Carriers Fading Beyond the Horizon

Naval power in the twenty‑first century has gradually moved away from large formations built around massive industrial‑era giants such as battleships and aircraft carriers. It has become distributed, autonomous, and networked. The aircraft carrier — a symbol of the industrial age — can no longer serve as the core of a fleet: it is too expensive, too vulnerable, and too dependent on infrastructure. Modern warfare requires not center‑dependence, but the absence of one — a multitude of autonomous elements that cannot be decapitated with a single strike.

The NAVIS and ARGUS configurations described in this article are doctrinal concepts — analytical models that outline the logical structure of a distributed maritime weapons system. Under conditions of political will and military‑technical necessity, such architectures could form the basis for real operational systems.

When the “Masters of the Ocean” Become Excessive

• They are excessively large and prohibitively expensive, making them strategically inefficient under modern conditions. A Ford‑class carrier costs more than $13,3 billion and requires substantial additional investment in the supporting infrastructure needed to operate and sustain the ship.

• They are vulnerable even to inexpensive and relatively low‑precision strike systems — including drone swarms, UAVs, USVs, cruise missiles, and undersea drones. Intercepting a single target with a surface‑to‑air missile costs $2–4 million, while a strike drone costs $20–30 thousand, and a low‑cost aerial decoy creates a cost asymmetry that collapses the economics of interception.

• A carrier is a single, highly visible point of concentration for the fleet, and its loss — or even the threat of disabling it — paralyzes operational decision‑making.

• The threat of a carrier being struck forces commanders to alter behavior, routing, operating areas, and escalation rules.

• Carriers are becoming an outdated instrument — their role is diminishing.

• Their massive crews — 4,500 to 5,000 personnel — create the risk of a single catastrophic loss of life, which, beyond the human tragedy, results in severe reputational consequences and multimillion‑dollar compensation obligations.

• Carriers require enormous and vulnerable support infrastructure — oilers, dry docks of specific dimensions, satellite support, layered air defense, and escort ships — and the loss of any element in this chain renders the carrier itself ineffective.

• Building a single carrier ties up industrial capacity and consumes materials that could instead produce a large number of more flexible ships capable of performing missions equal to or exceeding those of a carrier. Carriers lose relevance in an era of distributed strike systems, where power is generated not by a single massive platform but by numerous inexpensive, dispersed systems that cannot be “decapitated” with one strike.

The transition to a post‑carrier architecture means the gradual formation of a distributed system in which the carrier’s functions are divided across several technological streams. These components do not emerge simultaneously: some already exist, others are in development or experimental production, and still others are undergoing doctrinal refinement. Together, they form a resilient distributed maritime weapons system that remains operational even when individual components are lost.

Relevance — already in operational service

They will become the backbone of the fleet earlier than all other components: the technologies are mature, the industrial base is ready, and construction cycles are short. These ships provide air defense, anti‑submarine warfare, network integration, and serve as carriers for containerized modules. They replace the carrier in the functions of command, communications, and sensor‑data distribution.

Relevance — actively employed

They assume the roles of reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting previously performed by carrier aviation. Maritime patrol aircraft provide the long‑range coverage of 3,000–5,000 km, and HALE‑UAV sustain endurance of up to 40 hours, forming the key sensor layer of the post‑carrier era.

Relevance — mass deployment in the mid‑term

They provide power projection without entering the adversary’s engagement zone. Ranges of 1,500–2,500 km and hypersonic velocity enable strikes from outside enemy reach, covering missions previously tied to the aviation component of the carrier.

Relevance — partial technological readiness, requiring scaling

They perform reconnaissance, targeting, strike missions, air‑defense support, electronic warfare, and signature deception. Their autonomy and low cost create a new operational layer that enables persistent presence without risk to crewed platforms.

Relevance — emerging as a concept, long‑term horizon

This is a multitude of relatively inexpensive autonomous carriers whose combined combat functionality cannot be eliminated even by multiple strikes. They generate strike power without a center of gravity, replacing the very principle of the carrier air wing.

Relevance — appears last, requiring maturity of all preceding components

This formation integrates frigates, unmanned systems, missiles, and autonomous platforms into a unified strike network in which the interaction of all elements becomes the foundation of combat power and the survivability of the naval force.

