War Game Lessons for U.S. and Japan on N. Korea

The announcement that Japan has positioned Patriot missile defense batteries around Tokyo should come as little surprise. North Korea demonstrated in July 2006 that it could fire accurate missile salvos that range Japan’s capital and has repeatedly threatened to reduce the city to a sea of fire.

The participants in our game were divided into mock U.S. and Japan teams.  As the scenario progressed, they identified priorities and expectations of one another.  Our conclusions were chilling but identified critical steps that we should take to strengthen this alliance.

After the attack, the American team focused its energies on containing an unfolding crisis on the Korean Peninsula and concluded that its first priority should be working with Beijing to decipher North Korea's intentions and stabilize the situation.  The American team planned shows of force to demonstrate our ability to respond to future attacks, but was keenly aware of the limitations on Japan’s military forces.

The Japan team, meanwhile, focused on the consequences of the missile strike on its territory.  They debated whether Tokyo should declare the provocation an “armed attack,” invoking U.S. commitments under our mutual security treaty, and whether Japan should seek some form of retaliation. The Japan team ultimately concluded that its greatest weakness was its lack of a combined strike capability in cooperation with the United States.  If Japan sought a forceful response, or even the option of taking out other missile sites that could strike Tokyo with deadly payloads, it would have to outsource the mission to the United States. 

After the teams briefed each other on their respective views, they concluded that the alliance would lose credibility if Washington worked through Beijing while constraining Japanese demands for a U.S. retaliatory attack. They also agreed that the only way around this problem was to develop credible military options for the United States and Japan to operate with South Korean support – the basis for effective deterrence.

The teams also agreed that we should develop contingency plans that address the possibility that the next Korean War may begin with a North Korean attack against Japan.  Simply initiating this dialogue with Seoul and Tokyo would demonstrate for North Korea that such a provocation would not take us by surprise.  The 2010 attacks spurred bilateral U.S.-South Korean contingency planning that has reduced the likelihood that Pyongyang will lash out against South Korean forces again.  We should not invite the Kim regime to shift its focus to Japan because of our unpreparedness.

This year, the United States and Japan will have an opportunity to address this agenda. Not only is Japan studying its own military requirements and self-imposed constraints, but our two governments are reviewing a set of bilateral defense guidelines that were last updated in 1997.  The United States should also work to bring South Korea into concurrent contingency planning efforts, so that we can develop a common understanding with Seoul as to how our governments would handle future provocations that target Japan. 

 The Obama administration will shy away from these conversations for fear that they could offend Chinese sensibilities.  If Beijing senses that it can pressure Washington away from these discussions, of course, it would have little reason not to do so.  In the months ahead, it will be incumbent upon leaders in Congress to monitor these efforts with our allies and make sure they are fully realized.

After all, if North Korea’s long history of provocation offers any single lesson, it is that we will either get ahead of the threat or be surprised by it.