Russian Ground-Launched Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons
Russia maintains the largest force of ground-launched non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in the world. Even more striking is the fact that essentially 100% of these weapons violate Russian arms control commitments. According to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), “Russia continues to violate a series of arms control treaties and commitments, the most significant being the INF Treaty. In a broader context, Russia is either rejecting or avoiding its obligations and commitments under numerous agreements, including…the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.” The 1988 INF Treaty prohibits ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500-km and Russian commitments under the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives include, among other things, the complete elimination of short-range ground-launched nuclear missiles of less than INF range, nuclear artillery and nuclear land-mines. Russian now has a monopoly on these weapons because the U.S. honored its commitments to dismantle these weapons. In 2014, the Obama administration concluded, “…that the Russian Federation was in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” This missile type is now operational.
The linkage of Russian ground-launched non-strategic nuclear weapons to arms control violations limits the availability of information about these programs including the range of the missiles, their numbers and even their very existence. However, the 2018 NPR records Russia “…is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons).” Dave Johnson, a staff officer in the NATO International Staff Defense Policy and Planning Division, has written that “…the capabilities now available to Russia consist of redundant, overlapping, long-range, dual-capable missile coverage of nearly all of Europe from within Russian territory, airspace, and home waters.” He also noted regarding Russia’s precision strike weapons systems that “…all… are dual-capable or have nuclear analogs.”
Despite Russian denials of its violations of the INF Treaty, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, has actually documented Russian INF Treaty violations. In March 2018, he declared, “In each strategic theatre, groups of long-range cruise-missile carriers based on land, sea and in the air have been created, capable of providing deterrence in strategically important areas.” He was even more explicit in November 2017 when he said Russia had “…set up full-scale units of vehicles capable of delivering precision-guided missiles to targets located up to 4,000 kilometers away.” This statement is particularly interesting because he is talking about a ground-launched missile prohibited by the INF Treaty with a range substantially in excess of any Russian ground-launched missile reported in the Russian or Western press.
The Trump administration has revealed that the Russian ground-launched cruise missile the Obama administration concluded violated the INF Treaty, the SSC-8/9M729 is nuclear capable. However, the scope of Russian INF Treaty violations is reportedly much greater than a single missile. This reflects Russian policy which involves multiple missile types in each range category. Unless there has been a massive underestimate of the range of the SSC-8/9M729 missile in the available press reports, it is not the missile that General Gerasimov was talking about. There are several other nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missiles that are reported in the Russian press to have ranges in the INF Treaty prohibited zone. These include the R-500 and the Kalibr.
In June 2017, an unclassified intelligence report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, U.S. Air Force (NASIC) indicated that Russia had deployed the 3M14, a “Ground, ship, & sub” launched cruise missile with a range of 2,500-km. The 3M14 is the Russian Kalibr cruise missile, reportedly a member of the Club family of missiles. In June 2017, NASIC published a corrected version of the report which eliminated any reference to a ground-launched version of the Kalibr. In the convoluted world of the intelligence community and Russian arms control compliance, the correction may have been made because the intelligence community is not allowed to release unclassified information indicative of an arms control violation that has not been determined by the NSC, a policy that goes all the way back to Dr. Henry Kissinger in the 1970s.
A report of a ground-launched version of the Kalibr associated with the Iskander system appeared in a 2012 Finnish study by Stephen Forss. In July 2017, Russian expatriate Pavel Podvig wrote, “There is a general agreement that the INF [Treaty] culprit, known as SSC-8, is somehow related to the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, which we know has the INF range.” In August 2018, state-run Russia Beyond the Headlines reported, “The new projectiles, R-500 ‘Kalibrs,’ are a land-based version of the country’s notorious cruise missiles which were used for the first time in late 2015 to eliminate Islamic State terrorists in Syria.”
The Bastion is a supersonic coastal defense anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile system using the Oniks (3M55) missile. In July 2016, Interfax, Russia’s main unofficial news agency, reported, “The Bastion coastal defense [cruise missile] system has an operational range of 600 kilometers and can be used against surface ships of varying class and type…” The 2017 National Air and Space Committee Intelligence report stated that the 3M55 missile (also called the P-800 Oniks) was possibly nuclear.
Soon after its first test launch, Ria Novosti, an official Russian Government news agency, reported range numbers for the R-500 ground-launched cruise missile that are in the INF Treaty prohibited zone. In November 2007, Ria Novosti reported: “The flight range of a new cruise missile adapted for Iskander and successfully tested in May 2007 could exceed 500 km (310 miles).” In November 2008, it revealed that the potential range of the R-500 “can exceed 2,000 kilometers…” Writing in Ria Novosti and for the UPI, Ilya Kramnik, then Ria Novosti’s military correspondent, said that the range of the R-500, and possibly a second missile, could be between 1,200 and 3,000-km. Kommersant, a major Russian business publication, maintains that the range of the R-500 “can amount to 1,000-km.
In 2014, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer explained the differences in the range numbers for the R-500. He “said the missile (R-500) has been tested at a range of 1,000 km,” but the “…range could be extended up to 2,000-3,000 km by adding extra fuel tanks.” (This technique, adding external conformal fuel tanks, was applied by the Soviets to extend the range of the Cold War AS-15 air-launched cruise missile.)
It is interesting that when then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced the first test of the R-500 he boasted, “It can be used at long range with surgical precision, as doctors say.” Russia has treated the R-500 with unusual secrecy. While President Putin gave the developers of the R-500 missile a Russian state award, their names were not mentioned: “because their identity is a state secret.” It seems clear that Russia did not want reporters talking to the R-500 designers. The R-500 is reported to be nuclear capable. The 2017 NASIC report contains a photograph of the R-500 in flight but no entry for the R-500 in the chart on land-attack cruise missiles. The Russian Defense Ministry said serial production of the R-500 was underway in 2012.
The Russian Iskander-M “aeroballistic” missile has been described by the Russian Defense Ministry as nuclear capable. NATO also assesses the Iskander to be nuclear capable. In 2009, the Commander of the Rocket Forces and Artillery Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Bogatinov, said that special (nuclear) warheads were available for the Iskander and the legacy Soviet Tochka (SS-21) missiles. In 2006, the Russian nuclear weapons laboratory at Sarov published a document celebrating its accomplishments, including the specific nuclear weapons it had designed. The publication stated that the “Tactical BM [ballistic missile] Iskander is equipped with a special nuclear warhead developed at our institute.” Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists credits Russia with about 140 nuclear warheads for the Iskander and SS-21 system. Russia has ten brigades of Iskander missiles with 120 field reloadable launchers. In August 2018, Interfax reported that the Iskander-M had been given an anti-ship capability. The Iskander force is operational and still being expanded.
The actual range of at least some versions of the Iskander-M is reported to be up to twice the official range of 500-km. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius has said the range is 435miles (700-km). An upgraded Iskander-M missile is reportedly also being developed. Because of the way the INF treaty range definition for ballistic missiles is written, this is probably not a violation of the INF Treaty, but it is a clear violation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiative commitments regarding short-range nuclear missiles.
The 2018 NPR records that the Russians have nuclear capable CRBMs (Close Range Ballistic Missiles.) A now-declassified year 2000 CIA report predicted that Russia might put low-yield nuclear weapons on multiple rocket launchers. Russia used these types of rockets in the large May 2014 nuclear exercise presided over by President Putin. These weapons also contradict a commitment made during the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives to eliminate battlefield nuclear missiles.
Russia inherited nuclear artillery from the Soviet Union which was supposed to be eliminated under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives by the year 2000. In 2003, then-Commander of the Rocket and Artillery Forces, Colonel General Vladimir Zaritskiy confirmed the continued existence of the battlefield nuclear weapons that were supposed to have been eliminated by 2000. In another interview in November 2003, he said that missile and artillery weapons were still an important aspect of Russia’s nuclear strike capability.
There are many reports that Russia has retained tactical nuclear artillery. In 2004, Russian television displayed a new howitzer which it said: “…could be used to fire low-yield nuclear bombs.” In 2005, a Russian Defense Ministry publication stated, “The Missile Troops and Artillery are a combat arm of the Ground Troops. They are the main means for fire and nuclear strikes against an enemy.” In 2007, General Zaritskiy stated that new policy guidance for the use of these weapons was issued in 2004. In September 2007, Russian journalist Nikolay Poroskov reported that tactical nuclear ground-based missiles, air-defense weapons, naval anti-ship and ASW missiles, missiles directed against ground targets and also artillery projectiles, nuclear mines, aerial bombs, and air-to-surface missiles exist and Russia’s arsenal, it is variously estimated, amounts to 3,500 to 4,000 nuclear weapons, among which there are about 1,200 warheads for missiles and 1,500 munitions of various classes. In 2009 and 2010, former Duma Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee Aleksey Arbatov indicated Russian tactical warheads can be delivered by artillery. In 2011, Arbatov stated that the nuclear weapons of ground troops’ artillery, tactical missiles, and mines were “partially” destroyed. In 2011, Colonel General (ret.) Viktor Yesin also said Russia had nuclear artillery. In 2011, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated that “…specialist units within Russia’s ground forces received ‘more than 100 cranes reliable enough to handle nuclear warheads.” In 2013, Academician Yevgeniy Avrorin, a former Director of the Sarov nuclear weapons laboratory (the All-Russian Scientific-Research Institute), in an interview published by the Sarov laboratory, said the Russian 152-mm nuclear artillery shell with “a kiloton yield” had been “broadly deployed” throughout the Russian Army. In 2014, Pravda.ru reported, “Russia, according to conservative estimates, has 5,000 pieces of different classes of TNW - from Iskander warheads to torpedo, aerial and artillery warheads!” In August 2016, Sebastien Roblin, writing in the National Interest, stated that a nuclear shell for the Russian 240-mm mortar exists.
Strangely, Russian nuclear artillery is not mentioned in either the 2018 NPR or the 2017 DIA report on Russian military power. The reason is unclear. The DIA report footnotes Alexei Arbatov, a noted Russian expert and former Vice Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, as its source that Russia has nuclear artillery. Moreover, the DIA report completely ignores a later statement by Arbatov who said that, “Data relating to the Russian Federation’s nonstrategic nuclear assets (medium-range aviation, operational-tactical aircraft, and missiles) are classified, but unofficial estimates range from 2,000 to 3,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons, a considerable segment of which can also hit targets in regions adjoining Russia.” “Operationally deployed” nuclear weapons is the 2002 Moscow Treaty counting rule. It does not count the entire weapons inventory but merely the number of weapons deployed on delivery vehicles or stored at operational bases.
It is possible that the CRBMs noted in the 2018 NPR have replaced Russia’s nuclear artillery, probably because of better range and accuracy but such a change would likely have been covered in the Russia press. Apparently, it has not.
Russian missile defense interceptors and surface-to-air missiles reportedly have nuclear capability and a secondary surface-to-surface role. This was first reported by noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer in 2010. The 2018 NPR confirms the nuclear capability. State media TASS (on many occasions) and Russia Today have said the S-400 has surface-to-surface capability. Felgenhauer has written that such capability was “demonstrated” in the Russian Vostok-2010 military exercise conducted in the Far East.
Some of the systems cited by Felgenhauer very likely constitute violations of the INF Treaty. This is because the exemption from the INF Treaty prohibitions for air and missile defense interceptors only applies if they are used “solely” for air or missile defense. Russia reportedly has over 700 nuclear warheads for these missiles.
Russia is even reportedly developing a nuclear anti-tank weapon for its new Armata tank. This is one of the increasing lists of Putin’s crazy nuclear weapons programs since it would be almost as much of a threat to Russian forces as to NATO forces because of the extremely short- range of a direct fire anti-tank weapon. Moreover, the tactical use of such a weapon would be determined by low ranking NCOs. Nuclear weapons would also be distributed widely on the battlefield creating security, control and additional contamination problems. Well-connected hardline Russian journalist Colonel (ret.) Nikolai Litovkin said in Russian state media that Russia can but won’t do this. Hopefully, he is correct, but he may be functioning as a Russian disinformation operative in this case. He claimed that the Soviets had nuclear tank rounds, but there is no apparent evidence of this in open sources.
The Russian monopoly on ground-launched non-strategic nuclear weapons is dangerous. These weapons are the most relevant to the Russian strategy of deterring a NATO counterattack against a Russian invasion of a bordering NATO state under Russia’s version of “escalate to de-escalate” (or “escalate to win”) because these weapons have the potential to defeat NATO. Russia can launch types of attacks that no Western nation can match. Even considering the full range of relevant weapons endorsed in the 2018 NPR, the same assessment is still true. We will have more deterrent capability, but we will still be unable to match all Russian options and, hence, maximize our deterrence of such attacks.
Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.
 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, (Washington D.C., US, Department of Defense, February 2018), pp. 73-74, available at https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/200187 2886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
 “Text of the Gorbachev Reply to President’s Nuclear Initiative,” Moscow 28671, unclassified.: “Yeltsin Makes Statement on Disarmament,” January 29, 1992, unclassified.
 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 2014), p. 8, available at http://www. state.gov.documents/organization/230108.pdf.
 ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., “WEST 2017 Keynote: ‘The View from the Indo-Asia-Pacific’,” PACOM.mil, February 22, 2017, available at http://www.pacom.mil/ Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1089966/west-2017-keynote-the-view-from-the-indo-asia-pacific/.: Steve Holland, “Trump wants to make sure U.S. nuclear arsenal at ‘top of the pack’,” Reuters, February 24, 2017, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-exclusive-idUS KBN1622IF.
 Ibid., p. 9.
 Dave Johnson, Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds, (Livermore: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, February 2018), p. 39, available at http:///wwwcontent/ assets/ docs/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf.
 Ibid., p. 57.
 “Russia creating new cruise missiles strike forces - top general,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, March 24, 2018, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/ professional/docview/2017429525?accountid=155509.
 “Army; Russia sets up delivery vehicles that can carry precision-guided missiles up to 4,000 km - General Staff,” Interfax, November 7, 2017, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/docview/9614 20396?accountid =155509.
 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., pp. 10, 53.
 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-2017, (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Oh: National Air and Space Intelligence Center, June 2017), p. 37, available at https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/06/nasic-2017/.
 “CSIS, “SS-N-30A (Kalibr),” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 11, 2016,) available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/.; Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy, (Washington D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, December 2015), p. 35, available at http://www.oni.navy.mil/ Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015print.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-082038-923.
 Hans M. Kristensen, "NASIC Removes Russian INF-Violating Missile From Report,” Federation of American Scientists, June 30, 2017, available at https://fas.org/ blogs/security/2017/08/nasic-2017-corrected/.
 “The Select Committee Investigative Record,” The Village Voice, February 16, 1978, p. 92.
 Stephen Forss, “The Russian Operational Tactical Iskander Missile System,” Helsinki Finland: Maanpuolustuswkorkeakoulu, 2012, p. 16, available at http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84362/StratL4_ 42w.pdf?sequence=1.
 Pavel Podvig, “Is it too late to have an informed discussion about the INF treaty?,” Russian Forces.org, July 1, 2017, available at http://wwww.russianforces.org/blog/2017 /07/is _it_too_late_to_have_an_info.shtml.
 Igor Rozin, “New anti-ship missile will make Russia’s Iskander-M even deadlier,” Russian Beyond the Headlines, August 8, 2018, available at https://www.rbth. com/science-and-tech/328925-russias-iskander-m-to-get-new-missiles.
 “Russian Navy to get 5 coastal defense missile systems by end of 2016 - source (Part 2),” Interfax, July 22, 2016, available at https://dialogproquest.com professional/docview/1806232632?accountid=155509.
 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, op. cit., p. 37.
 “Russia to compensate for INF losses with Iskander missile system,” Ria Novosti, November 14, 2007, available at http://www.en.rian.ru/russia/20071114/88066432.html.
 Ilya Kramnik, “Sticking An Iskander Missile Into The ABM Shield Part One,” UPI, November 19, 2008, available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/StickingAnIskanderMissileInto_The_ABM_Shield_Part_One_ 999.html.: Ilya Kramnik, “Missile bargaining: Iskanders for missile defense,” Ria Novosti, January 29, 2009, available at http://www.en.rian.ru/analysis/20090129/119877816.html.
 Mikhail Barabanov, “The Iskander Factor,” Kommsersant, November 9, 2008, available at http://www.
 Jerome Cartillier and Jo Biddle, “US calls on Moscow to get rid of banned arms,” Yahoo News, July 29, 2014, available at http://news.yahoo.com/russia-violated-arms-treaty-testing-cruise-missile-us-002749693.html;ylt= A0LEVj1 Ex3VVO9YAtmwnnIlQ;_ylu=X3oDMTEzZWJidTA2BGNvbG8DYmYxBHBvcwMxBHZ0aWQDR kZHRTAxXzEEc2VjA3Ny.
 Dr Carlo Kopp, “Soviet/Russian Cruise Missiles,” Air Power Australia,” Technical Report APA-TR-2009-0805. April 2012, available at http://www.ausairpower. net/APA-Rus-Cruise-Missiles.html#mozTocId152650.
 “New strategic cruise missiles developed in Russia - Defense Ministry (Part 2),” Interfax-AVN Online, August 8, 2012. (Translated by World News Connection.).
 “Army Brigade To Be Equipped With Iskander Systems This Year –Commander,” ITAR-TASS, September 29, 2009. (Transcribed by World News Connection.).: “Ground Forces Personnel Will Be Armed With Iskanders,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, October 29, 2009, (Translated by World News Connection.).
 “Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the start of the meetings of NATO Defence Ministers, NATO, October 26, 2016, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/opinions136579.htm?Selected Locale=en.
 All Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center, Sarov, 2006, p. 59.
 “Ten brigade sets of Iskander-M missile systems delivered to Russia's Ground Forces – commander,” Interfax, December 22, 2017, available at http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=80016.: “Russian units switching to new Iskander missile on schedule, general says,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, available at https://dialog. proquest.com/professional/docview/460325189?accountid=155509.
 “Iskander-M adjusted to hit marine targets,” Interfax, August 3, 2018, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/ professional/docview/2082484130?accountid=155509.
 Gennadiy Melnik and Denis Telmanov, “Iskanders Taught To Work in Formation. Russia’s Main Military Argument Tested for First Time in Conditions Close to Actual,” Moscow Izvestiya Online, September 26, 2011. (Translated by World News Connection.).: Viktor Myasnikov, “Full Aft. Verbal Arms Race Is Under Way and Has Prospects of Becoming Real One.” Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Nov 21, 2007. (Translated by World News Connection.).; Forss, “The Russian Operational Tactical Iskander Missile System,” op. cit., p. 15.; “Southern MD Missile Brigade holds tactical exercise at the Kapustin Yar range.” Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, September 30, 2016, available at http://eng.mil.ru/en/newspage/ country/more.htm?id=12095913 @egNews.; “Russia: Pundit on new military doctrine, response to strategic challenges,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, March 22, 2007. (Translated by World News Connection.).
 “Russia deploys missiles on NATO doorstep: Lithuania,” AFP, October 16, 2016, available at http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/world/europe/Russia-deploys-missiles-on-NATO-doorstep-Lithuania/articleshow/54754894.cms.
 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., p. 53.
 “Evidence of Russian Development of New Subkiloton Nuclear Warheads [Redacted],” Intelligence Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, 2000, approved for release October 2005, pp. 6, 10, available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0001260463.pdf.
 “Russian forces practice rocket fire,” Interfax, May 8, 2014, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/ docview/1522714188?accountid=155509: “Putin oversees Russian nuclear exercise amid Ukraine tensions,” CBS News, May 8, 2014, available athttps://www.cbsnews.com/news/putin-oversees-russian-nuclear-exercise-amid-ukraine-tensions/.
 Barabanov, “The Iskander Factor,” op. cit.,: “Russia: Pundit on new military doctrine, response to strategic challenges,” op. cit.: Myasnikov, “Full Aft. Verbal Arms Race Is Under Way and Has Prospects of Becoming Real One,” op. cit.; Melnik and Telmanov, “Iskanders Taught To Work in Formation. Russia’s Main Military Argument Tested for First Time in Conditions Close to Actual,” op. cit.; Forss, “The Russian Operational Tactical Iskander Missile System,” op. cit. p. 15.; “Southern MD Missile Brigade holds tactical exercise at the Kapustin Yar range.” op. cit.
 “Russian TV shows howitzer capable of firing low-yield nuclear warheads,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, April 11, 2004. (Translated by World News Connection.).
 Quoted in Mark B. Schneider, The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation, (Fairfax Va.: National Institute Press, 2006), p. 17, available at http:// www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Russian-nuclear-doctrine-NSF-for-print.pdf.
 Mark Schneider, “The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Comparative Strategy, October 1, 2008, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495930802358539?journalCode=ucst20.
