Build Iron Dome in the United States To Prepare for Israel's Worst Day

Israel is racing to build more Iron Dome air defense systems amid a growing threat of war with Hezbollah, which has a massive stockpile of more than 150,000 mortars, rockets, and missiles. Yet Iron Dome systems themselves and their manufacturing facilities within Israel may become targets for Hezbollah, which is why the United States and Israel need to build a full, redundant Iron Dome production and integration capacity in the United States.

Suppliers based in the United States now help produce more than half of the parts for Iron Dome and a higher portion of parts for its interceptor. In addition to producing parts, nascent efforts are underway to eventually build the entire Tamir interceptor in the United States. That is an essential endeavor, but it is not sufficient.

In a full-scale war, Hezbollah would employ much of its massive stockpile of mortars, short- to long-range unguided rockets, unguided short-range ballistic missiles, precision-guided munitions, and unmanned aerial systems to target Israel. Some of that effort would be focused on attempting to destroy Israel’s Iron Dome systems to enable more effective subsequent attacks.

In response, some may shrug and point to existing factories in Israel to produce replacement Iron Dome systems and Tamir interceptors, suggesting that Israeli production capacity is sufficient and arguing that the significant cost of establishing redundant production capacity is not worth it. The problem is that those production facilities in Israel themselves could be damaged or destroyed by Hezbollah to reduce, delay, or even eliminate Israel’s ability to replace destroyed Iron Dome systems or expended Tamir interceptors.

It is worth noting that on June 18, Hezbollah released a video emphasizing its drone reconnaissance of Iron Dome sites and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems facilities around Haifa.

Even if most Iron Dome and Tamir production facilities in Israel were not damaged or destroyed, a significant number of workers in those production and supply facilities would be mobilized as reservists. Following October 7, Israel activated over 360,000 reservists, one of the largest mobilizations since 1973. Ten to fifteen-percent of the tech sector workforce was mobilized for reserve duty. Seventy-percent of Israeli high-tech firms that responded to a survey by the Israel Innovation Authority reported the mobilization impacted their productivity.

In a full-scale war with Hezbollah, Israel could be forced to implement a much larger call-up of reservists. Many of them would include Israelis who work in the country’s defense industries, including in facilities that build and resupply the Iron Dome system. A possible outflow of workers could complicate and slow the ability to replenish its air and missile defense capabilities at the worst possible moment. If the war is longer than some expect, as we have seen in Gaza, these complications could compound.

So, what’s to be done?

In addition to producing and fielding more systems and munitions, the United States and Israel should work together to strengthen the Iron Dome and Tamir supply base in the United States and create a redundant full production and integration capability in the United States for every major component of the Iron Dome system.

This effort, no doubt, would come with a significant cost. But the benefits are numerous and clear.

The creation of this redundant production capacity in the United States would allow American industry to temporarily replace the production capacity of damaged or destroyed factories in Israel. And if Hezbollah fails to successfully target the facilities in Israel, the American facilities could come alongside factories in Israel to speed up the rate of replacement and replenishment.

In addition to helping Israel defend itself, the establishment of this redundant production capacity in the United States would create American jobs and third-country export opportunities (necessary to sustain the production lines), while strengthening the U.S. economy and defense industrial base. That, in turn, would help to ensure U.S. forces are equipped with the best and most advanced capabilities possible. 

Recognizing the logic of this argument and the need for redundant production capacity in the United States, efforts are already underway in Camden, Arkansas, to replicate Rafael’s integration facility in Haifa and produce fully assembled Tamir missiles and the U.S.-licensed version: SkyHunter. Industry broke ground in Camden on February 21, and officials forecast that the Camden facility will manufacture up to 2,000 Tamir full missiles per year, including 325 SkyHunter missiles for the United States Marine Corps’ Medium Range Intercept Program Capability (MRIC). But that Tamir integration facility in Camden is not scheduled to be up and running until 2026.

Congress should watch this effort closely and ensure it is not delayed.

But legislators should not stop there. They should also take two more steps.

Congress should authorize, fund, and require the Pentagon to work with industry and Israel to establish a redundant full integration and production capacity in the United States for all components of the Iron Dome system.

Congress should also require the Pentagon to provide a written report without delay identifying any sole source suppliers in the Iron Dome (including Tamir) supply base and mandate that the Department of Defense contract with a second U.S. supplier in each case to eliminate any single points of failure in the supply base that could delay system replacement or interceptor replenishment. 

Laudable efforts are underway to produce more Iron Dome systems to help Israel defend itself. But those efforts are not enough. Congress should ensure the administration works with Israel and industry to establish as quickly as possible a full production and integration capability for all Iron Dome components in the United States. There’s no time to waste.

Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Dr. Lydia LaFavor is a research fellow.