Trump's Mineral Policy Offers Strategic Opportunity in the Pacific

In an April 2025 executive order, President Trump affirmed that offshore critical minerals are key to creating supply chains that do not depend on adversaries like the People’s Republic of China. While US leadership on deep-sea mining directly serves the nation’s resource needs, it also brings mutually-beneficial partnerships with other nations. Such relationships would not only reduce China’s dominance over the minerals industry, but could also be leveraged to combat China’s expanding foothold in the Indo-Pacific.

Nauru is a small island nation located northeast of Australia and the Solomon Islands and south of the U.S.-aligned Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia. The country’s efforts on deep-sea mining are focused beyond its territorial waters or exclusive economic zone, in an area of the Pacific Ocean known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ). This region is known for its relatively rich deposits of valuable minerals like Nickel, Cobalt, Manganese, and rare earths. 

Four years have now passed, and the ISA has yet to finalize the regulations. Despite this failure, Nauru has remained faithful and has yet to begin commercial mining through its sponsored company. However, a November 2024 letter from Nauru’s government urged the ISA to either complete its regulations or review a future exploitation application in the absence of formalized rules.

Nauru demonstrates commendable resolve in the face of international red tape. Its continued determination to advance the seabed mining industry aligns with the stated vision of the Trump administration.

With a land area of just over eight square miles, Nauru currently offers little in the way of exports. Rich phosphate reserves once sustained the island’s inhabitants, but these deposits have long been depleted. Moreover, the phosphate extraction process proved environmentally devastating and left much of the country’s land infertile. This tiny nation is understandably desperate for a stable economic future, leaving it vulnerable to Beijing’s development enticements.

For now, Nauru thankfully remains within the Western security fold. Under a deal signed at the end of 2024, Nauru granted Australia veto power over any “security, banking and telecommunications” agreements with other countries. Given its longstanding ties to Nauru and concerns over Chinese power, Australia is the ideal country to take point on Nauru’s direct protection.

However, China could still undermine American and Australian interests in Nauru. Last year, Nauru switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China for the second time in the 21^st century, illustrating the impact that Beijing’s promises of development can have on Nauru’s foreign relations. China can pursue investment and cooperation in sectors beyond the purview of the recent Australia deal, such as seabed mining.

China already seeks agreements on deep-sea mining with several other Pacific nations. Despite its status of free association with New Zealand, the Cook Islands recently entered into a memorandum of understanding with China to collaborate on seabed mining surveys. Kiribati has signaled its willingness to partner with Beijing in the emerging industry. The United States must act fast to prevent yet additional sources of critical minerals from falling under Chinese control.

Both supporters and critics agree that President Trump’s April Executive Order introduces a path for mining in international waters. The Metals Company (TMC), the same business that partners with Nauru, responded to the policy change by applying for a seabed mining license from the US government in an unclaimed portion of the CCZ. TMC could serve as a useful point of contact between Nauru and the United States.

The Trump administration should negotiate a seabed resources agreement with Nauru that prevents China from gaining access to more critical minerals. Even if Nauru decides to wait on the ISA, a deal with the U.S. now would stymie any Chinese ambitions down the road. The fewer Pacific Islands nations that are economically aligned with China, the better.

Given the diplomatic uncertainties of deep-sea mining, a Nauru-U.S. deal could avert other future headaches. Many countries, including Nauru, claim mining rights in international waters through the ISA, but a non-member like the United States could theoretically consider those claims invalid. Disagreements could easily arise if the US government were to license a company to mine in waters assigned to another country by the ISA. Reaching minerals agreements with Nauru and other nations will help America to avoid these complications and stay on good terms with strategic islands in the Pacific.

The agreement specifics could take many forms. Washington might offer tariff relief or encourage private investment in Nauru in exchange for rights of first offer to purchase any extracted minerals. To address concerns about the potential environmental impact of seabed mining, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) could conduct transparent research on Nauru’s sector of the CCZ.

Pacific Islands partnerships should not stop with Nauru. Tonga and Kiribati have both shown interest in deep-sea mining. Even the February 2025 deal between China and the Cook Islands only pertains to seabed study and does not commit to commercial extraction. By offering government and private resources to Pacific Islands states, the United States can stop China from attaining an international leadership role over seabed mining. This collaboration would instead solidify American leadership in the industry, allowing the United States to guide seabed mining in a way that respects both the environment and national sovereignty.

President Trump’s executive order calls for research into a potential “international benefit-sharing mechanism for seabed mineral resource extraction and development that occurs in areas beyond the national jurisdiction of any country.” Including interested Pacific Islands nations as founding participants in such an arrangement would ensure that these small states can benefit from shared ocean resources that are developed by the United States. This mechanism would also strengthen America’s sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, the United States is severely lacking in its domestic capacity to produce and process critical minerals. While international agreements are important for eroding China’s chokehold over global supplies, Washington should also take steps to expand mining at home and to process any raw minerals that are acquired, regardless of their source. By cultivating American resources and securing international partners in the Pacific, the U.S. can gain an edge in the global competition with China.

Wyatt J. Greco is a Master of Public Policy Student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy. He specializes in International Relations and National Security, with regional interests in the Pacific Islands and Europe.