 Quoted in Schneider, “Russian Violations of Its Arms Control Obligations,” op. cit., p. 338.
 “Washington Presses Moscow to Begin Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons Reduction,” Gazeta.ru, Vedomosti, February 10, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/papers/ 20100205/157782788.html.: Alexander A. Dynkim and Alexei Arbatov, “NATO Russian Relations,” Moscow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010, p. 29, available at https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/en/publ/2016/Supple ment2016.pdf.
 “Moscow, Washington Must Demonstrate Openness Regarding Nuclear Potentials – Expert,” Interfax, April 18, 2011, available at http://search.proquest.com/ professional/docview/862548201?accountid=155509.
 “Russia: Former RVSN Main Staff Chief on Reduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Article by Viktor Ruchkin on recent statements made by Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired) on the possibility of a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenals of Russia and the United States: ‘In a Broad Context’," Krasnaya Zvezda Online Saturday, April 30, 2011. (Translated by World News Connection.)
 The Russian Ministry of Defence press service, “During 2011, the Engineer Troops have Received New, Specialist Machinery and Equipment” (in Russian), December 23, 2011, available at http://www.function. mil.ru/ news_page/country/more.htm?id=10859461@egNews.
 Академик Евгений Николаевич Аврорин: «Наука — это то, что можно сделать, а техническая наука — это то, что нужно сделать»,” atomicenergy.ru, April 10, 2013, available at http://www.atomic-energy.ru/interviews/ 2013/04/10/41068. (In Russian).
 Dmitriy Sudakov, “Russia prepares nuclear surprise for NATO,” Pravda.ru, November 12, 2014, available at http:// www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/12-11-2014/129015-russia_nato_nuclear_surprise-0/.
 Sebastien Roblin, “The Russian Army's Super 'Gun' Is a City Destroyer,” National Interest, August 20, 2016, available at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russian-armys-super-gun-city-destroyer-17416They’ve devastated fortifications from Afghanistan to Ukraine.
 Aleksey Arbatov: "Look Before You Leap,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, August 7, 2013. (Translated by World News Connection.)
 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the US by Developing BMD,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 136 (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_Ttnews[tt news]=36624.
 Nuclear Posture Review, op. cit., p. 53.
 “Russian Armed Forces will get five S-400 air defense systems in September-October 2016,” TASS, February 29, 2016, available at http://tass.ru/en/defense/859641.: “S-400 missile defense regiment takes up combat duty outside Moscow (VIDEO),” Russia Today, January 11, 2017, available at https://www.rt.com/news/373371-moscow-air-defense-s400/.; “S-300 missiles strike simulated enemy’s ground air defenses in East Siberian drills,” TASS, March 31, 2017, available at http://tass.com/defense/ 938610.
 Felgenhauer, “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the US by Developing BMD,” op. cit.
 Mark B. Schneider, “Russian INF Treaty Violations: Implications for the Nuclear Posture Review and the Future of the INF Treaty,” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, Issue No. 424 September 5, 2017, available at https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/08/the_nuclear_posture_review_and_the_future oftheinftreaty11994.html.
 Dr. Mark B. Schneider, “Confirmation of Russian Violation and Circumvention of the INF Treaty,” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series 350, February 2014, p. 18, available at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Confirmation-of-Russian-Violations-of-the-INF-Treaty8.pdf.
 Alexei Arbatov, “Arbatov Analyzes Possible Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reductions,” Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer Online, May 17, 2010. (Translated by World News Connection.).
 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Develop Nuclear Round for T-14 Main Battle Tank,” The Diplomat, April 17, 2017, available at http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/russia-to-develop-nuclear-round-for-t-14-main-battle-tank/.: Arthur Dominic Villasanta, “Russia might be Developing a Nuclear Tank Round for New Version of the T-14 Armata,” Chinatopix.com, April 13, 2107, available at http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/113471/20170413/russia-developing-nuclear-tank-round-new-version-t-15-armata.htm.
 Nikolai Litovkin and Gleb Fedorov, “Why Russia can, but will not fire nuclear shells from an Armata tank,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, April 20, 2017, available at http://rbth.com/defence/2017/04/20/why-russia-can-but-will-not-fire-nuclear-shells-from-an-armata-tank_747106.