Washington may finally have Iran under the kind of sustained pressure that months of negotiations failed to produce. Renewed U.S. sanctions, restrictions on Iranian financial and commercial networks, pressure on oil revenues, and the cumulative economic costs of war have narrowed Tehran’s room for maneuver. Iran tried to push those costs outward through restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, raising expenses for shipping, Gulf exporters, insurers, and Asian energy consumers. Gulf producers and commercial operators have adapted sufficiently to keep substantial volumes moving, eroding Tehran’s ability to turn maritime disruption into the economic stranglehold it sought. Serious negotiations may resume after the U.S. midterms, giving Washington an opportunity to convert accumulated economic pressure into Iranian concessions. The previous negotiating process repeatedly converted pressure into pauses before Tehran had paid the political and economic price Washington was trying to extract.

Pakistan is the wrong country to entrust with converting that pressure into practical next steps. Islamabad needs a workable relationship with Tehran for its own economic and security interests, while Iran possesses several ways to make deterioration painful for Pakistan. American sanctions obstruct Pakistani plans for Iranian energy and expanded trade. Confrontation threatens Balochistan and could force Islamabad to divert security resources toward an already unstable frontier. Pakistan’s Makkah defense commitments to Saudi Arabia at least theoretically expose it to Iranian support for the Houthis, making Iranian restraint valuable to Islamabad regardless of what Tehran gives Washington. China, Pakistan’s indispensable strategic partner, purchases Iranian petroleum and wants reliable Gulf energy flows. Pakistan’s military leadership has also used mediation to rebuild its political relevance in Washington by presenting access to Tehran as a valuable diplomatic asset. These interests have consistently pushed Islamabad toward de-escalation at precisely the point when sustained pressure had the potential to force Iran into harder choices.