In Defense of the B-58 Hustler, the First Stealth Bomber

Many consider the Convair B-58 Hustler, the world’s first Mach two bomber, to have been a highly problematic aircraft in the 1950s. It was an extremely expensive aircraft, and its reported lack of range, along with safety concerns, combined with General Curtis Lemay’s opposition to the whole concept, helped force the USAF brass to retire the aircraft very early in its career. That is the conventional thinking expressed in Kenneth P. Werrell’s 2024 book, Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes and Failures, 1940-1990. Werrell quotes an Air Force historian named John Greenwood, who provides a quick summation of the case against the aircraft: “‘The B-58, although the holder of numerous world speed records, was severely restricted in its usefulness and lifetime. Designed for supersonic, high altitude penetration, the B-58 was limited in range, payload, and growth potential for the addition of advanced radar and other electronic equipment. The decision to phase out the B-58 was an easy one.’” (p.146)

This is the main argument presented in the second edition of Colonel George S. Holt, Jr’s book The B-58 Blunder: How the U.S. Abandoned Its Best Strategic Bomber, published in 2023. As for the claim that the B-58 was much more expensive than the B-52, which continues to serve even now, he, a former B-58 navigator, says that is categorically false. He offers the following rebuttal: “Each B-58 actually cost less to operate than a B-52. This myth originated from the oft quoted, ‘For the cost of operating two B-58 Wings, we can operate six B-52 Wings.’ But, never stated, is the fact that the size of a B-58 Wing was never the same size as a B-52 Wing. The two B-58 Hustler Wings each had 39 UE (unit equipped) B-58s assigned, whereas six B-52 Wings would have had a normal complement of only 15 UE (unit equipped) B-52s assigned.” (pp. 74-75) Secondly, Colonel Holt maintains that since there were far fewer B-58 bases, that “… the B-58s incurred much less base support and other associated operational, maintenance, and logistical support costs, due to economy of scale. Thirdly, a Top-Secret report (now unclassified) estimated the annual operating costs of strategic bombers, including the associated cost for KC-135 tanker refueling support for both the B-52 and the B-58. It showed that the B-58, on an airplane-to-airplane basis, was less costly to operate.” (p. 75) So the B-58 was quite a bargain.

Now then, what about the concerns about the safety of the aircraft? Holt says that has been overblown as well: “Compared to other aircraft, the ‘operational’ accident rate was not that bad and quite different from the oft-quoted phrase; ‘Of the 116 built, 26 were destroyed for an accident rate of 22%.’ Of the 116 built, 24 (not 26) were destroyed before the Hustler was finally phased out of the inventory. However, seven of those accidents occurred before the Hustler ever entered the Air Force inventory to become operational. Eight Convair test pilots and flight engineers were killed flying those aircraft in the test and evaluation phase of the B-58’s development. Each accident uncovered early developmental problems that had to be fixed before delivery to the Air Force. A more meaningful accident rate would read as follows; ‘Of the 116 built, 17 were destroyed after the B-58 became operational for an accident rate of 15%.’” (p. 78)

He also reports that several losses occurred at air shows, not on operations, so only “14 B-58s [were] lost over a span of 10 years. An average loss of 1.4 aircraft per year is not a bad accident rate, at all, when compared to other combat aircraft. The Mach 3, SR-71 (and variants) had an accident rate twice that of the Hustler, and the B-47 experienced 28 fatal accidents and 63 deaths in just one year.” (p.79) Once again, the USAF’s opposition to the B-58 was based on selective memory, and did not consider that flying can be dangerous for ANY new jet aircraft. The fact that the B-58 was singled out for being unsafe was just a convenient excuse because the Air Force brass simply felt threated by the aircraft’s new capabilities and just wanted to preserve the status quo at the taxpayer’s expense.

Finally, in response to USAF criticism that the Hustler did not have the range needed for a strategic bomber, he offers clarification. Both the vaunted B-52, Strategic Air Command’s favourite, and the B-58 needed air-to-air refuelling to reach their wartime targets, and furthermore: “Its range, with a single refueling, was adequate to attack all of its assigned [Single Integrated Operations Plan] targets and its low altitude speed was much faster than the B-52.  It is true that the B-58 had no terrain-following radar, but because of its speed, low radar signature, and ability to withstand heavy turbulence at low altitude, it was actually more effective at low-level penetrations to its targets. In the 1968 – 1969 period, a number of advanced radar improvements were made to the Hustler, including an improved version of the bombing/navigation system (AN/ASQ-42) and the installation of a highly accurate radar altimeter, which allowed the B-58 to fly even lower on its penetration to enemy targets. In exercises against our own Air Defense Command, it was virtually undetectable, and I could not find a single instance of a successful intercept by any of our own fighter pilots.” (p. 81)

There you have it. The B-58 was a stealth aircraft before anyone knew about stealth! I agree with Colonel Holt and wish the Hustler had been given a chance to prove the critics wrong. When one considers all the terribly bad aircraft that the USAF accepts, including the F-35, we all need to remember what happened to the B-58 Hustler, an aircraft that was well ahead of its time and didn’t deserve its fate. I highly recommend Colonel Holt’s book and hope it attracts a wider audience.

Roger Thompson is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, a Research Fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for the Study of Security and Development, the author of Lessons Not Learned: The US Navy’s Status Quo Culture, and a former researcher at Canada’s National Defence Headquarters.

Werrell, Kenneth. Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes, and Failures: 1940–1990 (Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series). Texas A&M University Press. Kindle Edition.

George Holt. The B-58 Blunder: How the U.S. Abandoned its Best Strategic Bomber. George Holt Jr. Kindle Edition.