'AI +' Initiatives Multiply After Years of Experimentation

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is officially moving to the center of the national stage in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the words of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), it “is the core engine of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation” (新一轮科技革命和产业变革的核心引擎) and is “reshaping the way economic development and social life operate” (重塑经济发展与社会生活的运作方式) (NDRC, August 26). This description appears in an explainer released in late August alongside the “Opinion on Deepening Implementation of the ‘AI+’ Action Plan” (关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见), a landmark document from the State Council that signals the Party-state’s intentions for the direction of development policies over the next decade (State Council, August 26). By 2035, the “Opinion” states that the country will have “fully entered a new stage of development based on an intelligent economy and society” (国全面步入智能经济和智能社会发展新阶段). That, at least, is the plan.

Also dovetailing with the recent flurry of AI-related announcements was an update to the AI Safety Governance Framework (人工智能安全治理框架), announced on September 15 by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) This framework, which aims to “span borders, sectors, and industries,” similarly calls for safeguarding “national sovereignty, security, and development interests.” It also lists threats that AI might exacerbate, including spreading disinformation, which could “threaten social stability and public security,” and “seizing discourse power and agenda-setting power in cyberspace” (CAC, September 15; Global Times, September 16).

Central government policy documents often function as signals. In this way, this latest “Opinion” likely has cleared the way for an intense period of policymaking, investment, and innovation over the next few years. Whether the country will achieve the ambitious goals set by the action plan depends on a number of factors, however, not all of which are within Beijing’s control. The announcement nevertheless appears to be having immediate impact, at least among policymakers.

Already, in the first week of September, the National Energy Administration unveiled an “opinion” of its own. Released in conjunction with the NDRC, the “Opinion on Promoting the Implementation of High-Quality Development “‘AI+’ Energy” (关于推进“人工智能+”能源高质量发展的实施意见) explicitly builds on the “AI+” action plan, seeking to “seize on the important strategic opportunities of AI” (抢抓人工智能发展重大战略机遇). With an even more ambitious timeline, it calls for reaching a “world-leading level” (世界领先水平) in energy-related AI technologies and applications by 2030 (NEA, September 4). Several days later, a vice minister from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Zhang Yunming (张云明), announced plans to formulate an “AI+Industrialization” (“人工智能+制造”) roadmap, implementation guide, and other related plans (SCIO, September 9).

In the months ahead, the formulation “AI+” is likely to become ever more present in both official discourse and business jargon, as entrepreneurs across the board seek to capitalize on its newly established imprimatur. Other “AI+” plans could appear for the rest of the priority areas highlighted in the “Opinion,” but also in separate sectors. In fact, many of the drivers underpinning the “AI+” action plan long predate the plan itself.

Public and private entities throughout the country have spent years experimenting with the “AI+” label, figuring out what sectors, products, or ideas it can be attached to, and which might eventually get political endorsement. Uses of the “AI+” formulation go back to at least the 2016 “‘Internet+’ AI Three-Year Action Plan” (“互联网+”人工智能三年行动), and likely were given a boost by the 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan (新一代人工智能发展规划) (NDRC, May 18, 2016; State Council, July 20, 2017). That latter document planned for AI application scenarios across healthcare, finance, manufacturing, education, and security. Although it doesn’t refer explicitly to “AI+,” but within weeks of its release, media began referencing “AI+Education” (AI+教育), with reporting stating that, “with policy support, it is poised to spark a new wave of investment” (在政策支持下，将会掀起新的投资高潮) (BJNews, July 31, 2017).

Over subsequent years, AI was added to a variety of things, from “Easier Travel” (人工智能+出行更轻松) in 2018 to traffic lights (“AI+信号灯”)—a subset of a broader “AI+Transport” (“AI+交通”) push (People’s Daily, February 2, 2018; Shanghai S&T Liberation Daily, September 16, 2018). By 2019, even English-language state media was providing explainers of “AI+.” CGTN noted that it is “more than just a simple addition”; instead, it is about “deeply integrating AI technology and Internet platforms with traditional and emerging industries to create real benefits for society.” It lists smart homes, autonomous vehicles, and intelligent healthcare as good examples of “AI+” (CGTN, March 25, 2019)

“AI+” began to feature in policy around 2019, but only at the local level. An AI innovation and application pilot zone was launched in Shanghai, with a focus on AI plus comprehensive research and development, manufacturing, life, and transport (AI+综合研发、AI+制造、AI+生活、 AI+交通) (CAC, May 21, 2019). In early 2020, Beijing’s annual government work report discussed cultivating the emerging industry of “AI+health” (重点培育“AI+健康”新兴产业), as well as building an “AI+government affairs” (AI+政务) platform (Beijing Daily, January 19, 2020). By the end of that year, some observers argued that the security industry was currently the hottest, most frequently mentioned in the AI industry, with a wave of references to “AI+ security” (AI+安防) (Uniview, December 31, 2019). Security firms capitalized on this, offering smart security applications and 5G integration to “strengthen social governance” (强化社会治理) (iResearch, November 2, 2021; (Fibocom, September 20, 2022). Perhaps the most important milestone in subnational policy was the reference to “exploring interdisciplinary ‘X+AI’ talent cultivation models” (探索开展“X+人工智能”的交叉融合人才培养模式) in Beijing’s Implementation Plan for Accelerating the Development of Beijing as a Globally Influential AI Innovation Hub (2023-2025) (北京市加快建设具有全球影响力的人工智能创新策源地实施方案 (2023–2025年)) (Beijing Government, May 30, 2023). This framing in terms of “X+AI” implied the fungibility of AI as general tool to enhance a variety of different modes of production.

Finally, “AI+” reached the level of national policymaking, appearing in both the 2024 and 2025 government work reports, the latter of which highlighted smart vehicles, robots, and manufacturing equipment (Xinhua, March 12, 2024, March 12). As an article by a professor at Zhejiang University wrote in the People’s Tribune in February 2025, “AI+” represents “a new paradigm” (一种新的范式), fusing AI with new technologies to spur new productivity (通过新技术的融合与创新，催生新的生产力) across all sectors of the economy and society (People’s Tribune, February 5).

The proliferation of AI+ initiatives, policies, and plans will not automatically entail a rapid buildout of AI-integrated technologies throughout the PRC economy. Such a fundamental shift will take time. As the Zhejiang University professor warned, “current ‘AI+X’ or ‘X+AI’ approaches remain superficial” (“AI+X”或“X+AI”还较为肤浅). Moreover, as some observers have noted, diffusion likely will be hampered due to short-changed local governments, a weak domestic venture capital sector, and the sheer intensity of the efforts required to deeply integrating AI throughout the economy (Substack/Matt Sheehan’s Newsletter, September 9).

As the above analysis shows, however, “AI+” has been gathering momentum now for the best part of a decade. The upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan, which is currently being finalized, could provide even further support if it becomes the first to include “AI+” as a major policy initiative. If there is a lesson here for analysts, it may be to underscore the importance of watching as local signals, such as successful policy experimentation, start to gain momentum. These could indicate the eventual direction of travel for future national policy.

Arran Hope is the Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation. He was previously a reporter for The China Project, and holds degrees in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge and Columbia University.

This article appeared originally at The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief.

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