The Implication of Russian Orbital Nuclear Weapons

In February 2024, Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH) courageously made public the fact that, “Today, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has made available to all Members of Congress information concerning a serious national security threat. I am requesting that President Biden declassify all information relating to this threat so that Congress, the Administration, and our allies can openly discuss the actions necessary to respond to this threat.” (Emphasis in the original). It was immediately reported in the press that this was a Russian program to place nuclear weapons in orbit for anti-satellite purposes. Although the full story is not known and the White House is attempting to minimize public perceptions of the significance of this Russian threat, it has confirmed the main elements of the press reports. In addition, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan revealed that before Congressman Turner’s statement, the Biden Administration intended to inform only very few members of Congress, limiting the briefing to the most senior leadership, the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Moreover, the public would have been kept completely in the dark.

President Biden’s statement further sugar coated Russian behavior.

Congressman Turner very politely characterized the White House position as “sleepwalking into an international crisis.” Unfortunately, a key element of the White House statements – the assertion that a nuclear ASAT weapon does not threaten humans on the surface of the earth – is simply untrue. There is no difference between high-yield nuclear weapons intended to destroy satellites on a large scale and those intended to attack the surface of the earth with nuclear EMP effects. Indeed, it is difficult to detonate a thermonuclear weapon in near earth orbit without killing humans on the surface of the earth or in aircraft flying above it through its nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects. The White House assertion confuses conventional with nuclear ASATs despite the fact they are completely different. Contrary to the White House statement, a nuclear ASAT can be deliberately used “to attack human beings or cause physical destruction here on Earth.”

As documented in the reports of the Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission and in numerous publications by its Executive Secretary the late Dr. Peter Pry, the effects of a nuclear explosion in low-earth orbit can be devasting to human beings on the surface of the earth because they will destroy electronics and the electrical power grid over a vast area. According to the Chairman of the EMP Commission Dr. William Graham, “China and Russia have considered limited nuclear attack options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack.”

President Biden’s statement was intended to minimize public perceptions of the significance of the Russian threat. The precise impact of a nuclear detonation in low earth orbit depends upon: 1) the yield of the weapon, 2) the design of the weapon and, 3) over what area the weapon is detonated. However, it is certain to be serious. If the detonation was over the United States, it could devastate large areas and in the worst case destroy the electrical grid of the entire continental United States with catastrophic consequences. While there would be significant EMP effects under any circumstances, the inter-netting of the U.S. energy grid (because the American left has almost prevented construction of new power plants for several decades), creates a unique vulnerability to nuclear EMP attack. If the electrical grid collapses, so does everything else. By manipulating the height of burst, yield and possibly the weapons design, EMP effects could also be used tactically in theater military operations.

The first deaths from a nuclear ASAT attack if detonated over inhabited areas would be due to things like airplane crashes, failure of electronic equipment and the demolition of emergency services. The longer-term effects could be up to 90% population deaths within a year resulting from starvation. This inconvenient fact is not included in the White House assessment. Nor does the White House note the possible effects of a no warning EMP attack on the U.S. National Command Authority which Russia has been threatening to attack for a number of years. These threats have included President Putin himself. These threats involved hypersonic missiles, but a no warning orbital EMP strike makes this threat even more serious. As I wrote in 2019, “The threat to our national command authority undercuts our nuclear deterrent potential. It may allow a large ICBM and/or SLBM attack to arrive before any U.S. decision to retaliate….This could easily become the Russian theory of victory in a nuclear war.”

There are some remote areas of the open ocean over which a low orbital nuclear weapon could be detonated without large EMP effects on the earth’s surface because of lack of inhabited islands, and limited shipping and airline traffic. This is clearly a best case scenario. There is no guarantee where Russia might detonate its nuclear ASATs and it may even want to inflict a low-level of EMP damage to the United States and our allies as a nuclear warning shot. Moreover, these locations may not be the most effective ones for prompt satellite destruction.

Even in a best case situation, the impact of high-yield nuclear detonations in low-earth orbit would be tremendously damaging to human civilization. The commander of the German Space Command, Major General Michael Traut, said a Russian nuclear weapon detonating in orbit could mean “…more or less the end of the usability of that global commons [of orbit].” In other words, a Russian nuclear detonation in orbit would preclude for a significant period of time the use of low earth orbits for the benefit of mankind. Furthermore, “Ludwig Möller, the director of the European Space Policy Institute, predicted an economic fallout of trillions of dollars in the banking and energy sectors if Russia were to successfully knock out commercial satellites.”

