Putin Attempts to Shift Nuclear Brinkmanship

Instead of following the series of aerial Russian provocations in the Baltic Sea region with nuclear brinksmanship, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a more subtle tack. At the so-called Global Atomic Forum in Moscow, Putin praised Russia’s nuclear power program and offered to share relevant technologies with “the states of the Global South and East” (President of Russia; Izvestiya, September 25). Only the leaders of Ethiopia and Myanmar were present to applaud this speech, but Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who appears to find it important to cultivate connections with Putin, confirmed Russia’s leadership in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy (RBC, September 26). Putin’s tone was notably different from the address to nuclear scientists at the Sarov federal research center last month, where he held a closed meeting on the Burevestnik nuclear-propelled drone, emphasizing the role of science in strengthening Russia’s strategic deterrence (President of Russia; Vedomosti, August 22; The Moscow Times, August 23).

Russia’s relative respect for U.S. satellites is meant to aid the rehabilitation of personal rapport between Trump and Putin following Putin’s rejection of the U.S. peace deal at the Alaska summit (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25). The decision of Putin’s ally, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, to release some political prisoners—even while repressions against others are expanded—is also supposed to help mend the Trump–Putin relationship (Carnegie Politika, September 12; Novaya Gazeta Europe, September 14). Lukashenka made himself a star presenter at the Atomic Forum in Moscow, and his key topic was impeccably peaceful—the agreement to construct a second nuclear power plant in Belarus (Kommersant, September 25). When questioned by journalists about the deployment of the Oreshnik missile system, however, he confirmed that it was “on the way” to Belarus (Radio Svoboda, September 26).

President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not present at the Moscow forum despite placing great importance on Rosatom’s construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, instead opting to travel to the United States for a long-desired meeting with Trump (Kommersant, September 26). The Russia–Türkiye strategic partnership has notably slackened as Ankara shows full support for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) actions aimed at countering Moscow’s provocations, and Trump prompts Erdoğan to sanction the Kremlin (Izvestiya, September 26). Russia has made no attempt to escalate hostilities in the Black Sea even after the recent Ukrainian drone attack on Novorossiysk, however, because nuclear energy cooperation is Putin’s best instrument for countering U.S. influence on Erdoğan and because the Kremlin counts on profits from Türkiye importing Russian oil and gas (Meduza, September 24).

The Kremlin is using the combination of its air incursions in the Baltic region and Putin’s nuclear “pacifism” rhetoric, including his proposition for extending New START, to confuse and aggravate divisions between the United States and Europe (Top War, September 25). Moscow cannot quite figure out the meaning of the shifts in Trump’s positions on its war against Ukraine, but tends to interpret uncertainty as an opportunity (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 25). Russian pro-regime expert commentary on U.S. policy making remains respectful and deferential, while the Kremlin’s media ridicules and vilifies the European political elite (RIAC, September 22). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly directed warnings about the severe consequences of intercepting Russian aircraft primarily at the Europeans while expressing readiness for a “honest dialogue” with the Trump administration, and taking no immediate issue with Trump’s description of Russia as a “paper tiger” (Vedomosti, September 27; Forbes.ru, September 28).

Putin’s track record of nuclear brinksmanship is so long and rich that his attempt to show self-restraint and advance cooperative ideas is, at best, unconvincing, likely motivated by the assumption that Washington’s strategic memory is short. His insistence on staying the course in Ukraine is undercut by Russia’s failure to win significant territory and by the failure of massive missile and drone attacks to terrorize Ukraine. Nuclear weapons may be Putin’s only means of rapidly altering the course of an attritional war. The Western coalition may soon have to gather again political courage and military means to deter his new attempts at blackmail and intimidation.

Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.