets: Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.[4]

To make his case, Colby presents his arguments in a deductive manner, establishing a logical progression from theory to its application and recommendation.[5] This methodology not only solidifies the foundational elements of his arguments, but it also ensures that any reader understands his assumptions and principles. Yet, for a reader who is already versed in basic international relations theory or military affairs, the slow build-up compounded with Colby’s propensity to be repetitive may feel tedious. This repetitiveness, however, allows readers to selectively peruse the book.

Colby considers Japan, Australia, and the Pacific islands as foundational to that perimeter because he concludes that they are defensible, capable, and important for power projection from the U.S. Pacific Coast.[7] He also includes in that array Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea as critical states for any defensive coalition despite the vulnerabilities associated with their geographic proximity to China.[8]

Colby prescribes an aggressive perimeter, but he takes a reasonably sober assessment of the value and defensibility of other states in the region. He concludes that Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan should not be retained in the defense perimeter given their minimal power and defensibility.[9] Similarly, Colby views New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh as unlikely to make a major difference in the balance of power within the region given their limited power projection and their geographic position away from the “locus of competition.”[10] He also contends that an alliance partnership with India should not be deemed as essential despite its potential contribution, given India’s natural opposition to Chinese domination and emphasis on autonomy.[11] Colby’s explicit prioritization is refreshing given the unwillingness of other commentators to accept a clear limit to U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific.

East Asia, Oceania, and the Western Pacific (Development Policy Centre)

Regrettably, Colby often connects his arguments with banal assertions. He makes the self-evident observation that the U.S. should “identify China’s best military strategies and plan its defense around them,” while stating that the advancement of China’s interests and regional hegemony would be features of its best strategy.[12] His discussion about the fundamental considerations for U.S. strategy are hardly more incisive.

The harder question—the one that Colby touches on but misses the opportunity to answer satisfactorily—is how to maintain resolve when the coalition is faced with tightening economic pressures, domestic turmoil, or disinformation. Colby reasonably assumes that anti-hegemonic resolve will likely strengthen as China increases its belligerence. However, it is less clear that such resolve could be sustained amongst a diverse set of states over a long period of time.

Furthermore, Colby assumes that China will continue its upward trajectory of overt military aggression, but this is far from a foregone conclusion. China’s historical and ideological context indicates a nuanced calculus focused on long-term strategies.[13] China could continue to operate below the threshold of war through diplomatic or economic coercion, legal warfare, or information operations.[14] Colby seeks to narrow the scope of his book away from grand strategy, but an examination of the interconnectedness between the military and other elements of national power is required to fully understand China’s strategy and begin to develop a realistic, effective U.S. response.

Colby is clear-eyed about the limitations of his proposed strategies, but his analysis of potential contingencies is shallow. He argues that in the event of a strategic failure in which China seizes and holds allied territory, the coalition should opt for a “binding strategy”—a deliberate effort to compel China to behave in a way that hardens the resolve of the U.S. and its allies and partners.[15] Successful recapture of allied territory is contingent upon states’ willingness to take a costlier and riskier approach, which might manifest if China’s behavior presented a more malign threat. Yet, as Colby admits early in the book, effective application of compellence is extremely difficult. The enemy has a vote. After Taiwan, China may be content with projecting its power through means other than force. If this were the case, it would be difficult to create a perception that China is an existential threat. 

Colby does not claim to do anything more than provide a “simplifying” logic for U.S. strategy toward China that would be accessible to American readers.[16] His prolix approach, however, leaves the more well-versed reader itching to skip large sections of the book. Nonetheless, Colby should be commended for laying the foundations for an updated defense strategic framework and offering concrete proposals that are together a meaningful contribution to the conversation surrounding China’s alarming belligerence.

Kelley Jhong is a U.S. Army officer and currently a candidate for an M.S. degree in Information Strategy and Political Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] William A. Galston, “Opinion | Will America Come to Taiwan’s Defense?,” Wall Street Journal (October 12, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/will-america-come-to-taiwan-defense-china-xi-navy-11634053378.

[2] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021), 236.

[3] Colby, 24–25.

[4] Colby, 146.

[5] Colby, xii.

[6] Colby, 69.

[7] Colby, 75.

[8] Colby, 76.

[9] Colby, 75–76.

[10] Colby, 77.

[11] Colby, 75.

[12] Colby, 101.

[13] Rush Doshi, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 6.

[14] Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 4 (August 2021): 63.

[15] Colby, The Strategy of Denial, 212.

[16] Colby, 236.