The Information Warfare Myth

Russia’s troop buildup on the Ukrainian border may culminate in a full-scale invasion. Or it may be meant to coerce NATO to negotiate and concede to some of Vladimir Putin’s demands regarding Ukraine’s future. But one thing it surely demonstrates is that the efficacy of information warfare to achieve political and security objectives is greatly overstated. The U.S. military and national security community should take note.

The potential destructive effects of cyberattacks are serious, and it is no overreaction on the part of Western intelligence and military services to take that threat seriously. But even cyberattacks, at least as thus far practiced, seem far more bark than bite when evaluating what they achieve beyond imposing some costs on the target nation.

Russia has been employing all the information warfare tools it can muster for nearly eight years, including cyberattacks, disinformation, and pro-Russian influence campaigns. Yet all evidence indicates the Kremlin has failed through information warfare alone to keep most of Ukraine in Russia’s political, economic, and cultural orbit. This contrasts with the parts of Ukraine Russia physically seized (the Crimea) or is engaging in a proxy war using local insurgents (the Donbas).

Contrary to the Russian narrative, Ukrainians were never as anti-Russian as Moscow claims. For example, in 2010, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology recorded that 93 percent of Ukrainians surveyed in all regions had a favorable attitude toward Russia, with 22 percent of the population believing the two states should reunite. Yet in 2016, only 17 percent of Ukrainians reported having a favorable attitude toward Russia. More recent polling confirms Ukrainian public opinion remains at historic lows.

On the question of NATO accession, in 2010, shortly after Yanukovich was elected, in part to improve relations with Russia, only 28 percent of Ukrainians supported NATO accession. A June 2017 poll by the Democracy Initiatives Foundation showed Ukrainian support for joining NATO at 69 percent. Polling in 2021 showed that number remaining above 60 percent. Finally, Russian meddling in Ukraine’s information space has galvanized Ukrainian distrust of Russian media, prompting the ban of Russian social media sites and media outlets in the country.

Not only has Moscow’s information war against Ukraine proved to be remarkably anemic, but it may ultimately be counterproductive. Russia already has conducted cyberattacks against the Ukrainian financial industry and power grid, and Moscow will undoubtedly continue such attacks. It is doubtful, however, that more cyberattacks and a broader, more intense information warfare campaign (if that is even possible) can turn the tide and help Russia achieve lasting political objectives in Ukraine. Moscow has likely come to this realization, hence the threat of physical aggression.

U.S. military information warfare advocates have, for years now, tended toward the hyperbolic in predicting its significance. Information warfare is not insignificant, particularly cyber warfare, but it thus far has a dismal record at achieving foreign policy or military warfighting objectives. What, exactly, did the United States achieve through information warfare methods in Iraq and Afghanistan? Perhaps information warfare, particularly cyber and electronic warfare, will play a more decisive role against a technologically sophisticated adversary.

In some ways, however, even this thesis is being tested, as Ukraine is not a backward nation. Its information technology infrastructure was already heavily compromised to Russian actors. With its historical and cultural connections to Russia, it should have been an easy target for an information warfare campaign. Yet it has turned out to be the hardest of targets. Ukrainians have proven resilient to the point of defiance. And that should inspire the West and give pause to the Pentagon to not overinvest in information warfare at the expense of traditional hard-power capabilities.

All warfare methods must, ultimately, prove their efficacy. Information warfare’s durable effects seem stubbornly hard to measure. Perhaps they are mostly illusory. For now, information warfare is, and may always be, an enabling component to warfare and not a main effort.

Bill Bray is a retired Navy captain and the deputy editor-in-chief of the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine.