Feeding Victory

Feeding Victory: Innovative Military Logistics from Lake George to Khe Sanh. Jobie Turner. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, April 2020.

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Turner’s first case study reaches back to the French and Indian War, where the pre-industrial context of the era underscored the imperative of establishing and maintaining supply lines in combat. When the British and French met on the colonial territory of what is now Upstate New York, their differing approaches to transportation and distribution—in particular how one side leveraged the complex geographical terrain to their advantage in establishing lines of communication—would serve as a measure that redefined the colonial era.

The British throne entered the French and Indian War with a marked advantage in men, materiel, and economic prowess. Moreover, their colonial foothold in North America provided them a position of relative territorial strength over the French.[2] This would not prove decisive as the two monarchies marched to war in the mid-1700s. Throughout the first section of the book, Turner lays out the conditions that both sides set leading up to the Lake George Campaign. On the British side, Major General Edward Braddock led his forces—both regulars and the famed Rogers’ Rangers—out of Virginia and on the march northwest to take Fort Duquesne, building roadways and Conestoga wagons along the way.[3]

The French and natives, however, chose a different approach. They took to the water, capitalizing on the extensive network of lakes and rivers throughout the northeast and the strategic position of Fort Duquesne at the nexus of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers. This method of transportation proved necessary, but insufficient over the course of the campaign, as use of the waterways helped the French drive back the British in 1758, forcing a stalemate in the campaign. Major Generals James Abercrombie and Jeffrey Amherst identified the shortfall: the overreliance of Braddock on the slow, lumbering Conestoga wagons in their supply lines. To mitigate this, the British government infused men, capital, and supplies in the construction of watercraft to support their forces and expand their transportation network.[4] By shifting focus to supply lines from both land and water, and seizing on the French side’s excessive dependence on maritime transport, the British would ultimately emerge victorious, at great cost to their empire.[5]

Turner shifts focus in his second chapter to another pivotal era in war and military logistics—the trench-laden battlefields of World War I. While the context of war was altered by the post-Industrial era, one common component that the Western Front carried with it from its eighteenth-century precursors was the prevalence of land and maritime lines of communication between the warring parties; instead of wagons, however, we see a heavy focus on expanding of rail lines on the battlefield, particularly from the German side.[6] The Germans further complicated things with their adoption of submarine warfare, which challenged the supply ships the British and French—now allies—relied on to bring supplies and ammunition to their supply bases.[7]

Turner lays out a contest of what he calls “Steam on Steam,” or “strength against strength: German rail power versus British sea power.”[8] The Germans changed the calculus of logistics with their extensive rail lines, using steam powered trains to move men, weapons, supplies, and equipment across the European continent with a speed and capacity not then seen on a battlefield. Turner aptly points out that while the use of rail infused a more mobile and rapid means of supplying the trenches of the Western Front, it was not in and of itself a decisive adaptation to military logistics. The slow pace of building rail lines and the counterfire of the British and French forces were too much  for the German side, rendering the Western Front a stalemate until the arrival of the United States in 1918. Steam, rail, and trucks would eventually prove more influential in World War II, as would the emerging development of the early 20th century—airplanes.[9]

Landing ships putting cargo ashore on Omaha Beach, at low tide during the first days of the operation. (Wikimedia)

The third chapter and case study takes the reader to the Second World War, where even greater advances in technology changed the character of war, and in how war is supplied and sustained over land, sea, and now by air. Turner uses the Pacific Theater of World War II, in particular the Guadalcanal Campaign, as his setting for this section. By the 1940s, the capacity of supply vessels over water had exponentially increased, and the sea lines of communication in the Pacific Theater were the main focus of logistical supply and resupply for both sides fighting for control of the island.

By highlighting the prevalence of maritime resupply, Turner shows how Guadalcanal illuminates an important aspect of logistics: the establishment of beachheads, lodgments, and staging bases. When the Marines arrived at Guadalcanal in August 1942, the combination of transport ships, landing crafts, and supply vessels provided the baseline for the assault force attempting to take the island. However, limited space on the beachhead, coupled with Japanese airstrikes on the assaulting Marines, ensured the contested landing and subsequent buildup of the supporting supply system would slow the advance onto the island.[10]

By comparing how effectively the two sides supplied food and other needed cargo to their combat troops at Guadalcanal, Turner underscores the primacy of logistics in war. In the end, the Marines would prove stronger in this domain, especially after they captured ten days’ worth of Japanese food supplies at Savo Island.[11] Further, the Japanese failed in their campaign to establish a combined supply run from both the sea and air, supported by bombing runs. Dubbed the “Tokyo Express,” this attempt at rapidly resupplying their troops in contact was necessary, but insufficient to allow the Japanese to reconstitute enough combat power to dislodge the Marines from the island.[12] On the American side, however, the application of air power proved a difference maker, as the combination of air combat and aerial resupply operations sustained the Marine offensive and opened up new airfields that carried through the rest of the war.[13]

