Russia's Phantom Pains of the Soviet Empire as a Source of Systemic Threats to the West

Russia’s relations with post‑Soviet states shape the strategic environment across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. After 2014, and especially after 2022, Moscow expanded its pressure toolkit: political statements about “historical territories,” information campaigns, economic restrictions, military activity, and engagement with domestic political groups. These actions alter risk perceptions in neighboring states and create conditions for new crises.

This article applies a unified analytical framework to all regions. Each section examines, in sequence, the historical context, post‑1991 trajectory, security issues, economic ties, domestic political dynamics, information influence, and points of tension. This approach makes it possible to compare states and identify the elements that shape the strategic environment around Russia.

Facts documented after 2022 show that Russia employs the full spectrum of hybrid tools in the Baltic region. New waves of cyberattacks targeting government institutions and infrastructure companies demonstrate Moscow’s ability to inflict damage without direct military confrontation, affecting governance, energy systems, and logistics. Incidents involving unidentified drones flying over infrastructure sites in Lithuania, along with reports from Estonian and Latvian security services about detentions of individuals linked to Russian structures, confirm the presence of intelligence activity and attempts to cultivate assets on the ground. Diplomatic statements about “protecting Russian speakers,” information campaigns, and efforts to influence elections indicate that Moscow views the domestic politics of these states as an operational environment.

Military exercises near the borders, troop movements, and shows of force in the Baltic Sea—combined with regular airspace violations—create a regime of continuous monitoring of Russian military activity for the Baltic states. In practice, this means that early‑warning systems, air defense, and intelligence assets of the region and its allies must operate in a heightened readiness posture, and any change in the scale or nature of exercises may be interpreted as a signal of potential escalation. Likely scenarios for conflict expansion—hybrid operations, border provocations, information attacks, and attempts to destabilize domestic politics—logically follow from Russia’s already observed behavior and are not abstract constructs.

For the United States, NATO, and the EU, the Baltic region remains an area of primary risk precisely because the full spectrum of Russian pressure instruments has already been recorded here: cyber operations, information campaigns, intelligence activity, military signaling, and engagement with domestic political groups. The response to Russian actions in this theater directly affects the broader security architecture of NATO’s eastern flank. Misinterpreting signals, reacting too slowly, or underestimating cyber threats could create conditions in which a localized incident in airspace, at the border, or within digital infrastructure becomes a trigger for a wider crisis. This is why strategic decisions by the United States, NATO, and the EU in defense, cyber security, and engagement with Russian‑speaking communities in the region must account for the mechanisms of Russian pressure already in evidence and their potential for further development.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia share a common historical context of incorporation into the USSR, but differences in their political trajectories after 1991 produced three distinct models of relations with Russia. These differences define the specific vulnerabilities Moscow exploits in the region. National narratives shaped by events of the early 1920s continue to influence perceptions of Russian actions: in Armenia, the Soviet period is remembered as the end of external threats; in Azerbaijan, as the loss of independence; in Georgia, as the forcible alteration of the political system. These interpretations form the basis for how each state responds to Russian signals and pressure.

After the collapse of the USSR, the states chose different paths of development, and this divergence created three separate political architectures, each becoming the foundation for specific forms of Russian influence. Georgia pursued integration with Western institutions and implemented extensive reforms, making its domestic politics sensitive to information campaigns and the activity of political groups oriented toward slowing its Euro‑Atlantic course. Armenia relied on allied relations with Russia, primarily in the security sphere, and for many years viewed Moscow as the key guarantor of stability; the weakening of these guarantees after 2020 created a new vulnerability that Moscow can exploit through control over security infrastructure. Azerbaijan developed an autonomous model, combining energy projects with balancing among external centers of influence, which makes it susceptible to energy and diplomatic pressure tools.

Azerbaijan’s participation in Turkic integration initiatives promoted by Ankara, including the Greater Turan project, reinforces its strategic alignment with Turkey. This dynamic establishes a distinct political vector that increases Baku’s distance from Russia and shapes the character of its external balancing behavior.

Security issues remain central for all three states but manifest differently. Armenia has experience with armed clashes around Nagorno‑Karabakh and has begun shifting toward procurement of Western weapons after the weakening of Russian guarantees, creating space for pressure through allied formats. Azerbaijan is strengthening its own armed forces and expanding cooperation with Turkey, making energy and diplomatic competition key instruments affecting its foreign‑policy course. Georgia experienced the 2008 conflict, and the perception of Russia as a source of risk became embedded in its political culture, making information operations and episodes of intelligence activity particularly significant.

