Russia Recoils From Possibility of Stable Relationship With U.S.

https://jamestown.org/programs/edm/

The traditional May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow was not a grand affair this year, unlike the one originally planned for 2020, which had to be postponed and curtailed because of the severe aggravation of the COVID-19 pandemic. The rumble of tanks on Red Square last Sunday signified, nevertheless, that the pause in Kremlin policymaking caused by the extended May holiday (see EDM, May 3) is over, and the instrument of choice in Russian foreign policy—military might—is ready for new demonstrations and deployments. President Vladimir Putin was content to take a break from “irksome” matters such as the violent border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan or the diplomatic row with the Czech Republic (Carnegie.ru, May 4). Rather than spend any more time on those, Putin likely believes he needs to prepare political ground for the planned summit with United States President Joseph Biden in mid-June, even if insightful analysts in Moscow play down expectations for any sort of breakthrough (Russiancouncil.ru, May 6).

The main cause of Lavrov’s outburst at the virtual meeting of the United Nations Security Council were the sanctions imposed and constantly fine-tuned by the US and the European Union, which the Russian leadership tries simultaneously to shrug off as insignificant and to make into an excuse for the poor performance of Russia’s economy (RBC, May 4). The latest set of US sanctions introduced in mid-April was less severe than many in Moscow had expected, so now every seeming indication that Biden’s team has no intentions of adding more punitive measures is eagerly amplified by Russian media (Izvestia, May 8). The disturbing prospect for Russian politicians and oligarchs, however, is that the US government, following Biden’s executive order, is preparing steps that would deliver effective punishment for the next Russian breach of the rules; and even the usually hesitant European Parliament recently adopted, by an extraordinary margin, a resolution suggesting a ban on imports of oil and natural gas from Russia, among other measures (Rosbalt, May 6). The sanctions regime, therefore, has a stronger deterrent than destructive effect on the Russian economy, and the already imposed penalties for multiple misdeeds deny the Kremlin the opportunity to “weaponize” energy exports even as a counter-measure of last resort (Moscow Echo, April 28).

It is not sanctions but bad domestic policies that hamper a strong post-pandemic recovery and sustain the decline of household incomes, which is the main worry for the majority of Russians (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 7). The Kremlin increasingly relies on police power to suppress discontent, but as many Russian economists argue, repressions are costly and have turned into a major factor contributing to chronic economic stagnation (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, May 6). Despite all the propaganda and self-glorification, which typically focuses on the Soviet victory in World War II but hides its horrible human price, Russia’s international image molds into a brutal and backward dictatorship, draining its resources of “soft power” (VTimes, May 5). The persecution of the political opposition and curtailing of media freedom are not merely internal affairs but violations of international norms. And the G7 meeting confirmed that the West recognizes the connection between the rise of Russian repressions at home and Moscow’s aggressive behavior abroad (Novaya Gazeta, May 6). Russia seeks to join forces with China in a counter-offensive against this “interference.” As such, Lavrov lashed out against the US plan to convene a summit of democracies, warning that it would cause a further escalation of global tensions (TASS, May 7).

Conventional political wisdom says that Russia stands to benefit from more stable relations with the US and Europe, which should theoretically alleviate Russia’s persistent fears of a NATO invasion. This rationale, however, does not apply to the Putin regime—and not only because the latter needs to exaggerate external threats in order to justify its domestic repressions and explain away economic failures. Every step in bolstering solidarity among Western democracies and in upholding democratic values constitutes a threat to the existence of this corrupt autocracy, and no détente or a “reset” can possibly mitigate that threat in the Kremlin’s eyes. From the West’s side, containment can undermine Russia’s ability to project military might, but such a strategy is always a work in progress, and the Kremlin will try to exploit every opening for dialogue in order to undercut and erode Western commitment to these goals.

Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor.