In the South China Sea: 'Not One Square Inch'

The daily average of Chinese militia boats in the South China Sea has reached 241 vessels, mostly concentrated around Mischief and Whitsun reefs. All while the militarization of small islands in the region has continued at pace. How do we reconcile this with the fact that Beijing has not taken a single island since 2012? The past decade has been spent measuring the growth of Beijing’s military at the cost of failing to determine under what conditions it would be willing to act. We have no way of knowing if deterrence has worked or if Xi has simply never had the intention of acting. However, we can ascertain the price China’s dictator will be expected to pay, relative to what has historically been the case; and that is one thing he does not have control over. The question should then be: is the cost for Chinese aggression in the South China Sea as high as it was fourteen years ago? A question which can only be answered by a very flat-no. To regain the initiative, the onus to impose a steep cost on aggression ultimately rests on the states within the South China Sea, but the depth of support and resolve we are willing to offer from the West is equally important.

To that end, Xi Jinping’s South China Sea ambitions should be measured, not by the growth of his military, but by the same metric by which he conducts his domestic politicking. Where he has normalized concerted attempts aimed at intimidating and imposing a high cost on those who seek greater freedom. Whether it was Hong Kong in 2019 or against the youth protesting years-long lockdown policies, he responded the same, brute force. As Ian Johnson reported in 2023, with China’s economy beginning to stagnate, Xi responded in a manner which no doubt sought to avoid Gorbachev’s failures; he tightened the ranks, imposed absolute ideological controls, and demanded conformity. He even purged the People’s Liberation Army’s greatest living war heroes from their highest posts.

With ASEAN and China poised for diverging economic growth forecasts up to 2030, Xi Jinping is under pressure. Similarly, in 2021, Putin was faced with a liberal order at the end of a decades-long economic stagnation with no end in sight, and the prospects of historical “Kyivan Rus”, the epicenter of Russia’s supposed identity, falling prey to the West’s pervasive liberal-order. He chose to act much as he previously had against his own people whenever they had reclaimed greater liberties, with brute force. In 2022, Russian soldiers crossed the Belarusian border with Ukraine and began a still-ongoing war which has economically crippled Russia, beyond what it likely imagined was possible. In doing so, Vladimir Putin has failed to achieve every single one of his strategic goals. For all of the failures in preventing the war and hampering preparedness, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization pulled together and provided decisive aid to the Ukrainian military, which continues to valiantly fight off a much more powerful opponent. Mistakes were made, of course, chief among them was the unwillingness of Kyiv and numerous European allies to heed Washington’s warning that an invasion was certain.

By nature of the conflict, allies were close, overland logistical routes were highly permissible, and the opportunities for accomplishing a fait-accompli were limited. This is not the case within the South China Sea. There is no multilateral joint-security architecture (although there are bi and trilateral defense treaties), ASEAN states appear fragmented, and Washington appears distracted. Geographically, these small, isolated islands are more difficult to resupply, and the People Liberation Army Navy outmatches all of the claimant states combined, making a fait-accompli an enticing proposition.

A major factor which predisposes Beijing towards a worsening security situation is similar to that faced by the Kremlin. With every act of coercion aimed at imposing costs, and intimidating an actor into changing their behavior, they become more likely to seek outside support. For authoritarians obsessed with the threat of internal power struggles, freedom of association is always perceived as a threat. A decade ago, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia actively avoided deepening their cooperation with the United States, to avoid antagonizing China. Today, all of these countries look to Washington as the balance against Beijing’s coercion. For Xi Jinping, this trend is not a result of China’s aggressive policies; it is the result of another empire imposing its own will within Beijing’s traditional sphere of influence. Without a domestic mechanism for forcing attention towards the popular will, authoritarians conceive of free people simply as individuals that must be led.

When George F. Kennan wrote his “Long Telegram” from Moscow, he correctly identified the limits of Soviet confrontation. The Kremlin felt no pressure to act; Communist ideology had preordained the inevitable fall of capitalism. Soviet leaders aimed only to survive and push for gains within the limited spaces where the West lacked resolve. Most of Kennan’s warnings still stand and very much apply to Beijing’s current leadership. The Chinese Communist Party continues to derive legitimacy from the framing that only they can guard the populace against the “external” threat. As well as a similarly neurotic worldview which carries the trauma of the Century of Humiliation.

Where China differs today is in the fact that Xi Jinping is faced with the prospects of a capitalist system which has yet to fail, and that his own country has adopted. His pressure is internal; wages have stagnated, economic growth has slowed, demographic headwinds will soon become an issue, and Chinese society is experiencing a period of “involution.” The inability to deliver the kind of future growth which ensures a functional social contract between the Communist Party and the Chinese people threatens his legitimacy. All while his neighbors increase their defense spending, lean harder on American support, and are poised for greater economic growth.

For an authoritarian, subject to the blowback of his own propaganda machine, the decision for war may not be made that far ahead. While some have previously suggested that Xi has already priced the cost of a Taiwan invasion or aggression in the South China Sea; it is equally, if not more likely, that he simply does not believe a cohesive opposition will form against his coercion. While the People’s Liberation Army may be planning for a war with the United States, just as the US Military does the same, the political leadership in Beijing has more to gain from pushing in areas where Western resolve appears weak or fractured. Despite decades of reform to his military, and a force which at one point was reported capable of overwhelming NATO’s Baltic forces within 60 hours, Vladimir Putin chose to attack Ukraine, because it looked weak and isolated. The decision to prioritize military reform, and to leverage finite economic resources in order to develop a technically prestigious military, which must be coup-proofed, is a personal decision for authoritarians. The sacrifice of such a great deal of energy and attention towards developing a “powerful” military, is further justified by the parades which leave domestic populations seemingly in awe. If the noble citizens being ruled over are impressed by these displays of might, how could the regime’s adversaries not be? How could the small, and seemingly fractured nation of Ukraine oppose Russia’s historic destiny? It could not stop the conquest of Crimea, which the West appeared to have accepted. In Asia, how could Taiwan oppose the Chinese Communist Party’s dream of unification? It all begins with a test in the South China Sea; if and when Xi Jinping asks his neighbors to submit, those states will, in turn, look to the West for support. Once this happens, it will be up to Washington and its allies to demonstrate how much they value democracy, and that means not a single island in the South China Sea can be allowed to fall.

Alexandru Filip is a Research Fellow with the Dupuy Institute, based out of Tysons Corner, Virginia. His research focus is strategic and security studies, with a current emphasis on China’s military development. He has published pieces on capability analysis and policy recommendations in venues such as RealClearDefense, The Centre for International Maritime Security, The Center for Maritime Strategy, The National Interest, and Merion West.

image: Chinese President Xi Jinping attends a plenary session of China's National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Two former Philippine officials are filing a complaint with the International Criminal Court accusing Chinese President Xi of crimes against humanity over his government's assertive actions in the South China Sea. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File)