Economic ties with Russia vary, but Moscow regularly uses them as a pressure instrument. Rospotrebnadzor’s bans on the export of Georgian wine, mineral water, and Armenian and Azerbaijani products following domestic political decisions that displeased Moscow demonstrate that economic restrictions are part of a hybrid toolkit aimed at adjusting the foreign‑policy behavior of these states.

The threats already observed show that Russia adapts its pressure mechanisms to each of the three models. The weakening of Russian guarantees for Armenia creates the risk of a security crisis that could quickly extend beyond bilateral relations. Attempts to influence Georgia’s domestic politics through information campaigns and engagement with political groups indicate that Moscow views the Georgian political system as an operational space. Competition over energy routes in Azerbaijan reflects Russia’s effort to maintain influence over strategic flows of energy resources and limit Turkey’s role.

Likely scenarios for conflict expansion logically follow from Moscow’s already observed actions. Pressure on Armenia through allied formats may intensify as it shifts toward Western weapons. In Georgia, an increase in information operations and activity by political groups oriented toward slowing its Euro‑Atlantic trajectory is likely. In Azerbaijan, Russia may continue using energy and diplomatic tools to preserve influence over regional routes. These scenarios represent a direct continuation of Russia’s actual behavior rather than hypothetical constructs.

Long‑term trends show that the states of the South Caucasus continue adjusting their foreign‑policy courses: Armenia is seeking new avenues of cooperation with the EU, Azerbaijan is strengthening its role as an energy partner and deepening engagement with Turkey, and Georgia is striving for further alignment with Western institutions. For the United States, NATO, and the EU, the region remains an area where localized episodes of pressure can quickly acquire international significance. Given the mechanisms of Russian influence already in evidence, the South Caucasus requires continuous analysis of Moscow’s public signals, assessment of intelligence‑service activity, and monitoring of economic restrictions used as instruments of pressure.

Russia’s full‑scale war against Ukraine accelerated Moldova’s departure from Moscow’s orbit. Hybrid pressure — energy coercion, disinformation campaigns, financing of opposition structures, and cyberattacks on government institutions — increased domestic vulnerability and reinforced the perception of Russian policy as a direct source of internal instability. The unresolved Transnistria issue, Russia’s military presence, and the large ammunition depot in Cobasna — a legacy of the Soviet 14th Army and guarded by a Russian contingent of roughly 1,500 personnel, including Russian officers and locally recruited soldiers — form a persistent vulnerability node for Moldova’s security and sovereignty.

Historical proximity to Romania amplifies political sensitivity. Until 1940, Moldova (Bessarabia) was part of Romania, creating lasting cultural and linguistic ties and shaping a stable Romania‑oriented segment of society. After incorporation into the USSR and subsequent independence, Moldova found itself between competing identities: Romanian‑speaking groups look to Bucharest and the EU, while pro‑Russian groups rely on Soviet‑era legacies and ties with Moscow. Romania has become Moldova’s key external partner, providing energy diversification, supporting reforms, strengthening infrastructure connectivity, and acting as the main political conduit for Moldova’s European integration. Moscow systematically exploits this contrast in information campaigns to deepen internal divisions.

The national question remains a channel for external influence. In the autonomous region of Gagauzia, where pro‑Russian orientations are strong, Moscow relies on local elites and media networks to create an internal pressure point that can be activated during periods of political turbulence. This complements broader instruments of influence, including support for protest movements and attempts to destabilize the political environment through affiliated networks.

In response, Chisinau accelerated its alignment with the EU, suspended participation in CIS structures, diversified energy supplies, and expanded cooperation with Western partners. The Moldovan case illustrates how Russian actions can simultaneously undermine internal resilience and trigger strategic realignment.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan share a common Soviet experience, but differences in their political trajectories after 1991 produced five distinct models of interaction with Russia, China, and Turkey. The historical experience of incorporation into the USSR became embedded in national narratives in different ways: in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is viewed as a period of modernization; in Uzbekistan as a change in the political system; in Tajikistan as the formation of new institutions; and in Turkmenistan as a transition to centralized governance. These interpretations continue to shape perceptions of Moscow’s contemporary actions and define each state’s sensitivity to external pressure.

After the collapse of the USSR, the states chose different development paths, forming the basis for variations in their vulnerabilities. Kazakhstan pursues a multi‑vector policy, combining cooperation with Russia, China, Turkey, and Western partners. Uzbekistan adjusts its external ties according to domestic reforms and gradually expands its international engagement. Kyrgyzstan experiences cycles of political instability, making it susceptible to external influence. Tajikistan  focuses on security issues and  relies on Russia’s military presence, facing simultaneous pressure from Taliban activity and growing Chinese security expectations. Turkmenistan maintains neutrality, but its economic model remains vulnerable to external constraints.

