"Coalitions of the Willing" to Secure Asia's Maritime Commons

As President-elect Trump prepares to assume office, one of the critical issues his administration must confront is the growing challenge to free and secure access to Asia’s maritime commons posed by both state and non-state actors.  The administration needs to step up efforts to meet these challenges, but it should not rely exclusively on either bilateral partnerships with U.S. allies or the slow-moving, consensus-based regional institutions that make up the current regionals security architecture.

The Challenge

The U.S. benefits substantially from trade transiting Asian sea lanes, the ability to access the maritime commons to conduct regional naval operations, and the rule-based international order underpinning freedom of the seas.  It must be prepared to address the looming threats to these interests posed by piracy, terror networks, and China’s excessive maritime claims.

Despite improvements in the Straits of Malacca, piracy is increasingly problematic throughout the South China Sea.  The last few years have seen a marked rise in the frequency, costliness, and lethality of this threat to regional shipping.

The large number of Southeast Asian nationals fighting overseas for ISIS presents an additional risk. If these fighters return home, they could revitalize domestic terror groups, raising the general threat posed by regional terrorism.  These groups might consider maritime attacks, particularly in the more vulnerable regions of Southeast Asia, and the economic ramifications of any such attack could be severe.

Existing measures and policies for maritime security – including unilateral U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) – are a start, but the growing risks in the East and South China Seas point to the need for new initiatives. The U.S. needs to strengthen its efforts to deter and, when necessary, deny these threats to Asia’s maritime commons.

Bilateralism and Institutional Multilateralism: Paper Tigers

An approach that relies solely on unilateral polices or on the bilateral partnership between the U.S. and its chief ally in the region–Japan–may prove unsustainable.  The declining relative power of both the U.S. and Japan will diminish their ability to act alone in the coming decade.  Strict bilateralism also overlooks opportunities for greater burden-sharing and legitimacy through multilateral action.

Regional institutions like ASEAN, meanwhile, are paralyzed and lack real power. Given the substantial disagreements among its member states over the South China Sea disputes and its consensus-based decision-making process, ASEAN is unlikely to prove a useful partner for securing the regional maritime commons.

A Way Forward: Coalitions of the Willing

The solution I recommend in my recent article in Pacific Forum CSIS’s Issues & Insights is that the U.S. develop ad hoc maritime coalitions of the willing, one to address piracy and maritime terrorism, and one to address excessive state claims. 

Coalitions of like-minded states are generally more flexible and practical than more inclusive international or regional organizations.  By integrating a broader range of partners, coalitions can also bring greater sustainability, burden-sharing, and legitimacy to an effort than acting bilaterally through the U.S.-Japan alliance.  The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exemplifies the strengths of this approach. Coalitions can also offer a way of incorporating critical states that are usually hesitant to engage in formal security cooperation. India, in particular, is tepid about formal security cooperation but might be more willing to participate in ad hoc arrangements.

One coalition could be formed to address excessive state claims by engaging in regular consultation, joint freedom of navigation exercises, and coordinated diplomatic condemnation of UNCLOS violations.  Here, a partnership between the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia could be particularly effective.  These potential partners have extensive economic and security interests at stake in Asia’s maritime commons and have expressed concern over China’s recent assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. The U.S.-Japan alliance should consider utilizing its trilateral dialogues with India and Australia as the starting point for this coalition initiative.

A second coalition could be formed to run joint patrols to counter piracy and any potential terrorist threats to maritime commerce. It could have a broader membership base, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and other interested Southeast Asian states.  Ideally, ad hoc coalition initiatives would include multilateral patrols covering vulnerable areas in the South China Sea beyond the Straits of Malacca, coordinated reconnaissance, intelligence-sharing, and capacity building.

There are, of course, obstacles to these proposals. To succeed in mobilizing coalitions, the U.S. needs to maintain its credibility as a committed regional partner and leader.  President-elect Trump’s plan to strengthen U.S. naval forces should be a step in the right direction.  However, as he prepares to assume office, the President-elect must also take steps to reassure America’s allies of our continuing commitment to their defense and regional security more broadly.

Erik French is a PhD candidate at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, a junior fellow with the International Policy Scholars Consortium, and an Adjunct Instructor at American University’s School of International Service.