America's Blind Spot

Washington does not merely lack Arctic strategy — it lacks Arctic command. The High North is a glaring blind spot in America’s national security. In an era of great-power competition, Russia continues militarizing in the Arctic while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) expands its latent power there. The U.S. posture, meanwhile, is fragmented and reactive. It surges power in crises — although some may question this capability — but lacks the steady and unified command necessary to compete effectively in a rapidly evolving Arctic. More than limited resources, this is about deeper habits of U.S. strategic culture that must change.

For its part, the PRC views the region as an open frontier. Using its self-proclaimed “Polar Silk Road,” dual-use research stations, and claims of being a “near-Arctic” state, Beijing is quietly expanding its influence. The PRC continues exploiting Arctic governance gaps and utilizes a comprehensive approach to the region, leveraging political, economic, scientific, and military tools.

Shaped by its “century of humiliation” and need for national rejuvenation, China is confident in its ability to reshape the rules and reinforce its influence regionally and globally. While shrouding its rhetoric in principles of peaceful coexistence, China continues to prepare for the use of force and coercion to achieve its national objectives in the Arctic as well. Despite recently canceling or pausing some of its Arctic investment projects, China continues to place strategic importance on the region’s role in its global status and influence narratives.

As adversaries capitalize on their Arctic advantages, the U.S. remains aloof to this rapidly evolving domain. In a larger conflagration, adversaries could use the Arctic as a staging ground and “outflank” deterrence efforts in Europe and the Pacific. Lacking a cohesive Arctic command is not just a resource issue, it is a symptom of deeper cultural blind spots.

The Pentagon’s current Arctic “monitor-and-respond” posture is emblematic of America’s broader belief in decisive wars, quick victories, and reliance on technological overmatch. In the Arctic, however, this reactive approach is sure to fail. The U.S. lacks both the staying power and specialized training for sustained operations in one of the world’s harshest operating environments.

The U.S. divides Arctic responsibilities among three of its largest combatant commands — European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) — ensuring that no single entity adequately prioritizes the Arctic. The result is a reactive posture that cedes initiative to adversaries, leaving the U.S. dangerously exposed. America’s obsession with quick fixes and technological optimism, inherent in its tired mantra of responding “at the time and place of our choosing,” falls hopelessly short. Without a unified Arctic command structure and long-term posture, Washington risks discovering too late that speed and catchy slogans are no substitute for presence and preparation.

The Arctic is no longer exempt from great power competition, as it appeared to be in the years immediately following the Cold War. While Moscow treats the Arctic as a fortress and Beijing as a frontier, Washington treats it as an afterthought.

It does not take much to imagine the risks of America’s continued neglect. Should Russia continue to grow and modernize its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and subsurface capabilities in the region, the U.S. could face significant economic and military costs if Moscow limits or even denies access to the region. Furthermore, should Moscow expand its Arctic capabilities to a more offensive posture, the U.S. and Canada could face increased risk of a strategic surprise stemming from long-range cruise missiles flying below existing radar capabilities.

While the PRC’s Arctic capabilities lag behind Russia’s, the U.S. has largely overlooked the growing risk posed by the PRC’s expanding icebreaker fleet, alongside the potential for increased Chinese subsurface activities in the region. Lastly, and likely most worrisome, America’s continued regional neglect in the face of a burgeoning – albeit not without its own friction – Sino-Russian collaborative posture risks Washington and its allies ceding control of large portions of the region. A Sino-Russian Arctic fait accompli risks leaving North America exposed to strategic blackmail or even nuclear threats.

It is high time the U.S. situated the Arctic within its proper place; otherwise, it risks being the only great power lacking a credible plan for the High North. With Finland’s and Sweden’s accession into NATO, effectively bifurcating the Arctic with Russia on one side and NATO on the other, the U.S. has an incredible opportunity to collaborate with its Arctic allies – allies who possess vast knowledge, experience, and capabilities for operating in the harsh environment.

This collaboration begins with the U.S. establishing a phased implementation strategy culminating in a unified Arctic Combatant Command. A dedicated command aimed at the evolving operating environment would align planning, strategy, presence, and deterrence in the High North – something no patchwork of strategy documents can accomplish. Such a move would not happen overnight or without complexity and cost. Indifference, however, is no longer an option.

Cody Stamm is an Active Duty Engineer Officer with over a decade of service. He is also a doctoral student at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.