When the Network Goes Dark, Who Controls the Battlefield?

Ukraine’s military encountered an unusual vulnerability in its satellite communications this October. Certain drones equipped with Starshield terminals lost connectivity when traveling faster than 160 kilometers per hour. The equipment had not been destroyed, and the network remained operational. A service restriction prevented the terminals from maintaining their connections at higher speeds.[1]

The limitation disrupted Ukrainian drone operations, including attempts to intercept Russian drones. Ukrainian officials said the restriction appeared without warning and began discussions with SpaceX and the U.S. government to restore the affected capability. The decision-making process remains disputed. SpaceX chief executive Elon Musk has maintained that the U.S. government controls Starshield operations, while President Donald Trump denied ordering the restrictions.[1]

For military planners, the unresolved question of responsibility does not remove the operational concern. Ukraine had incorporated satellite communications into combat operations, yet decisions outside its chain of command could change the conditions under which the service operated.

The Pentagon must account for who controls access, what restrictions govern use, and whether missions can continue when those conditions change.

A Risk Long Recognized

In a 2022 article for the Air University’s Air & Space Operations Review, “Commercial SATCOM: A Risk Mitigation Strategy,” I examined five areas of concern associated with military reliance on commercial satellite communications: protection, control, reliability, interoperability, and access.[2]

Those concerns remain relevant as commercial constellations expand and military systems become more connected. The Starshield episode brings particular attention to control and access, characteristics that often receive less attention than bandwidth, transmission security, and resistance to electronic attack.

Commercial satellite systems offer substantial military advantages. Distributed constellations provide multiple communications paths, and commercial providers can expand capacity and deploy improvements faster than traditional defense acquisition programs. The Department of Defense has good reasons to use these services.

Indeed, its satellite communications modernization plans depend on them. A March 2025 Government Accountability Office report examined the department’s transition toward enterprise satellite communications, an approach intended to integrate military and commercial systems into architectures capable of shifting traffic among networks. GAO identified problems obtaining access permissions, sharing information, and procuring equipment capable of operating across multiple satellite systems. It also found that the department lacked comprehensive reporting on progress toward the integrated architecture.[3]

These findings concern operational resilience as much as acquisition. Alternate pathways help only if they are technically compatible and available when needed.

Consider a military unit equipped with terminals able to connect to two satellite constellations. If an adversary disables the primary connection, the unit may restore communications through the second network. That is the benefit of redundancy.

A different failure arises when the primary connection becomes unavailable because its service authorization changes. If the backup network depends on the same authorization system, contractor-controlled configuration, or policy restriction, the second connection may be unavailable as well.

The unit has two technical pathways but a common operational dependency. Counting networks without examining those dependencies can overstate readiness.

When a Working System Becomes Unavailable

Reliability engineering examines component performance, failure rates, maintenance, and recovery from equipment malfunctions. Military testing adds threats such as electronic warfare, cyberattack, and physical destruction. A service restriction introduces a different failure mechanism: equipment can function properly while an external decision prevents its use.

Such restrictions are not necessarily improper. Commercial services operate under contracts, licensing requirements, export controls, and security policies. Providers may need to prevent unauthorized activity. The government must retain authority over military assistance and national security decisions.

The issue is whether commanders know which restrictions apply to a mission and how those restrictions can change. Operational plans may depend on capabilities whose availability remains subject to decisions beyond the employing force’s control.

Remote configuration makes the problem more immediate. Changes to geographic permissions, service priority, mobility limits, or terminal authorization can alter what a fielded system can do without any physical modification.

The consequences depend on the mission. Lost satellite communications can interrupt sensor feeds, delay command updates, or prevent remote operation of an unmanned platform. Some systems can continue autonomously. Others require a continuous connection. Switching to another network may demand equipment or permissions unavailable during an engagement.

