The sUAS Tactical Trifecta

When a tactical drone is lost in a contested environment, the physical destruction of the airframe is secondary to the catastrophic loss of the intelligence it carried. The Army’s “no blood” mandate for shaping first contact, as reinforced by ATP 3-90.51, relies entirely on the proper deployment of uncrewed systems. However, executing this doctrine in a DDIL environment is impossible if the intelligence gathered is trapped on an isolated commercial controller. However, as the modern battlefield becomes saturated with small drones and UAS operating in highly contested, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited (DDIL) environments, the data these systems collect is increasingly vulnerable - and immensely valuable. Yet, as the Army rapidly accelerates the procurement of commercial off-the-shelf platforms (COTS), we are fielding an array of high-tech sensors that struggle to communicate collectively in near real time to support timely CCIR-related decision-making.

Since Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), anyone integrating aviation assets, UAS, and ground sensors has certainly felt the tactical pain in both planning and execution. Airspace Command and Control (AC2) and deconfliction for aviators and maneuver formations lacked a trusted, reliable, and near-real-time digital backbone. Maneuver commanders and formations employing the RQ-11 Raven - or the now-defunct Shadow - were often stuck relying on analog and cumbersome procedures, such as Restricted Operations Zones (ROZs), because there was no real-time, automated, and digitally integrated way to track unmanned assets beyond untimely, analog reporting via radio or BFT if tactical planners were lucky. Many, if not all, OEF and OIF aviation veterans, as well as the countless unit RTOs they relied on, will fondly remember that coordinating airspace and airspace users was often a real challenge.

Now, as demonstrated by the 1st Brigade Combat Team's (1BCT), 82^nd ABN's urgent operational needs in Operation Epic Fury, these historical gaps are colliding with highly congested, electronically contested environments. In today’s drone-packed skies, the traditional 'big sky, little bullet' approach is no longer sufficient for airspace management on a dynamic, fluid battlefield. Stale, batch-delivered data to only a select few only thickens the fog of war, especially as we continue to shift operational focus to Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), where data survivability, not necessarily the platform, matters more than ever.

But here’s the revolutionary part: the Army has an unprecedented chance to fix these legacy problems for good. In March 2026, led by the PM for UAS and a talented team of subject matter experts, the U.S. Army launched the UAS Digital Marketplace—a digital storefront that ditches the old-school acquisition playbook for a fast, competitive, open market. Now, cutting-edge commercial technology can reach Warfighters far faster than ever before, with little red tape.

The marketplace is scaling exponentially: having launched at the end of March 2026 with just 36 systems, it is rapidly expanding to hundreds of platforms and critical capabilities. Units are using decentralized funds to purchase these kits as both garrison and battlefield consumables and semi-attritable systems. Army Acquisition Executives have highlighted that this approach makes acquisition more agile and competitive, lowering barriers to entry for industrial innovators, commercial tech startups, non-traditional defense contractors, and uncrewed systems innovators.

But this frenzy to purchase and employ these new drones comes with a catch. As numerous commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems flood the market, units risk acquiring a patchwork of drones that cannot communicate with each other or with off-platform collection systems. As units procure disparate systems that lack interoperability, the result is more unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the sky, but collecting less meaningful, integrated, and actionable data. Deploying drones without integration into a coordinated RSTA collection plan not merely wastes valuable assets, but also strains the ability to replenish critical and, to a certain extent, unit-exquisite resources. Leaders in the UAS field have termed this the "COTS Dilemma": each off-the-shelf drone often runs proprietary software and also uses exclusive controllers, making standardization of training, capabilities, and integration extremely challenging. Without a common baseline or connected, integrated framework, units risk becoming isolated islands of battlefield capability, forced to operate independently rather than as part of an integrated, nested effort.

As an example, imagine hundreds of small UAS deployed from the platoon level and up. Without a unified AC2 solution, we introduce operational and tactical ingredients that could be a recipe for disaster. Nobody, especially aircrews, wants to endure a nightmare scenario where a sUAS collides with a manned helicopter. Even as we buy these systems at record speed, a fully integrated airspace management system that includes joint capabilities is struggling to keep up. Right now, no single Program Acquisition Executive (PAE) necessarily owns the full Army-wide AC2 requirements while navigating a sea of disparate, siloed capabilities (AMDWS, TAIS, AFATDS - or its eventual replacement, DCGS-A, etc.) that will eventually include NGC2. If commercial and operationally employed systems can't cooperate technologically, we sacrifice rapid-fire clearances, situational awareness/understanding, and the untapped potential inherent in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) missions.

These problems aren't just theoretical—as noted above, they're a real-world concern unfolding right now. Units operating in the CENTCOM AOR in support of Operation Epic Fury have issued an urgent call for help. In a fast-moving, contested environment, they're facing crippling delays because data has to travel all the way to the cloud - considering this capability even exists - and back. That's time lost—and in combat, time and timing are literally everything.

