The U.S Navy's Battle for Sea Power

The oceans have always been the chessboard of Great Powers. Sea power has raised nations of obscure stature on land to positions of prominence and influence across the waves. Portugal was but a small European kingdom on the periphery of the Iberian Peninsula, until a confluence of its famed navigators and groundbreaking caravel ship technology led to an unprecedented breakout on the world’s oceans, and made Lisbon the capital of the world’s first global maritime empire.  It was naval strength that enabled the Spanish conquistadors to vanquish the previously ascendant Aztecs and Incas, made the Dutch a force in the East Indies, and of course, molded Great Britain into a naval superpower policing the world’s seas between far-flung holdings where “the sun never set”.  

Yet this legacy of naval zeniths and twilights serves as a stark warning for America today, as it faces an unprecedented new challenge.  Xi Jinping’s China is clear-eyed in pursuit of becoming a naval superpower. Beijing is building a naval force that can make the CCP’s influence felt around the world. The strategic focus of the PLAN means that it is not sinking valuable man hours and material assets into periphery theaters or auxiliary missions. According to a recent analysis from the U.S. Department of Defense, the PLAN is focused on the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (aka the United States).  This may not represent a clear desire to launch a preemptive offensive against the United States Navy per se; Beijing has more restrained national interests to protect on the high seas, including valuable trade routes in the Maritime Silk Road.  However, given China’s increasingly aggressive stance towards its neighbors, America cannot afford to assume innocent motives, especially in light of China’s recent confrontations with the Philippines, disregard for international law, and of course, public preparation for Taiwan reunification, by force if necessary.  Xi Jinping may be seeking to establish a secure geo-economic sphere over East Asia, as former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby has warned, and naval power will be the linchpin of such a plan.

Therefore the continuing development of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into a power projection force with increasingly global reach represents the most significant challenge to American naval power since the Second World War.  While this development is neither new nor unexpected, the pace and implications of a shifting maritime power balance between Washington and Beijing are alarming.

According to publicly available assessment from the U.S. Department of Defense, the PLAN now operates the world’s largest navy of 370 ships and submarines, a number projected to rise to 435 vessels by the end of this decade.  It operates three aircraft carriers, with a fourth under construction. It maintains 12 nuclear powered and 48 diesel powered submarines, with an expected total of 80 submarines in operation by 2035. Its surface fleet is composed of largely modern and capable ships, backed by an advanced and expansive industrial base, with a shipbuilding capacity that CSIS estimates is 230 times larger than America’s. These are stark figures.

By marked contrast, the U.S. Navy’s stated target of 355 ships announced in late 2016, is still a goal on paper, as America operates only 291 warships. For nearly a decade, “The Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Military Strength has consistently graded the Navy as too understrength to ensure success in combat”, particularly in a hypothetical Pacific war with China.  As The New York Times noted last autumn, “At no moment since World War II has the service faced a more urgent demand to embrace new technologies and weapons systems… But the Navy, analysts and current and former officials say, remains lashed to political and economic forces that have produced jobs-driven procurement policies that yield powerful but cumbersome warships that may not be ideally suited for the mission it is facing.”  The most important mission is deterring the PLAN. And while it is increasingly being acknowledged that America may not be ready, recent developments have served only to underscore the problem.

In a Pacific war scenario, American submarines could well play a decisive role. But just this month, amidst a backdrop of a real terms cut of $10 billion dollars to the Pentagon budget, America learned that the U.S. Navy will order only one new Virginia class attack submarine next year.  This is notable because at least two new subs a year are necessary to meet America’s demanding priorities, and this doesn’t include an expectation to sell between three and five new subs to Australia under AUKUS over the coming decade.  A key part of the delay is workforce issues; America’s defense industrial base is in a perilous state, and the challenges extend well beyond submarines.  The first Constellation class frigate, an essential component of the navy’s future surface combat fleet, was just delayed by a year due to workforce shortfalls at its shipyard.  This means that arguably the most important new subs and frigates in the American fleet are both falling behind in their respective deployments. Defense industrial base challenges are mounting at a time of broader issues for American naval power.

The U.S. Navy is facing widespread accounts of maintenance issues, the embarrassing fiasco of the littoral combat ships, and the identity malaise that comes from sending billion dollar flotillas to battle hundred dollar drones off of Yemen.  None of this bodes well for a China war scenario. If the United States is serious about retaining its global relevance and military edge in an era of Great Power competition, it cannot afford to permit an outdated defense industrial base, political malpractice, legacy planning, or short-term crises in periphery areas of the globe to sap its resources and strategic focus from the overwhelming priority: deterring the PLAN from a Pacific war.  The U.S. must develop a clear strategy to fix (not just describe) its defense industrial base problems, get both the Virginia and Constellation programs back on track, clear the backlog of deferred maintenance, accelerate development of the HALO hypersonic missile system, and make rapid headway in unmanned systems to keep pace with developments in the Black Sea and beyond.  If such things seem impossible to achieve under normal bureaucratic circumstances, then it is all the more reason to start acting like America really is facing the naval emergency that it finds itself confronting today.

Garrison Moratto holds an M.S. in International Relations and B.S. in Government: Public Administration from Liberty University. He has been published in numerous outlets on foreign policy, including most recently in Pacific Forum International's "Issues & Insights''.  He currently works as an independent consultant to a foreign policy think tank in Washington D.C.