In his fourth example, Turner keeps the focus on World War II, but returns to the European Theater and Germany’s assault on Stalingrad in 1942-1943. After launching Operation Barbarossa in the second half of 1941, the Germans faced significant challenges in sustaining their advance over the contentious Soviet road networks, further exacerbated by the inability of the supply lines to keep up with the pace and tempo of the Panzer tank assaults. Ultimately these problems did not impede success for the Germans, however, as on the Soviet side, the unrelenting assaults of the Luftwaffe significantly impacted the robustness of their logistics network until they received help from the British and Americans in late 1942.[14]

Reeling from Barbarossa, the Soviets repositioned enough of their supply basing out of German reach to reset and prepare for the assault on Stalingrad. Moreover, the Soviets also learned the necessity of protecting supply lines from the aerial bombardment of the Luftwaffe. Turner highlights in this chapter how the Germans overextended their supply and distribution network during the assault on Stalingrad, especially as German ground transports could not keep pace with the forces advancing across the wet terrain of the Soviet steppe. Not only did they strain their lines of communication, they far overtasked the Luftwaffe air support capability going into Stalingrad.[15] The primacy of airpower that would create such success early for the Germans would ultimately be turned against them, leading to their overall defeat.

Turner’s fifth and final study considers whether nuclear weapons change the context and conduct of logistics in war. Moving from the steppes of the Soviet Union to the jungles of Vietnam, Turner frames the evolution of logistics in war in the 25 years that passed between Stalingrad and his last example, the Battle of Khe Sanh. By the time the United States found itself at war again in Vietnam, advancements in transportation by air, land, and sea greatly expanded the capacity and capability to bring troops, weapons, equipment, and materiel to the battlefield. This helped drive the U.S. theory of victory for Vietnam; as Turner states, “the United States [believed it] could send enough soldiers and weapons to end the conflict through military means.”[16]

The U.S. had extensive ground lines of communication throughout Vietnam. By Khe Sanh, however, air would prove the more decisive method of supplying the fight, and airpower would yet again prove a challenge for protecting and managing supply lines on both sides. While the North Vietnamese army lay siege to the Marines at Khe Sanh, they were unable to deal a decisive blow due to the harassment of American artillery and air support on their supply lines.[17] On the other hand, the American logistics network brought to bear every technological advance available to keep Khe Sanh supplied—in addition to an extensive network of trucks, the Americans also capitalized on their emerging air capabilities. Adding in rotary wing lift, as well as the now venerable C-130 cargo aircraft for airdrop resupply, the Americans had multiple conveyances to keep their troops supplied and win the battle of supply at Khe Sanh.[18]

A U.S. Air Force C-130 dropping supplies at the Du Dop Army Special Forces camp, Vietnam, in 1968 (USAF Photo/Wikimedia)

If a warfighter cannot be supplied, a war cannot be won. Turner’s work is vitally important for operational and strategic planners of every branch of the military, especially those who look for common themes across history that are still relevant today. Feeding Victory is detailed in its approach and robust in its context—often to a fault, as occasionally the thrust of the logistical lessons gets lost in the stories of the battles. However, the stories are so well told that the detail is necessary to tie together the threads and themes. Further, the depth of detail in his notes at the end of the text provides ample additional supporting material for readers to do further research of these historical examples. In sum, Feeding Victory further underscores the old adage of “Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.”

now by air. Turner uses the Pacific Theater of World War II, in particular the Guadalcanal Campaign, as his setting for this section. By the 1940s, the capacity of supply vessels over water had exponentially increased, and the sea lines of communication in the Pacific Theater were the main focus of logistical supply and resupply for both sides fighting for control of the island.

By highlighting the prevalence of maritime resupply, Turner shows how Guadalcanal illuminates an important aspect of logistics: the establishment of beachheads, lodgments, and staging bases. When the Marines arrived at Guadalcanal in August 1942, the combination of transport ships, landing crafts, and supply vessels provided the baseline for the assault force attempting to take the island. However, limited space on the beachhead, coupled with Japanese airstrikes on the assaulting Marines, ensured the contested landing and subsequent buildup of the supporting supply system would slow the advance onto the island.[10]

