Integrated Deterrence 2.0

This paper critically examines the concept of "integrated deterrence," introduced in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which aimed to align all elements of national power to deter peer adversaries, such as China and Russia. Although theoretically sound, the strategy suffered from ambiguous interpretation and inconsistent interagency execution. The paper argues that the Trump Administration has an opportunity to revitalize this concept through a more structured and operationalized approach— “Integrated Deterrence 2.0.” This enhanced model calls for clear leadership, whole-of-government coordination, and strategic resource reallocation, while strengthening alliances and improving strategic communication. The analysis outlines how the U.S. can transition from military-first deterrence to a truly integrated framework involving diplomatic, informational, economic, and military tools aligned with the Trump Administration's priorities. By institutionalizing these changes, the U.S. can more effectively deter adversaries and navigate the evolving challenges of great power competition.

The bipartisan, congressionally mandated 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy asserted that the “Department of Defense (DoD) cannot, and should not, provide for the national defense by itself.” Instead, it argued for a “whole-of-government approach” that coordinates “all elements of national power” to satisfy the current demands of American security. Unfortunately, even after introducing integrated deterrence in 2022, the Biden Administration never fully realized its potential or provided a clear path for implementation. This led to competing interpretations and fragmented action. Two years later, it was rarely used by senior officials. The Trump Administration, specifically the acting National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, the National Security Council’s Principals Committee, and Congress, now have an opportunity to define and implement a stronger version of this strategy, one that meets the urgent needs of great power competition.

Genesis

“Our (the DoD) central charge is to develop, combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect…Integrated deterrence means using every tool at the Department’s disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the United States (U.S.) Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression.” This statement, made by former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III, captured the essence of integrated deterrence and its centrality within the Biden Administration's approach to great power competition. As defined by the 2022 National Security Strategy, the concept called for integration across domains, regions, the spectrum of conflict, levers of power, and with allies and partners. In theory, it enabled the U.S. to project credible capabilities and political will to deter aggression, augmenting the “traditional backstop of combat-credible conventional and strategic capabilities… (that) shape adversary perceptions of risk” across domains.

The Biden Administration recognized that great power competition with China and Russia required a more sophisticated approach than the Cold War model of military deterrence, which relied heavily on nuclear capabilities. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine showed that nuclear forces no longer deter limited conflict. Competition extends into cyberspace, outer space, and the economic and information domains. A new form of deterrence was therefore needed.

As initially described, integrated deterrence sought to address these challenges by leveraging all of America’s advantages in a coordinated way. The DoD would provide conventional and strategic deterrence, expeditionary forces, and a global infrastructure through its eleven combatant commands. The State Department, as the lead for diplomacy, would draw on its embassies, bilateral and multilateral relationships, international forums, and foreign assistance programs to negotiate and shape the information environment. Treasury would impose sanctions and coordinate financial deterrence, while Commerce would reenergize the defense industrial base, secure supply chains, and pass workforce needs to Labor or Education. Homeland Security would protect borders, critical infrastructure, and cyberspace, and the intelligence community would deliver threat intelligence, early warning, and countermeasures while clandestinely shaping the information environment. Other agencies would contribute their unique strengths.

Allies, partners, and the private sector would also serve as critical stakeholders in this strategic concept. They would amplify U.S. strengths by sharing security burdens, deepening economic partnerships, and reinforcing democratic norms. Indo-Pacific allies and partners could help counter China’s rise, while NATO and European allies would assume greater responsibility for continental defense and coordinate economic measures through the E.U. and G7. At the same time, the defense industry and technology firms would play essential roles: established contractors could deliver advanced capabilities, while newer entrants and tech companies would drive innovation in AI, cybersecurity, and data-enabled deterrence.

Competing Interpretations

Under the Biden Administration's leadership, integrated deterrence aimed to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics and revisionist agenda, as well as China’s economic and technological influence, along with its military buildup. By leveraging interagency resources, it sought to compensate for military overextension while countering two near-peer states with global ambitions. Unfortunately, because a “how” was never defined, this approach devolved into competing interpretations and inconsistent execution.

The first interpretation was that of a “DoD-Centric Approach.” This framed deterrence as purely military, with “integration” limited to further incorporating conventional and nuclear forces. The 2022 National Defense Strategy, for example, defined integrated deterrence as “using every tool at the Department’s disposal,” signaling a Pentagon-centered framework that sidelined other agencies despite its rhetorical emphasis on whole-of-government action. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2024 reinforced this view, stressing U.S. force posture, exercises, and operational integration as the principal deterrent measures.

The second and most common interpretation was “DoD-First, with Interagency Support.” In this model, the Pentagon retained primacy while other agencies played supporting roles, such as Commerce restricting semiconductor exports to China or Treasury sanctioning Russia’s defense-industrial base. These actions aligned with military objectives but remained secondary to DoD-led deterrence. Although this enabled some burden sharing, many measures were reactive and lacked a broader interagency strategy. This left the Pentagon in the driver's seat and allowed other departments to prioritize internal mandates rather than fully addressing the National Security Strategy’s top security challenge. The National Security Strategy itself underscored this imbalance, noting that the “National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence.” No other unclassified strategic document outside the DoD embraced this concept, leaving the Pentagon the only agency accountable and its sole champion.

The third interpretation was quite different. While only mentioned in a single bullet point in the National Security Strategy, it became the cornerstone for many groups, especially those of the Republican Party. These “Allies Take on a Bigger Role” advocates emphasized burden-sharing, pressing NATO and Indo-Pacific partners to step up. The results were visible: by June 2024, twenty-three NATO members had met or exceeded the two percent GDP defense spending threshold. In Asia, the Philippines expanded U.S. access to four new bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signaling Manila’s willingness to assume greater responsibility in countering Chinese aggression.

The final interpretation, one that seemed to be the intent of the National Security Strategy, was not fully realized. This “Whole-of-Government” approach envisioned a “seamless combination of capabilities” across military and non-military instruments of power to deter an aggressor. It would be proactive, with all departments working towards a primary security goal of preventing a future great power war. Yet in practice, execution faltered. A February 2023 Center for Strategic & International Studies report warned that integrated deterrence lacked clear roles and leadership, making it more slogan than actionable strategy. Subsequent U.S. Government Accountability Office findings in 2024 underscored bureaucratic fragmentation, showing agencies struggling to coordinate on research security and foreign influence screening, precisely the kind of interagency alignment the National Security Strategy had envisioned but never achieved.

Way Forward

While the Trump Administration would almost certainly not use the Biden era phrase “integrated deterrence,” it has an opportunity to strengthen deterrence by defining, leading, and implementing a unifying strategy that integrates all elements of national power. This requires reprioritizing resources: shifting forces to the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe and increasing defense spending. As the Commission on the National Defense Strategy notes, larger defense budgets must be paired with greater capacity for State, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, and intelligence agencies to focus on national security missions. Budgets should prioritize cyber, space, and economic security, while also recruiting cyber, AI, and intelligence specialists across the government. Domestic production must also be strengthened.

The Trump Administration should adopt a step-based approach. First, the National Security Council must clearly define its leadership role in integrated deterrence. A cross-agency mechanism must synchronize efforts across the Department of War (DoW), State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and the intelligence community, with Commerce, Labor, and Education included as needed. Organizationally, a permanent National Security Council mechanism, such as a task force, Office for Integrated Deterrence, or a monthly meeting of the Deputies Committee for integrated deterrence, could provide strategic oversight and coordinate unified action across departments.

These policies must be communicated through a new Integrated Deterrence 2.0 doctrine, a call to action akin to NSC-68. It should coordinate federal agencies and the private sector under a unified strategy while sending clear signals to adversaries about red lines and consequences. By relying on all elements of national power, this policy reflects President Trump’s emphasis on credibility and signaling, turning deterrence into both process and posture. Integrated Deterrence 2.0 would project strength, tie economic tools to administration policy, and press allies to share burdens, reducing U.S. costs while expanding leverage. Clear strategic messaging must also be directed at America’s adversaries and competitors, especially China and Russia, regarding red lines and consequences, particularly in the emerging domains and the grey zone. This may entail taking action beyond diplomatic statements, including limited and escalatory actions to signal where these boundaries lie.

Further diplomatic coordination should occur to prevent fragmentation while strengthening America’s allied commitments. Joint interoperability and exercises with NATO and Indo-Pacific partners should grow. Joint weapon production with allies and partners should be encouraged, along with standardized policies for cyber and space warfare. These reforms align with the Trump Administration’s stated priorities of burden-sharing, protecting American workers through re-industrialization, and avoiding costly nation-building campaigns. By linking alliance commitments to greater allied contributions and domestic industrial renewal, this strategy embodies the administration’s “America First” objectives. It also demonstrates strength abroad while delivering direct economic benefits at home, showing that foreign policy can serve domestic priorities without entangling the U.S. in costly overseas conflicts.

Legislative reform could enhance interagency collaboration and responsiveness. Aligning DoW geographic commands with State Department bureaus would allow combatant commanders to coordinate directly with regional assistant secretaries. Updating the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is also overdue; current workarounds like the Joint Requirements Oversight Council lack structure and authority, leaving service chiefs and combatant commanders divided between present needs and future priorities. A revised framework could streamline the budgetary process and ensure the force develops the right capabilities. To institutionalize whole-of-government coordination, Congress could require annual reviews of Integrated Deterrence 2.0 and increase funding for State, Treasury, and Homeland Security alongside the DoW, improving efficiency and deterrence across the federal government.

Conclusion

Integrated Deterrence, as defined by the Biden Administration, was a sound concept that leveraged all elements of national power to deter America’s adversary. However, it was not operationalized and was underutilized since its introduction. The Trump Administration has the opportunity to build upon this. U.S. national security demands a clear, operational strategy—backed by strong leadership—to unify national efforts in navigating twenty-first century competition. Integrated Deterrence 2.0, or a similar concept, may meet this need. American success in the current geopolitical environment requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, and whole-of-society approach. Implementing Integrated Deterrence 2.0 is therefore not only a strategic necessity but also directly serves the interests of the Trump Administration. It ensures allies carry their share of the burden, strengthens America’s economic and technological base, and provides credible messaging. It also advances the Administration’s economic sovereignty agenda by tying deterrence to domestic industrial revitalization and technological dominance.

For President Trump, this means a strategy that delivers peace through strength, rebalances defense costs onto allies, and protects American workers through industrial revitalization. It is a strategy that allows the administration to claim victory both at home by creating jobs and securing borders, and abroad by deterring adversaries without costly wars. In short, it delivers a strategy entirely consistent with the administration’s agenda. The phrase “integrated deterrence” may become another relic like Containment, Massive Retaliation, or the Third Offset Strategy, but for deterrence to succeed in the modern era, the current administration must unify national power under a coherent, institutionalized framework—or risk strategic failure.

Lieutenant Colonel Rudy Novak serves as Senior Instructor and Deputy Head of the Department of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he teaches and mentors cadets in international security and transatlantic relations. He holds graduate degrees from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the University of Oklahoma, and a bachelor’s degree from the University of Michigan. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Lt Col. Novak has authored articles and presented at major academic conferences, global security forums, and leading think tanks on deterrence, defense innovation, and international relations pedagogy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Approved for public release (PA #: USAFA-DF-2025-881): distribution unlimited.