Washington may finally have Iran under the kind of sustained pressure that months of negotiations failed to produce. Renewed U.S. sanctions, restrictions on Iranian financial and commercial networks, pressure on oil revenues, and the cumulative economic costs of war have narrowed Tehran’s room for maneuver. Iran tried to push those costs outward through restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, raising expenses for shipping, Gulf exporters, insurers, and Asian energy consumers. Gulf producers and commercial operators have adapted sufficiently to keep substantial volumes moving, eroding Tehran’s ability to turn maritime disruption into the economic stranglehold it sought. Serious negotiations may resume after the U.S. midterms, giving Washington an opportunity to convert accumulated economic pressure into Iranian concessions. The previous negotiating process repeatedly converted pressure into pauses before Tehran had paid the political and economic price Washington was trying to extract.

Pakistan is the wrong country to entrust with converting that pressure into practical next steps. Islamabad needs a workable relationship with Tehran for its own economic and security interests, while Iran possesses several ways to make deterioration painful for Pakistan. American sanctions obstruct Pakistani plans for Iranian energy and expanded trade. Confrontation threatens Balochistan and could force Islamabad to divert security resources toward an already unstable frontier. Pakistan’s Makkah defense commitments to Saudi Arabia at least theoretically expose it to Iranian support for the Houthis, making Iranian restraint valuable to Islamabad regardless of what Tehran gives Washington. China, Pakistan’s indispensable strategic partner, purchases Iranian petroleum and wants reliable Gulf energy flows. Pakistan’s military leadership has also used mediation to rebuild its political relevance in Washington by presenting access to Tehran as a valuable diplomatic asset. These interests have consistently pushed Islamabad toward de-escalation at precisely the point when sustained pressure had the potential to force Iran into harder choices.

Christopher A. Williams, The Coming War in America:  Iranian Threats to the U.S. Homeland,No. 671, October 13, 2026

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Two Iranian messages went out in the same week of September. On September 20, a group of lawmakers in Tehran submitted a bill under the parliament’s “triple urgency” procedure calling for Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the bill’s sponsors, Hossein Ali Haji-Deligani, had separately called for nuclear-weapons tests to be conducted as soon as possible. Days later in New York, President Masoud Pezeshkian told CBS News that Iran would let United Nations inspectors back into the country as part of a long-term ceasefire.

The first message made the headlines. The second is the story.

Earlier this month, the House introduced a resolution of disapproval to the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperative agreement. The resolution might fail but it’s likely only the opening round of a longer fight. Next year, the House and Senate may condition the deal’s implementation. This requires legislation, but the legislative door is largely open.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, Section 123a, the Kingdom can’t enrich U.S.-supplied material without prior consent. Such approvals were supposed to be given on a case-by-case basis, not with a one-time, long-term, programmatic authorization. Each of these “subsequent arrangements” also must sit for review before Congress for 15 legislative days.