China's Carrier Aviation Force Moving Forward 2025 and Beyond

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is accelerating the growth of its carrier aviation force.

China’s recently completed prototype maritime nuclear reactor suggest it, or the Type 006 will be nuclear-powered, but its propulsion system won’t be apparent until late 2026/early 2027. If the PLAN maintains its present construction-to-commissioning pace, the Type 004 should be operationally ready by 2027 and the Type 005’s sea trials will begin that same year or early in 2028. The latter could be operational by 2030. Whatever the Type 005’s propulsion system, its entry into service will give the PLAN three CATOBAR carriers in the Wester Pacific before this decade’s end.

However, there is more to PLAN carrier aviation than its fleet aircraft carriers. They are but PLAN’s most capable and visible hull-length flight deck ships (flattops). In addition to the Fujian conducting its initial flight deck testing last November, the PLAN launched its second CATOBAR capable ship, the Type 076 Helicopter Landing Dock (LHD), the Sichuan. Construction of its sister ship will start before this summer and while its air wing remains a matter of speculation, it has the same Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) as the Fujian and coming fleet carriers. That makes it a more powerful carrier than the Type 075 Helicopter Landing Assault (LHA), four of which will be fully operational by early this year.

There is also the 696ft long mystery flattop launched last summer. Built more lightly and more rapidly than the aforementioned flattops, this new ship displays no military insignia and has no arresting gear, launch systems or elevators to bring planes up from a hangar, if it has one. However, it has three islands, one of which is designed for ship’s navigation and a much larger one that is structured to monitor and control flight operations. It may be a drone carrier or destined for Beijing’s Coast Guard or Maritime Safety Administration, both of which are operating at greater distances from mainland China and may require embarked air surveillance support at those distance locations. That and whether it will embark helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) remains a mystery, but its construction demonstrates China’s continuing emphasis on embarked maritime aviation.

Flattops are incomplete without embarked aircraft and the PLAN is also expanding and technologically advancing its carrier air wings. It has two catapult-launch/arrested landing capable aircraft in production, the KJ-600 AEW-CS and the J-15T. Two squadrons of the former are already in service while the latter’s first training squadron is likely less than a year old. That may preclude the formation of Fujian’s full fighter complement before this year’s end, but the PLAN will have sufficient aircraft and pilots for both Fujian and the coming Type 004 by late 2026.

Production of the reported fifth-generation J-35 stealth fighter will determine the pace and future technological capability of the PLAN carrier aviation force. Chinese officials claim the land-based variant is already in production and implied the carrier variant is nearly so. If that is true, the Fujian and later carriers may receive their first fifth generation fighters by 2027. Beijing’s media outlets and netizens also claim sixth generation stealth aircraft prototypes have entered flight testing. Even if true, prototypes typically require 3-10 years of development and testing before they create an operational production model.

Skeptics will note that the PLAN’s carrier aviation force remains smaller than that of the US Navy and has yet to operate fifth generation stealth aircraft. That is true today, but the PLAN is expanding, gaining experience, and modernizing at a faster pace than the US Navy. While the US Navy struggles to commission one carrier every 7-10 years, China has commissioned two and possibly a third in this decade. China is also commissioning nearly twice as many guided missile cruisers, destroyers, and frigates than the United States.

More importantly, the PLAN carrier force is concentrated within its “Near Seas,” that is the waters within and along the edge of the 1^st Island Chain, where it enjoys the support of the PLA Air Force and PLA Rocket Force. The American Navy is spread out across the globe. Moreover, the PLAN’s carriers will be operationally superior to those of America’s most powerful naval partner, India, and allies, Britain, France, and Japan. Of course, France’s present and coming nuclear carrier will enjoy superior strategic mobility over China’s conventionally powered units but that advantage does not play out within the 1^st Island Chain’s comparatively constricted waters.

Given the situation described above, America’s seeming inability to build modern warships on time, the PLAN-USN force ratio trend between now and 2035 is not in America’s favor. Massed drone operations may offer a solution, but America’s leaders should note that the People’s Republic is already a global leader in drone manufacturing and has been flying coordinated mass drone formations for entertainment purposes since at least 2018. It is not a great leap to employing such operations for military purposes. In fact, it may be one area where China has greater experience, and the US must catch up. Hopefully, that is not the case.

No military force is invincible or omnipotent. None of the PLA’s service components are exceptions to that reality. However, they are no longer the archaic, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained forces of yesteryear. The PLA has come a long way over the last 30 years, studying America’s and other Western nation’s militaries throughout that period to this day. Beijing is working strenuously to address its military shortcomings, expanding its force structure, advancing its military technology, and developing a modern, joint doctrine. America’s leaders and partners ignore that progress at their countries’ peril.

Carl O. Schuster is a retired Navy Captain and former instructor of military studies at Hawaii Pacific University. He finished his naval career as director of operations at then-Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center. He has published four books on naval affairs.