Believe It or Not, the U.S. Doesn't Have an Indo-Pacific Warfighting HQ

U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth should decisively direct the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, to establish a dedicated theatre-level headquarters within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. In doing so, Hegseth would promote the objectives of rapid reprioritisation of military resources, improved planning and revitalised alliances.

But even as prospects of an invasion across the Taiwan Strait become increasingly plausible, the United States lacks an Indo-Pacific command structure designed for a major theatre war. The secretary of defense should immediately rectify this with a dedicated theatre-level Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters within the Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to ensure robust operational planning and effective multinational coordination. This would shift U.S. posture from peacetime engagement to wartime readiness.

A thoughtful observer of U.S. national defence might assume such a thing exists, but it does not.

In fact, U.S. command organisation in the Indo-Pacific is set up for a peacetime posture. Establishment of the JTF is what’s needed to instead meet the demands of modern war.

The threat posed by China is no longer speculative; it’s immediate. The Chinese military has significantly advanced its capabilities for large-scale amphibious operations, airborne assaults, and urban combat—forms of action that would all plausibly be used in an invasion of Taiwan. While some analysts maintain that Taiwan’s rugged terrain and logistical challenges would deter China, others insist that U.S. security assurances to Taiwan may prove hollow without robust arrangements for military interoperability.

Recent U.S. war games underscore the urgency of the situation, as they suggest the Chinese armed forces could achieve their objectives in Taiwan within days, potentially outpacing any feasible U.S. military response from distant bases, such as Hawaii. This daunting prospect highlights the necessity for rapid reprioritisation of resources—switching them to the Western Pacific from elsewhere—improved operational planning and revitalised multinational partnerships. These are objectives that Mike Gallagher, former member of the U.S. House of Representatives and member of the House Armed Services Committee, called for in 2022.

Yet no U.S. theatre-level wartime headquarters dedicated to the Indo-Pacific has been established. USINDOPACOM’s existing component commands—such as the 5th, 7th and 11th Air Forces, the Third and Seventh Fleets and, in South Korea, the Eighth Army—are primarily structured for bilateral security cooperation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Their focus reflects a legacy mindset attuned to a more benign security environment. While combatant command doctrine assigns responsibility for campaign planning and wartime integration at the highest levels, the demands of daily shaping activities, such as multinational exercises and security cooperation initiatives, tend to eclipse comprehensive war planning. Geographic unified combatant commands (such as USINDOPACOM, combining elements of all the services) and component commands (the service-specific elements within the geographic combatant commands, such as Pacific Air Forces) are similarly encumbered by non-wartime missions. This leaves actual warfighting preparation underdeveloped.

This inertia is evident in how senior commanders frame their missions. For example, official Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) strategy and senior commander statements appear to integrate partnership-building with warfighting goals. But the PACAF campaign approach has also been described in terms of partnership-building, interoperability and conceptual development for great power competition, while excluding explicit wartime considerations. PACAF is characterised as an ‘operating force’ focused on agile basing and tactical support rather than as a warfighting headquarters. Such a stance may have sufficed in a less contested era, but it is no longer adequate given the immediacy of the Chinese threat.

Critics may argue that establishing a dedicated wartime headquarters would destabilise the region or provoke escalation. However, historical precedents and strategic theory suggest otherwise. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980—later transformed into U.S. Central Command—demonstrated the value of credible, forward-leaning military posture for deterrence and crisis response. Effective deterrence requires not simply the existence of military power but its visible organisation and readiness for combat.

A new theatre-level JTF would enable USINDOPACOM to conduct focused planning and preparation for a range of conflict scenarios, not solely a Taiwan contingency. This headquarters could integrate major service components, such as a reestablished 10th Army, the Seventh Fleet, and the 11th Air Force, to achieve unity of command and effort. Past recommendations, such as operationalising the Third Fleet as a South Asian and Indian Ocean command, further support the feasibility and necessity of such an arrangement.

The Indo-Pacific is now the primary theatre of strategic competition and potential conflict for the United States. China’s accelerating military modernisation and the increasing risk to Taiwan demand a decisive shift in American defence organisation and planning. Establishing a dedicated, theatre-level wartime headquarters is not a provocation but a prudent adaptation to new realities—one that would promote deterrence, prepare for major combat operations and reassure allies. The time to organise for Pacific theatre warfighting is now.

Marco J Lyons is a U.S. Army colonel and deputy chief of staff of V Corps (Forward) in Poland. His former three-year duty position was as assistant chief of staff (G-5) for plans with U.S. Army Pacific, where he worked closely with USINDOPACOM, PACFLEET, MARFORPAC and PACAF. The views expressed here are personal.

This article appeared originally at The Strategist (ASPI).