Obama Poking Holes in America's Nuclear Umbrella
The recent announcement by President Obama that he would seek negotiated cuts with Russia in their respective nuclear arsenals continues a trend in this administration’s nuclear policies that has weakened our relationships with our allies. Continued drawdowns, public statements on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in planning, and an aging stockpile should all spark concern that these allies might rethink their decision to forego an independent nuclear weapons capability. Many are included on the list of the thirty-five to forty states that possess the requisite scientific and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons if they so desired. Of particular concern, given the recent bellicosity of North Korea and the Russian-Chinese joint military exercises, is what policymakers in Seoul might do. This would not be the first time South Korea has taken a serious look at going nuclear.
A brief review of this history highlights how U.S. policy decisions affect perceptions of its security guarantees which can have serious consequences in the real world. Since 1954, South Korea has relied on a security guarantee including both deployment of U.S. troops on the peninsula and protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. South Korea did not have plans to develop nuclear weapons until several events starting in 1970 altered the country's calculus. First, President Nixon unilaterally withdrew 26,000 troops from South Korea immediately after a series of weak American responses to provocative military actions by North Korea; next Nixon made his surprise visit to China and normalized relations; and finally, in 1974 the U.S. rejected a request from Seoul for a larger role in nuclear planning.
In response to this changing security environment, President Park Chung-Hee launched a clandestine nuclear weapons program. South Korea entered into negotiations with several countries to buy various reprocessing facilities and a reactor and when the U.S. found out, we made clear that aspects of the security guarantee were forfeit if South Korea did not abandon its nuclear weapons program and ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). South Korea acquiesced, agreed to cancel the weapons project, and acceded to the NPT in 1975.
However, despite ratification of the non-proliferation treaty and assurances to the U.S., South Korea soon seriously reconsidered renewing its nuclear weapons program. In 1977, newly elected president Jimmy Carter began to fulfill a campaign promise to remove all American troops and 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula. In response the South Korean Defense Ministry suggested that South Korea could have a nuclear weapon completed by 1981. It was the cancellation of Carter's withdrawal plans—forced largely by a deeply alarmed U.S. Congress—and Park's assassination in 1979 that resulted in the end of this nuclear weapons project.
Since then, South Korea has maintained a lingering interest in an independent nuclear arsenal which is not altogether surprising given North Korea’s track record. Despite these provocations, South Korea has continued to try to engage high-level leaders of North Korea while reaffirming its commitment to a nuclear-free peninsula. That said, it can afford to adopt this accommodating posture only in the context of American-guaranteed security. In both of the above instances, South Korea abandoned its quest when the U.S. offered positive security assurances and publicly reaffirmed its commitment to the security guarantee.
If regional conditions continue to grow more threatening and the U.S. does not signal strength and an unwavering commitment to its ally, South Korea may again move toward a nuclear weapons capability. U.S. policymakers should continue to focus on shaping the security environment on the peninsula as best it can – the B-2 fly-overs, fighter drills, and relocation of Aegis destroyers off the coast are all appropriate responses. In the long-term, to avoid proliferation among U.S. allies it is critical to communicate resolve and to demonstrate follow-through on security promises. Accommodating other regional actors should be of secondary importance. China may not appreciate an expanded U. S. presence and the tough rhetoric that comes with signaling American resolve, but it cannot be in China’s interest to see a nuclear South Korea either.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula demonstrates why the United States does not and cannot make its nuclear policy in a vacuum. Nor should American nuclear policy orient itself around the ossified Cold War framework which largely took only Russia into account. Soaring rhetoric about nuclear zero from President Obama, negotiating New START, further talk of unilateral drawdowns, a Nuclear Posture Review with the stated goal of moving away from reliance on nuclear weapons, an ever-worsening fiscal picture, and deep cuts to the defense budget – all of these at least raise the question of whether the U.S. guarantee of security under its nuclear umbrella is waning. U.S. allies and enemies alike must surely wonder: what would further cuts in the American nuclear arsenal mean? Would the U. S. have either the will or the capability to respond to a regional crisis?
While South Korea is the most likely state that could next seek nukes, it is by no means the only country that would be impacted be a perceived shrinking of the American nuclear umbrella. Indeed, South Korean efforts to re-start a nuclear program would have a significant impact on Japanese thinking. The same is true in the Middle East, where the development of an uncontested Iranian nuclear weapons program would trigger similar questions about American security guarantees among other American allies.
American security guarantees and nuclear policy decisions are not merely academic debates; their impact is very real and a nuclear South Korea would serve as a very stark reminder of that.
