High-North Competition: Redefining the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic Role

“The use of polar military power should be widely referred to the practices of various countries, so that military power and civil power should be closely integrated, and the multiple benefits of military power should be used to effectively safeguard the country's interests in the polar regions. It is necessary to give full play to the role of military forces in supporting polar scientific research and other operations, and actively provide equipment, technology, and medical support.” – 2020 Science of Military Strategy, National Defense University Press, Beijing[1]. The Arctic theater is rapidly developing and the U.S. / Chinese Communist Party (CCP) / Russian competition for primacy is well underway. To be sure, the U.S. lags in establishing constant Arctic presence but even with the U.S. Coast Guards (USCG) new fleet of icebreakers, which have yet to be delivered, the U.S. is unprepared to compete. The U.S., and particularly the USCG which operates the only ice breaking or ice capable ships in the federal inventory, should assume a more active national defense posture and boldly innovate new operating concepts informed by adversary grey zone behavior and the developing security environment to compete and win in the emerging Arctic.

Grey zone competition already extends to the Arctic. Over ten years ago the CCP gained observer status on the Arctic Council to establish their Arctic credibility, steer policy, and advance the Polar Silk Road[11]. More recently, the CCP greatly expanded its Arctic presence through joint military exercises with Russia as well as over 13 dual-use CCP led scientific Arctic expeditions testing UUV and aviation operating concepts[12][13]. The increase in CCP Arctic dual use research and military patrols, Arctic Council observer status, and economic coercion for dual use Arctic infrastructure development in aggregate with their current Eastern Pacific grey zone behavior is revealing[14]. The CCP wants domination of the Arctic commons, building that authority begins now, and they will demolish existing global norms to obtain primacy.

Over the next decade Beijing will continue to increase its Arctic presence to further their claims as a near Arctic nation. In aggregated with Russian Arctic operations, this will stress the U.S. Arctic security posture. China now operates seven icebreakers of varying capability[15]. Russia operates more than 40 icebreakers; some are nuclear powered while others are diesel[16]. The USCG currently operates two with a third reconfigured commercial supply vessel just recently taking to sea. Concerningly, Russia recently began reconstituting its naval icebreaker fleet with two modern armed combat icebreakers and two additional hulls specifically designated to serve the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service[17]; polar naval combat vessels may soon also carry Chinese flags. The People Liberation Army (PLA) is predominantly guided by its four historic missions. In a 2019 Defense White Paper by Xi Jinping those roles were defined as : 1.) provide strategic support for consolidating the leadership position of the CCP and the socialist system; 2.) provide strategic support for the safeguarding of national sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity; 3.) provide strategic support to protect China’s overseas interests; and 4.) provide strategic support to promote world peace and development[18]. Particularly, strategic support to China’s overseas interests and promotion of world peace and development tasks the PLAN to expand operations and control to the Arctic commons. Following Russia’s lead, armed and SIGINT capable PLAN and CCG ships may become ever-present Arctic realities.

The Arctic is strategically important. It is the Northern approach to the homeland, holds multiple strategic chokepoints for shipping and communication cables, offers lucrative shipping routes, includes all Russian submersible strategic forces, and hosts most of the U.S. land based ballistic missile early warning infrastructure as well as enormous energy reserves[19]. As of 2024, the DoW Arctic strategy is to monitor and respond through the employment of robust intelligence collection and Ally / Partner cooperation along three lines of effort (LOE): Enhance – continued investment in sensors, intelligence and information sharing to improve understanding of the environment and manage risk; Engage – Allies, partners, federal, State, and Local authorities to strengthen deterrence; Exercise – demonstrate interoperability and credible joint capabilities[20]. Conveniently, the most current USCG’s Arctic strategy LOE’s, (Enhance Capability to Operate Effectively in a Dynamic Arctic, Strengthen the Rules-Based Order, Innovate and Adapt to Promote Resilience and Prosperity) nest well with the DoW strategy. As the only U.S. sea going, service capable of conducting surface operations in the high north, the USCG is ideally positioned to champion these LOE’s[21].

The Arctic maritime surface mission falls squarely and solely on the USCG’s shoulders; the U.S. Navy will not assume this responsibility[22]. Polar operations are one of the USCG’s 11 statutory missions. To meet mission demands, the USCG was recently funded to build three new Polar Security Cutters and requested additional funding to build as many as nine[23]. Additionally, in January 2025 President Trump announced plans to increase the U.S. icebreaker fleet to 40 hulls which would likely remain in the USCG portfolio[24]. More importantly, the USCG has decades of experience in polar regions to responsibly lead the deterrence mission. But new ships don’t guarantee a win. The USCG Arctic program must innovate new operating concepts unfamiliar to the historically peaceful and scientific nature of USCG Arctic patrols. Ship, crew, policy, and funding must adopt a much more active national defense posture to credibly compete.