In an excellent 2022 article, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Vincent, Director of Advanced Physics Courses at the Air Force Academy, summarized the impact of thermonuclear detonations in near earth space:

The situation could even be worse. Colonel Vincent assumed standard high-yield types of thermonuclear weapons. There are enhanced EMP weapons (tailored output) which have much lower yield but produce higher levels of EMP. Russian development of nuclear weapons with tailored effect began during the Soviet period. A declassified year 2000 Central intelligence Agency report discussed Soviet development of tailored output nuclear weapons and stated that, “X-ray effects can be used directly or indirectly against satellites or ICBMs in space because there is no atmosphere to absorb them.” Unlike the United States, Russia continued nuclear weapons testing and development after the end of the Cold War and reportedly has developed more advanced weapons designs. Two Russian generals told the Congressional EMP Commission that, “Russia designed an ‘enhanced EMP’ nuclear weapon.” Indeed, even as far back as the 1960s, the United States was able to develop a specialized nuclear warhead “to engage clouds of reentry vehicles and decoys above the atmosphere and destroy incoming warheads with a burst of high-energy x rays. The [Larwence Livermore National] Laboratory stepped up to the difficult challenge of designing the appropriate warhead. The Spartan warhead had high yield, produced copious amounts of x rays, and minimized fission output and debris to prevent blackout of ABM radar[s].” X-rays are the main prompt satellite kill mechanism from this nuclear detonation.

Admiral Kirby even acknowledged the impact of satellite destruction when he said, “Any anti-satellite capability should be of general concern because, you’re right, there are private and public satellites circling the Earth every day.” He specifically listed the threat to “communications, command and control…transportation…meteorological concerns, financial, commercial concerns. There are a lot of things that satellites do for — for the whole population of…[the] Earth.” While true, this gives no real feeling for the scope of the damage. Admiral Kirby could have said something similar to what the Associated Press reported: “Your home’s electrical and water systems could fail. Aviation, rail, and car traffic could come to a halt. Your cellphone could stop working.”

The 2004 EMP Commission report noted the damaging impact of EMP on commercial satellites and the fact that:

The national security and homeland security communities use commercial satellites for critical activities, including direct and backup communications, emergency response services, and continuity of operations during emergencies. Satellite services are important for national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications because of their ubiquity and separation from other communications infrastructures.

Congressman Mike Waltz (R-FL), a member of the House Intelligence Committee has stated, “If this weapon is allowed to fully deploy, it could completely blind our economy. It would take out our GPS…. It could blind our military. It is incredibly serious. It’s a weapon of mass destruction, not just us — countries all over the world.” His reference to GPS satellites which are in high (geosynchronous) earth orbit suggests the weapon is more than just the detonation of a nuclear weapon in low altitude space. Indeed, there may be more than one system involved. One of them has even been announced by Russia but has almost been completely ignored in the Western media.

The ASAT potential of thermonuclear detonations in low-altitude space was demonstrated in 1962 in the 1.4 megaton Starfish Prime nuclear test which “pumped” the Van Allen Radiation Belts increasing its electron density and even damaging a communications satellite launched the day after the test. The test also burned out electronics in Hawaii 800 miles away. Today, the effect would be considerably worse due to the fact that modern electronics are inherently more vulnerable than those that existed in 1962.

There is a possibility that the Russian weapon system is more than a simple nuclear weapon used for ASAT purposes. It may be a nuclear explosive driven directed energy weapon. Former Director of Central Intelligence and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has stated the threat was Russia “blinding” our satellites. “Blinding” implies a directed energy weapon. It also implies a power level less than full destruction of the targets since the optics are more vulnerable and easier to damage. Keep in mind that Mr. Panetta’s national security involvement is a decade old, and Russia could have made a lot of progress since then.

Reportedly, the Russian nuclear ASAT “could disable civilian communication, GPS, surveillance from space, and military command and control.” Most of these are high altitude satellites which can’t be neutralized by a low altitude nuclear EMP pulse, but they potentially could be knocked out by a nuclear explosive powered directed energy weapon. If exploded in low-earth orbit, such a weapon would also generate nuclear EMP that would devastate low-altitude satellites, but the directed energy aspect of the weapon would be the kill mechanism against high altitude satellites if the power output was sufficiently high and/or the system was put into very high or elliptical orbits. As noted above, Congressman Waltz said that the Russian weapons could “blind our military” and disable “civilian communication, GPS, surveillance from space, and military command and control.” If detonated in high earth orbit, nuclear EMP is not in play because there is not enough residual atmosphere at these altitudes to generate substantial EMP. A nuclear armed ASAT weapon detonated in high earth orbit even without the directed energy capability can destroy high altitude satellites but not through EMP but rather through prompt nuclear radiation although at much shorter range. The effective range would be determined by its power and the hardness of the target. A nuclear bomb powered directed energy weapon could be very effective. If it is further developed, it might evolve into a nuclear detonation powered missile defense system. Despite Mr. Panetta’s statement, the United States is clearly not developing comparable systems at present. Indeed, President Biden ordered a ban on testing of even non-nuclear ASAT systems.