Security occupies a central place in regional politics but manifests differently across the states. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan participate in collective‑security structures, making them sensitive to Moscow’s political signaling. Tajikistan faces challenges along its southern borders and depends on external partners for security. Uzbekistan is developing its own armed forces and expanding cooperation with Turkey and China, gradually reducing Russia’s role. Turkmenistan emphasizes neutrality, but its economic dependence creates space for pressure.

Economic ties with Russia remain significant, and Moscow regularly uses them as instruments of influence. Russian lawmakers have made statements about “disputed territories” in northern Kazakhstan, prompting a sharp reaction from Astana and demonstrating Moscow’s willingness to use territorial language as a political signal. Rospotrebnadzor has imposed restrictions on imports of Kazakh and Uzbek products following domestic political decisions that displeased Moscow. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan depend on labor migration and remittances, creating an additional lever of influence.

China has become a key economic and infrastructure partner for the region. It invests in transport corridors, energy projects, and joint ventures. Major Chinese companies operate in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; in Tajikistan, Beijing participates in modernizing border infrastructure and finances security projects. Chinese loans create long‑term dependence, gradually reducing Russia’s influence and forming a new architecture of external ties.

Turkey is expanding its role through the concept of the Great Turan, promoting cultural, political, and military cooperation. The idea itself extends beyond Central Asia and includes Turkic regions inside Russia — such as the Volga republics and parts of Siberia — which adds a layer of sensitivity to Moscow’s perception of Turkish influence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are deepening engagement with Ankara, including defense projects, military training, and joint initiatives. At the same time, the broader Turan narrative generates unease among non‑Turkic states like Tajikistan and creates quiet competition among Turkic states over leadership within this emerging framework. Turkey uses soft power, educational programs, and economic projects, strengthening its position and creating an alternative center of influence that affects both regional dynamics and Russia’s internal calculations.

Russia’s activity in Central Asia creates for the West the risk of a parallel security system in which Moscow uses territorial statements, information operations, and security‑based pressure to keep the region under control. Statements about “disputed territories” regarding Kazakhstan, interference in Kyrgyzstan’s political dynamics, and the use of Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan generate points of tension capable of disrupting the stability of transport and energy routes through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. These actions increase the risk of logistical disruptions, rising migration flows, and destabilization of infrastructure projects, directly affecting U.S. and NATO interests.

Competition intensifies due to the activity of China and Turkey, which are reshaping the region’s strategic configuration. China, by investing in transport corridors, energy projects, and border infrastructure, creates long‑term dependence and pushes the West out of key logistical routes. Turkey expands defense and political cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, creating an alternative center of influence that limits NATO’s ability to maintain a direct presence. Against this backdrop, likely threat scenarios include intensified Russian territorial rhetoric, information campaigns targeting Kyrgyzstan, pressure on Tajikistan through security issues, and attempts by Moscow to retain influence in Uzbekistan through economic and political tools—all of which could trigger regional crises with direct consequences for Western security and economic interests.

Ukraine has a unique trajectory of relations with Russia, distinct from all other post‑Soviet states. The historical context is tied to events of 1917–1922: the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, their unification in 1919, the subsequent suppression of Ukrainian statehood by the Bolsheviks, and the incorporation of historical Ukrainian lands—Kuban, the Belgorod region, and parts of Bryansk—into the RSFSR. These processes became embedded in public memory as a combination of modernization and the loss of political autonomy, and they continue to shape perceptions of Moscow’s contemporary actions.

After 1991, Ukraine developed through political cycles and shifts in foreign‑policy orientation. The Orange Revolution of 2004 marked the first major turning point, and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 radically changed the nature of relations with Russia. The annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas became the point of irreversible rupture. Until 2014, elements of industrial cooperation persisted: Yuzhmash serviced the R‑36M (15P014) intercontinental ballistic missiles, classified by NATO as SS‑18 Mod.1–3 “Satan,” which remained among the most reliable in Russia’s arsenal. The termination of cooperation after the annexation of Crimea negatively affected the readiness of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces.

The full‑scale invasion on February 24, 2022, radically altered Ukraine’s interaction with Russia and defined subsequent decisions in defense and international cooperation. Moscow’s actions reproduce a deeper historical pattern: Russian statehood inherited from the Ulus of Jochi a model of centralized coercion, in which control over territories and their historical narrative is a key element of legitimizing power. Within this logic, Putin views the appropriation of Ukrainian history and the seizure of Ukrainian territory as an essential component of the project to restore the USSR—regardless of its future name. Without Ukraine, this project is impossible: Russia without Ukrainian statehood, culture, and historical heritage remains a collection of separate Uluses of the western part of the Mongol Empire of the 13th–14th centuries, later known as the Golden Horde.

Economic ties between Ukraine and Russia gradually declined. Until 2014, significant elements of cooperation in trade and energy persisted, but after the annexation of Crimea Ukraine began reorienting toward European markets and developing new infrastructure projects. These changes affected the structure of the economy and the nature of foreign‑policy decisions. Political dynamics were shaped by internal processes: changes of government were accompanied by shifts in foreign‑policy approaches and reforms of state institutions. Public sentiment played a key role in decision‑making, especially in matters of security and international cooperation.

Russia’s information influence in Ukraine sharply decreased after 2014 and almost disappeared after 2022. Restrictions on access to Russian media resources and the development of domestic platforms reshaped the communication environment and influenced the formation of public narratives. Long‑term trends show Ukraine’s drive toward deeper cooperation with Western states and blocs. For the collective West, Ukraine became a central direction of foreign and defense policy: new mechanisms of military assistance were created, training programs for Ukrainian forces expanded, sanctions were imposed on Russia’s defense sector, and the parameters of allied presence on the eastern flank were adjusted.

Ukraine represents an example of a state that moved from incorporation into the USSR to independent development and faced large‑scale threats affecting the strategic landscape of all Europe. The war that began in 2014 and continues in full‑scale form after 2022 reflects a deep historical model of Russian behavior, rooted in a post‑Horde structure of power.

Russia views Ukraine as the central element of restoring an imperial model of governance, which turns the war into a threat to the entire European security architecture. The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the full‑scale invasion demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to revise borders by force, creating a precedent that undermines the legitimacy of NATO and EU institutions. Strikes on Ukraine’s energy and transport infrastructure are aimed at pressuring European markets, provoking migration flows, and destabilizing logistics. Attempts to disrupt grain corridors affect global food security, while information operations redirected toward NATO audiences aim to reduce public support for assistance to Ukraine. The occupation of Ukrainian territory creates for Russia a strategic foothold for further movement toward Western Europe and for altering the balance of power on the continent.

Likely threat scenarios include consolidating the occupation through political formulas, expanding strikes on critical infrastructure, pressuring neighboring states to restrict the transit of weapons, and using pauses in fighting to rebuild Russian forces. These actions are aimed at weakening the West’s ability to support Ukraine, altering the parameters of allied presence on the eastern flank and creating conditions for further revision of European security. Ukraine remains the key node through which Russia seeks to reshape Europe’s strategic landscape, making the threats to the West systemic, long‑term, and not limited to the current phase of the war.

Russia is shaping a multi‑vector system of pressure in which every region of the post‑Soviet space functions as an operational instrument directly affecting Western security. In the Baltic region, Moscow tests the resilience of NATO’s eastern flank through cyber operations, intelligence activity, and military signaling, forcing allies to continuously adjust readiness and early‑warning parameters. In the South Caucasus, it uses allied formats, energy routes, and interference in domestic politics, creating localized episodes capable of rapidly acquiring broader significance. In Central Asia, Russia combines territorial statements, information operations, and security‑based pressure, influencing transport and energy corridors important for Western access and regional stability. In Ukraine, it conducts a campaign aimed at undermining Europe’s security architecture and creating positional advantages that expand Russia’s ability to move toward Western Europe.

At the same time, Russia operates under growing internal strain: the costs of the war, sanctions pressure, and technological constraints weaken its capabilities but do not change its desire to present itself as the successor to the Soviet empire. This image no longer corresponds to its actual potential yet remains an important element of Russian foreign‑policy rhetoric and is used to maintain influence in neighboring states. In territories that Moscow has traditionally considered its zone of control, new centers of power are emerging. Beijing and Ankara advance their interests through economic projects, infrastructure, cultural programs, and defense cooperation, forming alternative models of engagement. This changes the nature of regional dynamics: in several directions Russia is gradually shifting into secondary and tertiary roles, and for the West the need increases not only to track Russian actions but also to assess the long‑term consequences of activity by Beijing and Ankara, including its impact on transport routes, energy chains, and political processes.

Sergey E. Ivashchenko is a strategic analyst working at the intersection of escalation dynamics, information strategy, and long‑range strategic forecasting.