As UAS leadership and operationally deployed units have explicitly warned, centralized data repositories serve as single points of failure during broad and targeted Electronic Warfare (EW) attacks; if these upper-layer feeds are lost, battlefield-employed AI decision-making capabilities degrade drastically. A recent Operational Needs Statement (ONS) confirmed this gap, calling for Tactical Edge Computing hardware at Launch and Recovery Sites capable of real-time intelligence processing without tactical reach-back to enterprise clouds. This requires resilient local transport networks, such as self-healing mesh and multi-path data routing, to connect edge compute nodes and operators in heavily jammed or disconnected environments. The ultimate goal is to collapse the kill chain by moving data processing to the tactical edge, while enabling a seamless transition from detection and identification to kinetic engagement.

True decision dominance—the ability to out-think, out-move, and out-shoot the enemy because every sensor, every drone, every system, and every Soldier shares information instantly and securely is a tactical and operational imperative. For years, we've imagined a unified and integrated web of unmanned platforms that are rugged, reliable, and ready, all plugged into collection systems that gather and sort critical intel from every corner of the battlefield.

To make this concept real, the Army continues to double down on a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA). Adhering to MOSA principles and establishing a universal "right to integrate" are absolute necessities for Class 1 and 2 sUAS and above platforms. Because commercial uncrewed technologies, payloads, software, and sensor capabilities are moving at an exponential pace, tech-refresh lifecycles move far faster than traditional platform upgrade frameworks can respond. sUAS manufacturers must rapidly adapt – or maintain the ability to universally adapt - to keep pace with these market innovations, providing platforms with the continuous flexibility to upgrade components on the fly rather than leaving units stuck with rigid, proprietary capabilities and vendor lock-in.

Initiatives like "Operation Jailbreak" are pushing the defense industry to open its software architectures and look under the glass through open APIs so even historically closed-vendor systems can seamlessly feed status, inventory, and telemetry data into the multi-billion-dollar Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) ecosystem. Recent testing last spring and demonstration exercises at Fort Carson, Colorado, and Hawaii reinforce the critical nature of this shift, where the Army evaluated competing operational data architectures to establish a unified, combined command and control framework. By breaking down these proprietary walls and enforcing a plug-and-play architecture, the military can finally and reliably open the aperture to connect small-unit edge sensors with the powerful, enterprise-level AI tools operational decisionmakers need.

The U.S. Army is undergoing a rapid, necessary transformation to ensure our Warfighters dominate the future fight. The procurement mechanics of the UAS Marketplace - and the pending new 4-star command for autonomous systems - represent a massive leap forward in hardware acquisition, enabling units to bypass sluggish bureaucratic models and field commercial innovation at the speed of need and relevance.

However, hardware without integration is an impending but avoidable hazard. If we continue to flood the battlefield with isolated sUAS that cannot communicate beyond the operator's echelon, we risk worsening the very problems we have struggled with since OEF and OIF: fragmented situational awareness via siloed technology, analog airspace deconfliction, and sluggish fires clearance. As the 1BCT's urgent needs in Operation Epic Fury demonstrate, deploying unintegrated commercial platforms into a contested DDIL environment actively degrades mission effectiveness. It leaves vital intelligence vulnerable to electronic warfare and attack.

As a maneuver and Joint Force, we must redirect our attention from platform proliferation to the data they collect. The true value of a Class 1 or 2 UAS doesn't necessarily rely on its mobility or its flight time, but on the intelligence it gathers and the speed at which that intelligence reaches a decisionmaker. By enforcing open API architectures, prioritizing operational edge compute hardware at Launch and Recovery Sites and above, and implementing edge data replication to ensure intelligence survives first contact and EW jamming, we transform commercial drones from isolated islands of effectiveness into an interconnected, highly lethal sensor web.

The technology to achieve this exists today. By mandate and design, we must deploy the digital connective tissue necessary to naturally collect, hold, and route edge telemetry into an intelligence collection repository that feeds and complements the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) ecosystem. Only then will we ensure that no intelligence is lost in the ether, collapse the kill chain at the point of collection, and finally solve the sUAS Tactical Trifecta once and for all.

COL Bryan T. Woody (U.S. Army, ret.) currently serves as Operations Officer and chief UAS expert for Arrowpoint Corporation in Huntsville, AL. Before joining the private sector, he concluded a distinguished military career as an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior aviator, commander for the U.S. Army’s UAS training battalion at Ft. Huachuca, and the Director of the Army Capability Manager - Reconnaissance and Attack (ACM-R/A) at Fort Novosel, Alabama, where he led modernization efforts for the AH-64D/E platforms.