America Must Present an Alternative to China's First BRI Project

Tazara Railway (Wikipedia Commons)

China and Tanzania have long enjoyed a close relationship since establishing relations in 1964. In 1970, the two countries began work on the TAZARA rail line. Funded largely by grants from the PRC, the expansive project stretched for over 1,000 miles to connect landlocked Zambia to coastal Tanzania.

Port investment is an equally important part of China’s growing critical mineral portfolio. Already, copper from Zambia, cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and rare minerals from the northern part of South Africa go through the port of Dar es Salaam to China. At once, this dynamic presents a challenge and opportunity for China. Given the vast quantity of resources flowing through Dar es Salaam, in addition to trade with other countries, the port is crowded and inefficient. But this need for modernization presented a chance for China to improve its raw material supply chain and solidify its presence in Tanzania.

In 2013 the opportunity presented itself. The Tanzanian government and China Merchant Holdings announced a $10 billion deal to redesign and modernize Bagamoyo port, which sits just north of Dar es Salaam. Close enough to the capital for trade to be easily directed and its security guaranteed by a ninety nine year lease to Chinese investors, the Bagamoyo port project would allow the PRC to alleviate its resource congestion issues and gain a foothold on the African continent.

But one year after the project began construction in 2015, then-President John Magufuli brought the enterprise to a halt after expressing concern that the deal limited Tanzania’s right to develop additional ports as well as China’s latitude to use the land as it saw fit under the terms of the ninety nine year lease. For the remainder of his term until his death in office in 2021, the project remained mired in stalled negotiations. His successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan, announced in 2021 that Tanzania and the Bagamoyo port project’s PRC-backed investors would reinitiate negotiations, which appear likely to succeed.

These two projects have the potential to solidify Chinese control of the supply chain for critical minerals extracted from central Africa – a pressing issue where America is falling behind. Already, Chinese companies own 80% of the cobalt output in the DRC, the source of an overwhelming majority of the world’s supply. Similarly, Chinese companies refine 90% of cobalt in the battery market. Already, China’s dominant position has enabled it to take the lead in 37 of 44 critical technologies. The competition for critical minerals will determine access to the materials that power commercial and military innovation. If America continues allowing China unchallenged control of the critical mineral supply chain, we cede our strategic technological edge.

The first step to challenging Chinese mineral dominance is to offer an alternative to Chinese investment in railway infrastructure. In September 2023, America and several partners initiated the Lobito Corridor project as part of G-7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. With $250 million in American financing to be provided by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and additional investment from EU countries, the Lobito Corridor would offer an alternative to the TAZARA line.

In two parts, the project would connect the southern DRC and northern Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito. First, the investment will improve an existing 1,300km line that connects the DRC and Angola. Then, additional financing will create a new line that leads into Zambia.

The Lobito Corridor project is a meaningful first step towards offering an alternative to Chinese investment, but policymakers should be clear about the goals of future projects in Africa. America and its partners should aim to be an alternative investment option, not try to supplant China as the lone source of developmental financing. African countries should be able to freely choose between competing offers, rather than being trapped in a zero-sum game of alignment.

This also applies to America’s critical mineral grand strategy. It is not feasible to remove China entirely from the critical mineral supply chain, nor would it be desirable. Instead, the U.S. ought to learn from our decades of lacking infrastructure investment in Africa and present ourselves as a ready, willing, and reliable partner for development.

To do this, investment in projects like the Lobito Corridor will be necessary. Future investments in mining, transportation, and refinement should present compelling and competitive alternatives to the PRC. In particular, the executive branch, working together with Congress, should allocate additional resources and direct development finance institutions to specifically pursue critical mineral mining opportunities in Africa. To prepare for the possibility of being cut off from strategic materials, Congress should revitalize the National Defense Stockpile by appropriating additional funds, investing in recycling technology, and encouraging coordination with private mining and refinement companies.

Minerals mined today will power tomorrow’s advanced technology: robotics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and more. No matter what America does, Chinese investments like TAZARA and Bagamoyo will be major parts of that supply chain for decades to come. But the U.S. doesn’t have to accept second place in the frontier technology race. By taking positive action, America and its allies can offer meaningful alternatives to secure critical minerals whose extraction benefits African states, legitimate purchasers, and American national security.

Farrell Gregory is a junior at Dickinson College studying Chinese and International Studies. He is a research assistant at the Yorktown Institute.