The situation around Iran, developing since January 26, 2026, demonstrates  the scale of resources required to sustain carrier‑based power during strike operations. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN‑78) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN‑72) are operating in the region simultaneously, with USS George H.W. Bush (CVN‑77) deployed as reinforcement — a rare concentration of forces that necessitates multiple Carrier Strike Groups.

According to the U.S. Navy, a carrier strike group consists of an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron, a carrier air wing of 65–70 aircraft, and supporting elements, with a total manpower of roughly 7,500 personnel.

The financial burden is comparable to the budgets of small states:

• A Gerald R. Ford–class carrier costs $13 billion.

• Escort infrastructure, air defense systems, dry docks, satellite support, and logistics constitute a highly significant additional cost component.

• A full carrier strike group represents an extraordinarily expensive, multi‑billion‑dollar force structure.

Even short‑term presence is extraordinarily expensive, with about $6.5 million per day required to operate a full carrier strike group.

These figures show that maintaining carrier‑based power requires enormous resources, while the structure itself remains vulnerable: the loss of any element — from an oiler to an air‑defense destroyer — degrades the combat effectiveness of the entire group. Under conditions involving modern adversary weapons, such concentration of cost, personnel, and infrastructure turns the carrier into a complex, expensive, and threat‑exposed instrument that demands disproportionate expenditure to maintain operational resilience.

A simple functional replacement for the carrier does not create a coherent, resilient system. Frigates, missiles, and unmanned systems perform necessary roles, but by themselves do not form a maritime configuration capable of operating autonomously and without infrastructure dependence.

The identification of this triad as the foundation of future naval weapons architecture is explained by the fact that it covers all critical mission areas:

• reconnaissance,

• targeting,

• command and control,

• defense,

• long‑range strike.

Integrating and sustaining all these components is enabled by the architecture of autonomous maritime systems — NAVIS (Naval Autonomous Vector for Integrated Scenarios).

A post‑carrier architecture is impossible without a systemic approach to autonomous maritime platforms. The NAVIS architecture fulfills this role by creating an environment in which every platform is modular, autonomous, replaceable, and capable of operating for weeks even under conditions of lost communications. The elements of NAVIS are described in detail in a separate doctrinal work, but within the scope of this article its architectural properties are what matter. NAVIS forms the structural layer of the fleet: concealed deployment points, containerization, trawl‑resistance, long‑duration autonomy, scenario‑based operation, integration with orbital satellite constellations and UAVs, and distributed AI modules that enable resilient decision‑making under limited connectivity. On this foundation, a new form of maritime power is built — with ARGUS providing the strike component.

A key element of this infrastructure is the set of concealed container modules that enable the deployment of autonomous platforms at points not tied to fixed bases. These containers serve as hidden autonomous storage and launch modules for ARGUS strike and support platforms operating within the NAVIS framework. ARGUS platforms use NAVIS as a system for covert deployment, autonomous navigation, and signature masking, allowing them to operate without bases and under limited communications. They carry the strike, decoy, sensor, and missile components of the system, but the launches are executed by the autonomous carriers themselves after leaving the container.

This configuration enables force deployment without bases or fixed infrastructure, creating a distributed network of concealed emergence points. ARGUS maritime strike platforms deployed from containers serve as carriers for long‑range and hypersonic missiles. After completing their mission, the carrier self‑terminates in cases of lost communications, critical damage, capture, deviation from the permitted corridor, or any threat of compromising the NAVIS architecture.

This article introduces, for the first time, the ARGUS (Autonomous Resilient Grid for Unmanned Seapower) architecture — a proposed configuration for distributed maritime strike built upon the NAVIS infrastructure.

If NAVIS is the foundational architecture for autonomous maritime systems, then ARGUS is their strike‑oriented form of employment. It is a distributed matrix of autonomous maritime platforms that operate as a constellation: they converge only at the strike point, disperse immediately after the mission, and have no single point of failure.

ARGUS is a distributed strike configuration that does not require a carrier, a large surface combatant, or a fixed base. Each drone is an independent weapons carrier, and the loss of part of the platforms does not critically reduce combat effectiveness. Scale, low cost, and autonomy turn ARGUS into the strike power of a carrier — without the carrier itself.

