Hegseth's Herculean Task

Enable action by removing barriers. Phase five of John Kotter’s famous change model proves the most stubborn as Secretary Hegseth continues to reform and reimagine the Department of War from the ground up. The Department of War is no Augean Stables, but an underlying filth still hinders the ideal environment for molding America’s warriors. This rot is of the most insidious kind: legacy.

At face value, General David Hodne was a premier tactical leader, a warrior who curated and commanded lethal formations. Tactical proficiency serves an officer well as they move up the ranks, but flag officers must do more than lead formations; they must speak in the halls of power. I witnessed firsthand General Hodne revert to the us-versus-them mentality of a junior platoon leader, in front of his own staff, at the Futures and Concepts Center in early 2025. The subject was the “Fork in the Road” email.

Hodne assured a room of civilians and field-grade officers that there was mass confusion at the top and that he didn’t know what was going on, then added that in his entire career, he had never once encountered a poor-performing GS employee. Rather than own his leaders’ decisions, Hodne bowed to self, to legacy.

General Chris Donahue is remembered for a photo op, the last American soldier on the ground in Afghanistan, and for a career as a lethal Delta Force leader. The details of his retirement, however, remain vague: a general riding out of a war zone as one of the largest black eyes in his country’s military history unfolded behind him is worth scrutinizing. Perhaps he should have been the one to shape the exfiltration of American and allied forces aggressively.

Instead, Donahue acquiesced to indecisive leadership’s confusion and salvaged the moment for himself as the last soldier out. Donahue relinquished command of U.S. Army Europe and Africa on July 2, 2026, after 18 months in the post — a departure the Army has not explained.

Retired General C.Q. Brown, meanwhile, rates at the bottom of these offenders. While in uniform, he rated the force’s progress a mediocre “C” and explained that he and lower-ranking troops wanted change but were stymied by the Air Force's bureaucratic middle. An A-grade general might have smashed through that static middle himself. Instead, Brown passed the mission to civilian leadership, and now, from the pages of Foreign Affairs, criticizes the civilian leader for cleaning up the mess. Brown also co-authored an essay in Foreign Affairs, published July 3, 2026, warning against politicizing the military — without naming Trump or Hegseth directly.

Command, at its best, has never been about criticism from the cheap seats. It is about playing your part.

In General Patton’s famous “Blood and Guts” speech, delivered to the Second Armored Division in 1941, the storied military leader told his men: “You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you... You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time.”

Hegseth, instead, must conduct competing tunes. Sections of his orchestra play their own songs. Why?

As the military culls officers on their way up the ranks, raters and senior raters — the officers who write annual evaluations — shape the opportunities available to those below them. Regrettably, the officers who learn to compose the most harmonious tunes for their raters emerge as the top prospects for choice assignments. These politically adept officers then fashion their tune to what their bosses want to hear, and what their bosses want to hear, more often than not, is themselves. It isn’t hard to see how this intellectual and moral incest breeds a selfish leader focused on his own path and legacy.

This personal devotion to self is the antithesis of the Athenian Plato’s counsel that the greatest victory is the victory over self. Because these leaders never won that victory, they have suffered their own Leuctra and their own removal. They are facing the consequences now, as Hegseth cleans the Department of War’s stables, consequences they might have faced earlier in their careers, in ways that would have served the organization and the mission both.

S.L. Nelson has served at the tactical and strategic levels as a military officer. His views are his own and do not represent the position of the U.S. Department of Defense. He currently chairs NATO Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS-219) Research Task Group, High North Scenarios for Wargaming and Analysis. He holds graduate degrees in security studies, organizational leadership, military operations, and theology.