New USCG operating concepts should align with DoW LOE’s for Arctic competition. To enhance maritime domain awareness (MDA) and demonstrate interoperability, new icebreakers should be able to integrate with the AEGIS weapons systems. Not only should they be capable of relaying information, but they should also provide detection and tracking with the fidelity to inform kill-webs. This could manifest as integration of navy type navy owned radar / C2 systems and cross-decking Navy Sailors trained to operate them. Employing USCG ships with meaningful sensor packages will relieve strained DoW assets allowing the Joint Force to keep pressure on the Pacific and Eastern European threats while improving the probability of detecting modern long-range weapons systems. The new ships should also be equipped with secure compartment facilities for handling highly classified information to carry out sensitive missions. Without an ability to receive orders or process and pass critical intelligence, it will be difficult to fully exploit their capability. Additionally, while it is unlikely a three-knot naval battle will ever play out on the ice, the ships must be outfitted with countermeasures if they are to complement northern latitude ISR / BMD detection, compete with armed adversary icebreakers, and project U.S. power credibly.

The new USCG Arctic program must be capable of incorporating extensive UUV and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations. Not only are remote operations a cost-effective means to extend detection opportunity, but they are also expendable. Severe weather conditions in the high north limit manned shipboard aviation operations. UAV’s could reduce risk to air crews as well as their costly and time-consuming training requirements, and increase the opportunity for airborne intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Moreover, the earmarked icebreakers are designed to carry MH-60 Jayhawk helicopters, the rotary wing asset expected to recapitalize all USCG rotor wing aviation. However, due to engineering lifecycle oversight, a portion of the MH-60 fleet was recently grounded significantly delaying the recapitalization process. Relying on 30-year-old MH-65 helicopters for persistent arctic operations would be foolhardy due to platform limitations and the increased deployment schedules anticipated in the Arctic theater[25]. Below the ice, UUV’s will play a vital role in monitoring adversary dual use Arctic activity. Like-for-like capabilities will further complicate the decision matrix of CCP and Russian operations by providing substantial sub-sea ISR with the possibility to expand operations to deliver subsea effects. Deterrence by detection is a powerful tool to complicate CCP decisions as it plays on cultural paranoia of external meddling and fear of encirclement. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of unmanned systems in future conflict[26]. If USCG ice breakers are not controlling swarms of drones above and below the ice, they are behind.

When it comes to partnership and engagement across the interagency, all levels of government and abroad, the USCG punches above its weight. The USCG has a proven history of conducting humanitarian missions, in particular rescue and aid to remote Alaska, which has built strong relationships with Alaskan communities sensitive to military operations. Operating concepts should incorporate remote high north community leadership to educate against predatory CCP investments and leverage the benefits of remote outposts. The future Arctic program should pursue infrastructure investments including MDA, extended logistics depots, and redundant and hardened C2 systems. Operations activities and investments should align with and support future Arctic resource exploration to include pipeline protection, mining operations, and defense, surveillance, and security of subsea resources. The USCG’s federal, state, and interagency reach is firmly established. Nurturing existing relationships and engaging NATO Arctic Allys will buy good will, fill resource gaps, and enable agile integration of USCG Arctic MDA operations to provide quality and timely Arctic awareness to the interagency.

To exercise interoperability and capability in the Arctic, the USCG must be more present. The USCG is already a credible leader in the Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum. With seven of the eight Arctic nations being NATO members, there is great capacity and willingness to integrate patrol schedules, provide robust year-round presence, and enforce existing international norms. These relationships must be fostered, and existing training events must be expanded to include Arctic native communities, state and local authorities and be unmistakably tailored to overt deterrence operations. The gap between a robust USCG ice fleet and today is almost a decade. NATO must provide continued presence with U.S. engagement in the Arctic – waiting for 2035 will be too late. The U.S. has an asymmetric advantage in this LOE via NATO. The CCP only has Russia.

The U.S. is behind in Arctic presence; however, it is not out of the race. A USCG-led fleet of modern and capable icebreakers with modern and agile operating concepts is a powerful deterrent. The U.S., and particularly the USCG must assume a more active national defense posture and boldly innovate new operating concepts informed by adversarial grey zone actions to compete and win in the emerging Arctic theater.

CDR Jacob W. Brantley has served in the Coast Guard for over 16 years, most recently serving in DoW/U.S. Coast Guard integration.

The views of this article are that of the author, not of the Commandant or official Coast Guard policy.

