A Lonely America Experiences Its Unipolar Moment

Donald Trump’s greatest legacy is not going to be some kind of American economic renewal. It will be an America that is alone.

The U.S. Navy cannot guarantee safe passage through the Gulf for global shipping without a ceasefire between American and Israeli forces with their Iranian enemy.  Iran holds enough ‘cards’ to keep the Gulf closed as a long as it has even small numbers of mines, missiles and drones to launch at close range. And it remains motivated to play those cards.

No U.S. Navy commander will send American warships to escort commercial ships through the Strait while this threat to even well-equipped warships remains high. That’s because the image of an American warship on fire in the Gulf, with large numbers of dead and wounded U.S. sailors, would be a hugely damaging symbolic and practical reverse in the war. American and Israeli air and naval dominance doesn’t extend to securing the Strait of Hormuz or even protecting Gulf States from attack.

None of this has happened out of a clear blue sky. 

Over his second term as president, Mr Trump has withdrawn active U.S. support and supplies from Ukraine, leaving Europeans to buy U.S. weapons Ukraine needs.  He’s threatened to leave NATO or not abide by its key article, and characterised the Russian threat to Europe as one for Europe to manage without America.  American interests with Russia are now about finding ways to build business and economic ties, with Mr Trump’s personal negotiator, Steve Witkoff working hard to force Ukraine to hand over unconquered land and agree to downsize its military as the price for peace with Moscow.

Nearer to home here in Australia, U.S. policy towards China is focused on rebalancing the economic relationship to benefit America far more than on dealing with any security challenge to our region from Beijing.  And the boilerplate policy documents of his Administration -the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy – both focus on America’s use of unilateral power, outside the longstanding framework of collective defence with partners and allies.

But with Mr Trump initiating the Iran war, we’ve reached a crystallising moment for geopolitics and security far beyond the Persian Gulf.  Mr Trump may be realising this. His European NATO allies certainly are. Beijing can no doubt not believe its luck as it watches America dismantle a major source of its global power and influence through breathtaking acts of self harm.

America is now a lonely, unilateral power that can act quickly and aggressively in ways that cause enormous damage to others’ interests, prosperity and security.  While Russia and China are reliably aggressive in pursuing their visions of influence and power, America is now both unreliable and unpredictable.

Placating Mr Trump with gifts or gestures that meet his in the moment demands builds no credit with him and prevents no punishment from him when circumstances change.  This is simply not a foundation for a deep alliance or even a reliable security partnership.

It may be that Australia ends up working with others, perhaps under French leadership, to create a neutral escort force for ships going into and out of the Persian Gulf. 

That will only be possible when a ceasefire in the Iran war is in place and when it is clear that Iranian drone and missile units are observing that ceasefire. Like our UK AUKUS partner, Australia has little to offer, but could stump up an Airwarfare destroyer. The French have sent 8 frigates and an aircraft carrier to the region and would be the obvious core of any escort flotilla.  That military power  is combined with the fact that President Macron has credibility with the Iranians: he opposed the Israelis and Americans starting the war and has made it clear France will not join the conflict.

If this neutral force ends up restarting the flow of shipping through the Gulf, it will be because it is in Australia’s and other nations’ interests for the economic disruption of the war to end and global economic recovery to begin.  It won’t be because our great and powerful ally has asked for or demanded our help. And it won’t be in partnership with the U.S.. As a participant in the war America simply can’t be part of this neutral force.

So, even in the aftermath of this globally disruptive war, we are likely to see the emergence of a new kind of global security partnership – one without America at its centre.  We are witnessing the unfolding consequences of an America that has devalued and damaged a key source of its global power and influence – its alliance network that has for decades extended its reach around the planet and magnified its power.

That creates a new and deeply unwelcome problem for Australia and other longstanding U.S. allies: how do we reduce our growing and large dependence on American power at a time of great danger and instability in the world and in our region? 

That’s a huge question, but the answer begins in partnership with others who share this challenge – like Japan, South Korea, France and Canada.  And it involves changing Australia’s current course and defence plans, which are making our military even more dependent on America than it is now.  Building a military that is less dependent on American systems and supplies might be hard, but when you have a drinking problem the first step is to stop drinking more.

Michael Shoebridge is founder and director of Strategic Analysis Australia. From 2018 until September 2022, he was the Director of the Defence, Strategy and National Security Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra.

This article appeared originally at Strategic Analysis Australia (SAS).