Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Correcting the Record

As the world remembers the August 6, 1945, and August 9, 1945, anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it is important to avoid the seductive lure of applying self-serving hindsight to a war time decision made almost eight decades ago. It is all too easy to cherry pick the facts and distort them to build a narrative that calls into question President Harry Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb. For some advocates of nuclear disarmament, the anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide such an opportunity. Let us correct the record.

Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan, was the preferred choice and was expected to begin as early as November 1945. Kyushu, the southernmost, was alone projected to cause at least 50,000 American casualties.

According to Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, the Navy Department estimated America casualties at 1.7-4 million with 400,000-800,000 deaths. The same Department estimate suggested up to 10 million Japanese casualties.

In July 1945, with no major battles under way, the United States Army still suffered more than 3,000 casualties in one month. The Navy and Marines were also losing ships and men to Japanese U-boats.

When President Harry Truman and Army Chief of Staff General, George C. Marshall, found out that the United States developed and tested an atomic bomb, both, after significant deliberation favored the use of atomic weapons for one overriding reason; atomic weapons stood the greatest chance of ending the war fastest and with the least loss of American life.

 Some historians contend that the only reason Truman used the bomb was to prevent the Soviets from taking part in Japan’s defeat and possibly expanding Soviet influence into Japan. This argument simply does not withstand scrutiny.

It was only on August 8, 1945, after learning the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Stalin only did so because he feared the United States would win the war without any Soviet participation—reducing any spoils the Soviets might take.

We are often told the Japanese were willing to surrender, but for American insistence on unconditional surrender. The Supreme Council for the Direction of the War intended to negotiate a surrender in which Japan was not occupied; Japan would disarm itself; and Japan would conduct its own war crimes trials. These demands would never be acceptable to the American people after suffering so much loss to defeat the Japanese.

Revisionists also regularly take the communications from internal Japanese debates—late in the war—cherry pick a sentence or two and suggest that a final decision to surrender was made in months before the bombs were dropped. In fact, after the bombing of Hiroshima, the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War had a majority of its members who favored continuing the fight. It was only after the bombing of Nagasaki that Emperor Hirohito made the decision to capitulate. Even then, young army officers tried to overthrow the government and continue fighting.  

The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was correct on military and political grounds. It did exactly what President Truman and General Marshall desired—end the war soonest with the least loss of American life. The loss of an estimated 150,000 Japanese lives in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was tragic, but more than justified by the American lives saved.

Viewing the carnage at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862, General Robert E. Lee remarked, “It is well that war is so terrible. Otherwise, we would grow too fond of it.” Nuclear war brings home this point in a way no other form of warfare can. It is for good reason that the great powers have not fought a war in eight decades. Thus, it is better to remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the peace the world has enjoyed since—a true and positive legacy.

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Dr. Stephen Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Curtis McGiffin is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.