[1] Tianliang, Xiao, Kang Wuchao, and Cai Renzhao. “The Science of Military Strategy, 2020.” Edited by Lou Yaoliang. Govinfo, January 2022. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-gpo195080/pdf/GOVPUB-D301-PURL-gpo195080.pdf. Pg 166.

[2] Office, U.S. Government Accountability. “China’s Foreign Investments Significantly Outpace the United States. What Does That Mean?” U.S. GAO, September 4, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/blog/chinas-foreign-investments-significantly-outpace-united-states.-what-does-mean.

[3] Meick, Ethan, Michelle Ker, and Han May Chan. “China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States.” China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States | U.S.- CHINA | ECONOMIC and SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, June 14, 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-engagement-pacific-islands-implications-united-states. Pg 10-11.

[4] Parlevliet, Alayna. “Support Threefold: Taiwan’s Pacific Island Allies: New Perspectives on Asia.” CSIS, July 17, 2024. https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/support-threefold-taiwans-pacific-island-allies.

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[7] “Chinese Coast Guard Fires Water Cannons at Philippine Vessels in the Latest South China Sea Incident.” AP News, May 1, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/philippines-disputed-shoal-south-china-sea-scarborough-27a2ef0bda953cb6bda4f42057fb7e39.

[8] Edvardsen , Astri. “China’s Coast Guard on First Patrol in the Arctic with Russia.” High North News, October 4, 2024. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-coast-guard-first-patrol-arctic-russia.

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[10] Porter, Tom. “Fishermen Caught a Chinese Spy Drone Just off the Philippines Coast: Officials.” Yahoo! News, January 3, 2025. https://www.yahoo.com/news/fishermen-caught-chinese-spy-drone-120436183.html.

[11] “Arctic Council Observers.” Arctic Council. Accessed January 4, 2025. https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/.

[12] Humpert, Malte. “U.S. Department of Defense Sounds Alarm Bells about China’s Growing Presence in Arctic.” gCaptain, January 2, 2025. https://gcaptain.com/u-s-department-of-defense-sounds-alarm-bells-about-chinas-growing-presence-in-arctic/.

[13] “U.S. Department of Defense 2024 Arctic Strategy.” Department of Defense, June 21, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Pg 3. 

[14] Auerswald, David. “China’s Multifaceted Arctic Strategy.” War on the Rocks, May 24, 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/chinas-multifaceted-arctic-strategy/.

[15] Humpert, Malte. “U.S. Department of Defense Sounds Alarm Bells about China’s Growing Presence in Arctic.” gCaptain, January 2, 2025. https://gcaptain.com/u-s-department-of-defense-sounds-alarm-bells-about-chinas-growing-presence-in-arctic/.

[16] Aliyev, Nurlan. “Russia’s Icebreakers, North Sea Route, and Invasion of Ukraine.” PONARS Eurasia, September 23, 2022. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-icebreakers-north-sea-route-and-invasion-of-ukraine/.

[17] Humpert, Malte. “Russian Navy Launches Second Arctic ‘Combat Icebreaker.’” gCaptain, December 31, 2024. https://gcaptain.com/russian-navy-launches-second-arctic-combat-icebreaker/.

[18] Heath, Timothy. “The Historic Missions of the People’s Liberation Army under Xi Jinping: The Military’s Role in the ‘New Era’: China Leadership Monitor.” China Leadership, May 30, 2024. https://www.prcleader.org/post/the-historic-missions-of-the-people-s-liberation-army-under-xi-jinping-the-military-s-role-in-the.

[19] “U.S. Department of Defense 2024 Arctic Strategy.” Department of Defense, June 21, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Pg 2.

[20] “Arctic.” United States Coast Guard, April 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pdf. Pg 1, 7.

[21] “Arctic.” United States Coast Guard, April 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pdf. Pg 6.

[22]  Konrad, John. “Top Navy Admiral Says No to Icebreakers.” gCaptain, April 1, 2023. https://gcaptain.com/top-navy-admiral-says-no-icebreakers/.

[23] Labs, Eric J, and David Mosher. “The Cost of the Coast Guard’s Polar Security Cutter.” Congressional Budget Office, August 21, 2024. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60656.

[24] Hooper, Craig. “In a New Surprise, President Trump Announces America Will Order 40 Big Icebreakers.” Forbes, January 29, 2025. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2025/01/28/in-a-new-surprise-president-trump-announces-america-will-order-40-big-icebreakers/.

[25] Hooper, Craig. “U.S. Coast Guard Cuts MH-60T Jayhawk Service Life, Grounds Helicopters.” Forbes, September 2, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2024/08/30/us-coast-guard-cuts-mh-60t-jayhawk-service-life-grounds-helicopters/.

[26] Mahnken, Thomas G. Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture. PDF. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011. Pg 7-9.