By comparing how effectively the two sides supplied food and other needed cargo to their combat troops at Guadalcanal, Turner underscores the primacy of logistics in war. In the end, the Marines would prove stronger in this domain, especially after they captured ten days’ worth of Japanese food supplies at Savo Island.[11] Further, the Japanese failed in their campaign to establish a combined supply run from both the sea and air, supported by bombing runs. Dubbed the “Tokyo Express,” this attempt at rapidly resupplying their troops in contact was necessary, but insufficient to allow the Japanese to reconstitute enough combat power to dislodge the Marines from the island.[12] On the American side, however, the application of air power proved a difference maker, as the combination of air combat and aerial resupply operations sustained the Marine offensive and opened up new airfields that carried through the rest of the war.[13]

In his fourth example, Turner keeps the focus on World War II, but returns to the European Theater and Germany’s assault on Stalingrad in 1942-1943. After launching Operation Barbarossa in the second half of 1941, the Germans faced significant challenges in sustaining their advance over the contentious Soviet road networks, further exacerbated by the inability of the supply lines to keep up with the pace and tempo of the Panzer tank assaults. Ultimately these problems did not impede success for the Germans, however, as on the Soviet side, the unrelenting assaults of the Luftwaffe significantly impacted the robustness of their logistics network until they received help from the British and Americans in late 1942.[14]

Reeling from Barbarossa, the Soviets repositioned enough of their supply basing out of German reach to reset and prepare for the assault on Stalingrad. Moreover, the Soviets also learned the necessity of protecting supply lines from the aerial bombardment of the Luftwaffe. Turner highlights in this chapter how the Germans overextended their supply and distribution network during the assault on Stalingrad, especially as German ground transports could not keep pace with the forces advancing across the wet terrain of the Soviet steppe. Not only did they strain their lines of communication, they far overtasked the Luftwaffe air support capability going into Stalingrad.[15] The primacy of airpower that would create such success early for the Germans would ultimately be turned against them, leading to their overall defeat.

Turner’s fifth and final study considers whether nuclear weapons change the context and conduct of logistics in war. Moving from the steppes of the Soviet Union to the jungles of Vietnam, Turner frames the evolution of logistics in war in the 25 years that passed between Stalingrad and his last example, the Battle of Khe Sanh. By the time the United States found itself at war again in Vietnam, advancements in transportation by air, land, and sea greatly expanded the capacity and capability to bring troops, weapons, equipment, and materiel to the battlefield. This helped drive the U.S. theory of victory for Vietnam; as Turner states, “the United States [believed it] could send enough soldiers and weapons to end the conflict through military means.”[16]

The U.S. had extensive ground lines of communication throughout Vietnam. By Khe Sanh, however, air would prove the more decisive method of supplying the fight, and airpower would yet again prove a challenge for protecting and managing supply lines on both sides. While the North Vietnamese army lay siege to the Marines at Khe Sanh, they were unable to deal a decisive blow due to the harassment of American artillery and air support on their supply lines.[17] On the other hand, the American logistics network brought to bear every technological advance available to keep Khe Sanh supplied—in addition to an extensive network of trucks, the Americans also capitalized on their emerging air capabilities. Adding in rotary wing lift, as well as the now venerable C-130 cargo aircraft for airdrop resupply, the Americans had multiple conveyances to keep their troops supplied and win the battle of supply at Khe Sanh.[18]

If a warfighter cannot be supplied, a war cannot be won. Turner’s work is vitally important for operational and strategic planners of every branch of the military, especially those who look for common themes across history that are still relevant today. Feeding Victory is detailed in its approach and robust in its context—often to a fault, as occasionally the thrust of the logistical lessons gets lost in the stories of the battles. However, the stories are so well told that the detail is necessary to tie together the threads and themes. Further, the depth of detail in his notes at the end of the text provides ample additional supporting material for readers to do further research of these historical examples. In sum, Feeding Victory further underscores the old adage of “Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.

Steven L. Foster,  a Senior Editor at The Strategy Bridge, is an officer in the U.S. Army with extensive experience in logistics, and a current emphasis in operational and strategic planning. He is currently serving as a strategic planner, and holds a Master of Public Policy with emphasis in National Security Policy from George Mason University. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.

[1] James C Rainey and Roger D Golden, “Quotes for the Air Force Logistician,” The Air Force Journal of Logistics 2 (December 2006): 144.

[2] Jobie Turner, Feeding Victory: Innovative Military Logistics from Lake George to Khe Sanh (University Press of Kansas, 2020), 9.

[3] Ibid, 15-17.

[4] Ibid, 56.

[5] Ibid, 57-58.

[6] Ibid, 61.

[7] Ibid, 65.

[8] Ibid, 65.

[9] Ibid, 96-98.

[10] Ibid, 110-111.

[11] Ibid, 143.

[12] Ibid 145-146.

[13] Ibid, 150.

[14] Ibid, 159-160.

[15] Ibid, 201.

[16] Ibid, 217.

[17] Ibid, 248, 253.

[18] Ibid, 257.