What To Make of China's New Air Facility in Laos

An announcement of a new Chinese-funded military facility in Laos to train local air force pilots has raised questions about whether it will function as a de facto Chinese military base, and how it will extend Beijing’s power projection across the region.

According to satellite imagery analysis the runway is about 2,000 metres long, sufficient to land most People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fighter jets, including the J-10 and J-11, as well as Y-20B transport aircraft, but too short to support long-range PLA bombers, which require closer to 3,000 metres, as my Lowy Institute colleague David Vallance points out.

The same airfield was previously known as Lima Site 44 when the United States military and Central Intelligence Agency used the same site during the Vietnam War. At the time, the CIA primarily used crude airstrips, as it was then, for resupply and to transport ground forces.

It is also unclear why the two sides selected this particular site or indeed why China chose to open a training centre in Laos – as opposed to Cambodia, where Beijing financed the construction upgrade of Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand several years back.

Several commentators have already drawn parallels between Ban Keun and Ream, suggesting that together the two facilities will allow the Chinese military to project force over both inland and maritime domains. However, other analysts stress that the two are fundamentally different, given Ream’s naval focus, and contend that the new air site in Laos represents a novel addition (Opens in new window) for China’s overseas military operations.

According to one analyst cited by Lu, Laos may have been a more appealing partner for this project given Cambodia’s recent diplomacy. The Hun Manet government in Phnom Penh recently restored military exercises with the United States, and Cambodia has allowed the US Navy to dock its vessels at Ream.

Laos has become dependent on China, which provided roughly two-thirds of Laos’ foreign direct investment in 2024 and owns the largest share of the country’s debt. The ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party has also enhanced political and security cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party in recent years. When President Thongloun Sisoulith visited Beijing in June, the two sides pledged to expand defence ties, and China’s Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of an annual “3+3” dialogue, signalling the priority that the Chinese Communist Party places on bilateral ties.

Viewed in this context, the new Ban Keun joint air training centre is a reflection of the two sides’ deepening alignment. China’s burgeoning influence in Laos has not gone unnoticed in neighbouring Vietnam, Laos’ principal security partner dating back to the two countries’ shared struggle for independence in the 1960s and 1970s.

Vietnam already fears encirclement as China fortifies artificial islands and bases in the South China Sea. With a new military facility in Laos in addition to Ream naval base in Cambodia, Beijing has effectively pulled off an end run around Hanoi’s air and maritime flanks. No other country in the region is as directly exposed as Vietnam.

Ultimately, long-term impact of Ban Keun depends on how the PLA uses the new facility, whether Beijing seeks to use Vientiane’s dependence to acquire an exclusive base, and what upgrades may follow – including lengthening the runway to allow the PLA to land long-range bombers such as the H-6. Any of those changes would draw greater scrutiny from beyond Southeast Asia and sharpen threat perceptions in Canberra and Washington.

Dr. Hunter Marston is the Director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Lowy Institute and Project Lead for the Asia Power Index. 

This article appeared originally at Lowy Institute's the interpreter.