A related problem appears in the Pentagon’s use of commercial space data. In an August 2026 report, GAO found that some Space Force officials hesitated to purchase or use commercial data because of licensing costs, perceived usage restrictions, and uncertainty about long-term access.[4] The report addressed commercial data and related services, not satellite communications specifically. Its findings nevertheless illustrate how access rights can limit the military value of a purchased capability.

What Mission Assurance Should Require

The Pentagon should not abandon commercial technology or attempt to own every satellite, network, and supporting service. That would sacrifice useful capability and introduce substantial cost. It should require explicit mission-assurance reviews of externally controlled services before counting them as essential military capabilities.

First, program managers and operational commanders should identify external dependencies that could interrupt a mission. The review should cover providers, government authorities, service-management platforms, network gateways, licensing arrangements, and remote configuration controls. Each dependency should be assessed according to what happens if it becomes unavailable.

The review must distinguish who can impose restrictions. Adversary interference, a provider’s contractual limitation, an allied government’s decision, and a U.S. national authority’s direction are different risks. They require different mitigations. A unit cannot overcome a national policy decision with an additional antenna.

Second, operational testing should address loss of access originating outside the communications hardware. Evaluators already examine physical and electronic threats. They should also simulate changes in service authorization, restrictions on commercial networks, and the loss of remotely managed support services.

These tests should establish how quickly forces recognize an interruption, which mission functions remain available, and how rapidly an independent pathway can restore operations. For a drone unit, that means demonstrating whether command and data functions can move to another connection within the time available for its assigned mission. A backup requiring equipment stored elsewhere or permissions that cannot be obtained during combat should not receive full operational credit.

Third, service contracts and government coordination procedures should specify authorized operating conditions, notification requirements for material changes, continuity provisions, and processes for resolving urgent access problems. Government decisions involving national policy and operational security will remain outside contractual control. Where those decisions affect deployed forces, commanders need established channels for understanding and managing the operational consequences.

These measures cannot guarantee uninterrupted access. They can establish where a mission depends on an external decision and whether an acceptable fallback exists.

Readiness Beyond the Equipment

The department should incorporate these requirements into its enterprise satellite communications modernization work. GAO recommended annual reporting to Congress on progress implementing enterprise SATCOM management and hybrid architectures; the department concurred.[3] Congress should use that reporting process to examine external operational dependencies alongside technical integration.

Progress should be measured through demonstrated mission performance under degraded conditions, including the loss of externally controlled services. A network that switches successfully between satellites in a laboratory may still fail during operations if the alternate connection requires unavailable authorization or depends on the same restricted service.

As military communications become more integrated, shared dependencies can affect otherwise separate platforms and units. Evaluators should establish whether alternate paths remain usable under the conditions in which forces will operate, not simply count the number of connections a system can make.

The October Starshield restrictions exposed a problem that extends beyond Ukraine and SpaceX. A force can own its weapons, train its personnel, and maintain its equipment while relying on an outside authority for an essential communications capability.

Before the Pentagon declares such a system mission ready, it should establish what happens when the conditions of access change. If the consequences are unknown and no tested alternative exists, the readiness assessment is incomplete.

CAPT Jonathan K. Corrado, Ph.D. (U.S. Navy Reserve) works in the nuclear industry.

The views in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or any other organization.

[1] Associated Press, “Presidential Adviser Says Ukraine Is in Talks to Lift Speed Limit on Military Satellite Network,” October 16, 2026,
https://apnews.com/article/385eb944f6c34990bdf21f624416b820.

[2] Jonathan K. Corrado, “Commercial SATCOM: A Risk Mitigation Strategy,” Air & Space Operations Review 1, no. 1 (2022),
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-1_Issue-1/Corrado_Commercial_SATCOM.pdf.

[3] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOD Satellite Communications: Reporting on Progress Needed to Provide Insight on New Approach,” GAO-25-107034, March 4, 2025,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107034.

[4] U.S. Government Accountability Office, “National Security Space: DOD Has Opportunities to Improve Its Use of Commercial Data and Related Services,” GAO-26-107959, August 27, 2026,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107959.