Rightly, the Pentagon has decided that the future of military satellite communications should not depend on one network or supplier. But putting more satellites into orbit is only half the job. The military also needs a simple way to connect to them from the ground. The U.S. Space Force is developing a Space Data Network to connect different commercial satellite systems; at the same time, the Space Development Agency (SDA) is building its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA). Its Transport Layer alone will eventually include between 300 and 500 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO).

There’s sound reasoning behind these initiatives. It’s harder to disable a distributed system built by a number of suppliers. It’s also easier to enlarge such a system, which isn’t dependent on any one company or technology. But more satellites do not by themselves make a military network more resilient. Resilience means that, when one network fails, troops can still reach another. That depends as much on the equipment on the ground as on the satellites in orbit.

On July 9, 2026, a joint investigation by The Insider, Der Spiegel and Le Monde revealed contents of the documents allegedly from a secret Russia-China military forum in Guangzhou. Among these documents, a slideshow purportedly laid out a three-tier plan to neutralize Elon Musk’s Starlink constellation. It begins with diplomatic and regulatory pressure followed by jamming and orbital-slot denial and physical destruction of satellites as the final rung. Fast forward two months, on September 14, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink announced, the first official disclosure of its kind, that the United States has, "on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the Joint Force against hostile adversary action." The causal link between the two developments is difficult to establish. However, they have certainly pushed the theoretical debate of space weaponization into the practical realm. It demands a closer scrutiny of their implications while also impinging the necessity to find a diplomatic common ground, sooner rather than later, vis-à-vis weaponization element of outer space.

Accelerating space launch is a top national security priority.  So is flight testing for the U.S. Air Force’s new B-21 stealth bomber, the F-47 fighter, and the Navy’s unmanned MQ-25 Stingray drone, and yes, air taxis. Yet a petition pending at the Federal Communications Commission is trying to rush forward a new path to more spectrum allocation for space launch.  Taking a Wild, Wild West approach to opening up spectrum could seriously slow the pace of military and commercial flight test all across America. 

Space launch advocates have completely overlooked one big problem with this proposal: flight test telemetry.  If the FCC were to grant the CSF petition, it could lead to the “wholesale disruption of spectrum access” found the Aerospace and Defense Industry Spectrum Access Coalition.