
Rotting From the Corps?
Last updated 12:09 PM EDT • Read time: 4m
The United States Army frequently channels the thinking of one of its most famous World War Two generals, George S. Patton. A few of his famous phrases resound through the halls of the institutions that turn out future Army leaders. In his famous "Blood and Guts" speech from 1941, Patton said: "You musicians of Mars must not wait for the band leader to signal you…You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time."
However, in today's U.S. Army, aspiring leaders wait for the band leaders to signal before playing, and march to their desired tune instead of contributing their creative perspective and playing their own notes.
Where Patton envisioned Army leaders orchestrating a symphony of destruction, today's leaders orchestrate a symphony of deceit. By the end of the 'best year of my life,' as leaders often describe their time at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), I recognized again in my military journey that rigor and accuracy were subservient to winning buy-in from the intended audience of a staff product or brief.
CGSC teaches an excellent curriculum, and the rigor of the curriculum exposes officers who do not possess the requisite knowledge but are still excellent communicators. For example, in one class we examined different factors and regional dynamics at stake in the Gulf War. The instructor asked what Israel's role was and why Patriot missiles were placed in Israel. A well-regarded officer, whose Army branch had already marked him as a future senior leader, immediately responded that Israel performed much heavy-lifting as an ally of the United States, inserting buzzwords (i.e., inoculate, case in point, seamless, adjudicate, prosecute, blah blah) to dazzle the audience. The officer did not know the answer but forged ahead with a learned verbal dance. For a moment, truth and reality succumbed to a beautiful, believable, verbose façade, until a few other students corrected the narrative, having watched Gulf War coverage on TV during the conflict
But why?
The military culls officers as they move up the ranks to select the best for command. Unfortunately, those officers who learn to compose the most melodious tunes for their senior leaders (i.e., raters) emerge as the top prospects for future command. These politically-adept officers fashion their tune according to what their bosses want to hear. Often, a leader's off-hand remarks and random thoughts spoken aloud become a cornucopia of insight to guide motivated officers in what they say and do. Instead of anchoring rigorous staff work on problem-framing within a realistic environment, senior leaders often get a brief focused on how the staff thinks the senior leader views the problem and what solutions best serve his predisopositions.
Because senior positions are two-year assignments, one can imagine the turmoil this causes for future planning and procurement. While the average officer does not go to work each day intending to deceive, he analyzes problems primarily through the lens of the leader's personality, whomever happens to wear the leadership mantle at the time. This divorces military thinking from reality.
Officers who grow up in this environment manifest two traits that translate to national security threats: first, fearing that initiative could put them at odds with their superior’s idea of the situation, officers wait for guidance before planning or constructing courses of action; second, once planning begins, officers focus on the partiality or biases of the senior leader, in terms of tailoring ideas, concepts and solutions to his preference.
Intellectual drift is inevitable in this system. Instead of continuous focus and refocusing on the problem, staff officers focus on adjusting momentum for whatever solution matches what each subsequent decision-maker envisions. The problem is now the last leader's vision, and the solution rests on the new leader's intent. This pattern creates a tremendous waste of resources.
Everyone knows this is happening: staff officers, general officers and contractors, too. Therefore, it is especially egregious when today's military organizations paint conceptual castles in the sky that fade into cost overruns and awkward capabiltiy implementation for tomorrow's leaders, staff and force.
Though I was only nine years-old during the Gulf War, I remember the United States helped defend Israel against Scud attacks to keep Israel out of the Gulf War. I got that much from watching television. Today, after watching a mid-career officer at CGSC eloquently describe the inverse of what happened in 1990-1991, I recognize the symptoms of a more significant rot nurtured in today's officer corps.
S.L. Nelson has served from the tactical to strategic level as a military officer. His views are his own and do not represent the position of the U.S. DoD.

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