Key properties of the system:

• distributed structure — no dependence on a specific host platform and the ability to operate autonomously

• concentration at the strike point — elements converge only within the engagement zone

• complete infrastructural independence — the system uses storage and deployment cycles based on containers, seabed capsules, underwater repositories, and mobile platforms

• mass scale — a large number of small carriers with distributed strike payloads

• reduced sensitivity to losses — the system retains strike potential even with partial component attrition

• compatibility with NAVIS — ARGUS uses the existing architecture of autonomy, masking, and containerization

The use of decoy drones amplifies the overall effect. False targets, externally identical to strike platforms but lacking expensive sensors and costing an order of magnitude less, create an artificial density of strike assets, saturate the battlespace with additional signatures, generate deceptive trajectories, and force the adversary to expend countermeasures that are themselves vastly more expensive than the decoys. By increasing the number of false targets, the system reduces the probability of real carriers being hit, thereby raising the overall survivability of the strike configuration. Decoy drones are a low‑cost way to expand the distributed volume of platforms ARGUS without increasing total expenditure, turning the system into an even more resilient, dense, and difficult‑to‑suppress strike matrix.

ARGUS replaces the carrier air wing: instead of 60 aircraft and a massive support and escort infrastructure, it employs a grouping of autonomous carriers whose strike potential cannot be suppressed even under repeated fire impact. This is an architecture aligned with the evolution of twenty‑first‑century strike systems.

ARGUS is a dynamic strike configuration that exists only during the period of attack. The system does not form a naval order, does not move as a dense group, and does not create an observable structure. It exists only at the point from which it delivers the strike.

ARGUS is activated from multiple locations — containers, seabed capsules, underwater repositories, mobile platforms, and next‑generation frigates that deliver containers into the operational area while remaining outside the adversary’s weapons engagement zone. Containers can be released into the water as autonomous modules, enabling covert deployment hundreds of kilometers from the strike point. In littoral operations, the system can be launched from small shelters, temporary sites, and concealed facilities, without relying on traditional naval bases.

Movement is dispersed. Each drone follows its own route, changes depth, speed, and signature, and avoids surveillance zones. The system exists as a multitude of independent points rather than a single formation: dozens of launch vectors, hundreds of routes.

Assembly occurs only within the weapons‑release zone: elements synchronize, distribute targets, and form the salvo. Numerous autonomous carriers generate a staggered flow of individual launches that overload missile‑defense channels. As the number of strike assets increases, the probability of interception decreases, while the probability of successful target engagement rises.

After completing its mission, ARGUS ceases to exist as an observable combat configuration. Platforms are recovered by host ships or other fleet vessels for maintenance and reuse. Platforms that are not recovered self‑terminate in accordance with the security‑preservation algorithm. The system loses any structural characteristics that would allow it to be tracked or classified as a target.

ARGUS does not rely on external control channels during the operation, which reduces vulnerability to electronic warfare and cyber interference. Routing, interaction, and the strike itself are executed autonomously based on onboard AI, without the need for synchronization with external command loops. Multi‑point deployment from capsules, repositories, containers, frigates, and temporary sites eliminates the possibility of identifying a single point of origin. The ARGUS infrastructure is a distributed set of deployment and servicing nodes, not tied to any fixed location.

ARGUS enables strike operations without moving the fleet into the operational area and without involving crews. The system does not require a carrier or fixed infrastructure, creating a stable asymmetric advantage.

The transition to distributed autonomous maritime systems brings the era of large naval weapons carriers to a close, forming a new doctrine of fleet development based on functional resilience and the preservation of combat capability. In this configuration, the key factor is the system’s ability to maintain operational effectiveness despite partial component losses and to deliver strikes regardless of the status of individual elements.

NAVIS provides the system’s architecture, while ARGUS serves as the mechanism for target engagement. Together, they enable an integrated process of reconnaissance, targeting, and strike without functional reliance on legacy CVN carriers. This structure delivers survivability, concealment, and flexibility that carrier‑dependent formations cannot achieve.

The shift toward distributed autonomous systems will become a defining factor in the evolution of modern navies. It changes the logic of maritime operations and directs the further development of naval strategic thought.

Sergey E. Ivashchenko is a strategic analyst working at the intersection of escalation dynamics, information strategy, and long‑range strategic forecasting.