During the late Cold War, the United States reportedly had a missile defense program (Excalibur) involving a nuclear explosive powered X-ray laser. It reportedly had a multi-target capability -- “each bomb could energize many separate X-ray emitters - about fifty seems to be the usual number, though some accounts go as high as 100,000…” Such a system could be used for ASAT purposes. If detonated sufficiently high in space, it is capable of being aimed at specific satellites without damaging or destroying other satellites unlike a simple nuclear bomb detonated in low-earth orbit which would indiscriminately destroy satellites. According to the Department of Energy, a nuclear detonation driven directed energy weapon “could have lethal ranges of thousands of kilometers.” The kill mechanism of an X-ray laser destroys by means of “ablative shock.” The heat effect of the X-rays impacting the surface of the target generates a shock wave inside it destroying its functionality. Other concepts for nuclear explosive driven directed energy weapons include visible light, microwaves, and charged particles. It could be put into an orbit that was high enough to eliminate significant EMP effects on the surface of the earth while attacking high-altitude satellites. Concerning potential power and range, keep in mind that the U.S. research and development is more than 30 years old.

The Biden Administration’s emphasis on the status of the Russian nuclear ASAT as under development is interesting because there is not really that much to develop if it is simply a device to detonate a nuclear weapon in low earth orbit. The apparently leaked story that “it is not clear Moscow has the ability to successfully launch it into orbit if it does perfect its weapon” lacks plausibility. If this system is just designed to detonate a thermonuclear weapon in low earth orbit, there would be no significant technical barriers to its deployment. Existing satellites and nuclear weapons could be combined to create an orbital nuclear bomb without doing a great deal of R&D. It is a straightforward engineering exercise. A nuclear explosive driven directed energy weapon is something very different. It would probably take a great deal of R&D work. Putin’s revocation of Russia’s Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification may be a precursor to resumed high-yield nuclear testing which would very useful for the development of nuclear explosive driven directed energy weapons.

Russia has denied the reports that it is developing the capability of putting nuclear weapons in space. According to President Putin, “We have always been categorically against the deployment of nuclear weapons in space and we are still against it.” He conveniently ignored the fact that Russia in 2023 announced that its new nuclear-armed Sarmat “super heavy” ICBM had an orbital capability to attack the United States over the south pole. In 2018, President Putin stated that the “Sarmat will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads...” The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States reported that, “The Sarmat has displayed at least partial orbital trajectory capabilities.” General Anthony Cotton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has confirmed the orbital capability of the Sarmat even hinting it might go beyond “partial orbital trajectories.”

Clearly the main role of the Sarmat is nuclear attack against ground targets but there is no reason that its warheads could not be detonated in orbit and function as a nuclear ASAT. There is a possibility that the orbital Sarmat could be linked to the Russian orbital nuclear ASAT. If so, the Biden Administration’s statements that the Russian system cannot harm people on the surface of the earth are clearly disingenuous.

Had Excalibur been developed when President Reagan was in office, he might have used it to defend against a Soviet nuclear attack. If President Putin gets a weapon like Excalibur (and today there is no competition in its development), he might use it to facilitate a nuclear attack.

The Biden Administration apparently leaked the story that it was trying to convince Russia not to test the nuclear ASAT. Its track record in influencing Russian behavior does not exactly inspire confidence. Colonel Vincent has pointed out the need to deter Russian thermonuclear detonations in space and suggested ways to reduce the impact of Russian nuclear detonations in space on low orbital satellites. This is certainly difficult, but his recommendations are sound and should be pursued. Unfortunately, the Biden Administration’s attitude toward nuclear deterrence may very well preclude this. It appears to be more interested in reducing public perception of the seriousness of the Russian threat than in countering it.

The Russian nuclear ASAT is part of a much larger Russian program to utilize nuclear weapons as an instrument of warfare and to intimidate its neighbors to expand the Russian empire. Despite Russian weakness, imperial expansion is at the top of the list of Putin’s geopolitical goals. Russia has the largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world and is both modernizing and expanding it. The threat of Russian use of nuclear weapons has become an integral part of Russian foreign and defense policy.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served as Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commission. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.