A Conundrum: Strategic Minerals and a Peripheral Africa

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), publicly issued in early December 2025, focused primarily on the survival of the United States as a “sovereign republic, rejecting international obligations and alliances, other than restoration of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.” The NSS also emphasized expansion of American access to critical minerals and materials, while at the same time positing two conditions that seemingly contradict this access: independent and reliable access to goods needed for national defense, and changing the relationship with Africa from a “foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm.” Africa, peripheral to American security interests, is seen as a source of raw materials and a market for U.S. goods and services. Africa is then seen as a “battleground for resource competition with China,” with a focus on critical minerals essential to the energy transition and the defense-industrial base.

In remarks at the opening of the Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, DC, on February 4, 2026, Vice President J. D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio welcomed delegations of 54 countries and the European Commission. Rubio stressed that diversifying access to critical minerals was one of the administration’s top priorities and Vance, in a long, rambling speech, underlined the fact that economies worldwide depend on critical minerals. He stated that the administration feels that the international market for critical minerals is failing in many areas, and its goal is to align trade policy, development finance, and diplomatic engagement toward diversifying global supply of critical minerals and strengthening the countries that partner with the United States. He proposed creating a trading bloc to regulate prices, ensure stability, foster diverse centers of production, maintain stable investment conditions, and develop supply chains that are immune to external disruptions.

The purpose of the ministerial was to “reshape the global market for critical minerals and rare earths.” In addition to the U.S. vice president and secretary of state, the treasury secretary, interior secretary, energy secretary, and U.S. trade representative also attended. In the press release following the ministerial, the State Department outlined the importance of critical minerals and rare earths, the market’s vulnerability to political coercion and supply chain disruption, and the various bilateral agreements the United States has entered into to address the issue.

Among the 54 countries attending the meeting were six African countries: Angola, the DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

The under-representation of Africa in the ministerial is notable. While China holds 44 million metric tons of rare earth mineral reserves (70 percent of global reserves), Tanzania holds 890,000 tons, and South Africa has 860.000 tones, but neither of these two African countries was invited. While some in Africa see the continent playing a strategic role in the global strategic minerals market, and strategic leverage as the United States seeks to counterbalance China’s dominant position in processing, refining, and downstream integration. Among the many unanswered questions, such as environmental impact, local economic benefits, and government accountability, one of the most important is whether African countries can turn the U.S. strategic interest into a structural advantage. Will they be able to leverage U.S. demand for strategic minerals to create local processing, value-added processes, industrial capacity, and long-term development rather than a repeat of traditional cycles of dependency?

U.S. government actions and statements in the wake of the NSS’s publication cast doubt on Africa’s ability to benefit from the U.S. effort to curb China’s influence in this sector. In an email to U.S. diplomats in the State Department’s Africa Bureau, for example, the head of the bureau stated, “To put it bluntly, Africa is a peripheral—rather than a core—theater for U.S. interests that demands strategic economy. Framing Africa as strategic has often historically served bureaucratic and moral imperatives, not hard interests.” Prior to the February ministerial, when U.S. President Donald Trump brokered a tentative peace agreement between the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda, he also obtained an agreement for U.S. exploitation of minerals in the eastern region of the DRC. This agreement has never been implemented due to ongoing fighting by the M23 rebel group in the mineral-rich east. Since the much-publicized Washington signing ceremony by the leaders of the two countries, the DRC-Rwanda conflict has faded from the pages of the American media, and even though the DRC was one of the invitees to the ministerial, little was said about this agreement or the security situation in the region.

The absence of South Africa and Nigeria was no surprise. Both countries have earned the Trump administration’s enmity, albeit for different reasons.

While South Africa’s coziness with Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, caused significant tension in its relationship with the United States, the passage of the Expropriation Act in January 2025 put it squarely on Trump’s “naughty list.” The act allows the government to legally take private property for public use, spelling out fair compensation, but also allows seizure without compensation in certain cases, such as when the owner is not using it, or it has been abandoned. Despite the fact that the law applies to South Africans of any race and only aims “to provide for the expropriation of property for a public purpose or in the public interest,” the U.S. Department of State has flagged South Africa’s human rights situation as worsening, and the Trump administration has even gone as far as accusing South Africa of deliberate violence against the minority white Afrikaner group, and Elon Musk, a close Trump ally at times, has even claimed that South Africa has committed genocide against white people, a claim that has been rejected by the vast majority of South Africans, including the main group representing Afrikaners. South Africa hosted the G20 summit in 2025, and the United States sent only junior officials. In addition, Trump said that South Africa will not be invited to attend the 2026 G20, which the United States will host at his golf resort in Florida.

In November 2025, Nigeria was designated a “country of particular concern” by the U.S. government for the second time in five years (the first time was in 2020 during the first Trump administration). The 2025 designation was instigated by Rep. Riley M. Moore (R-WV), who urged the Trump administration to take “immediate action to address the systematic persecution and slaughter of Christians in Nigeria.” Nigerian authorities have refuted this claim, and studies support their position. One study argues that Christians account for about half of Nigeria’s population, but extremist attacks explicitly directed against them account for about 5 percent of total reported incidents. While Nigeria does have an extremist problem, it is an inaccurate oversimplification to present it in terms of anti-Christian violence. Nevertheless, this is precisely what the Trump administration has done. The administration, in coordination with the Nigerian government, conducted air strikes on suspected ISIS positions on Christmas Day, 2025, and suspected jihadi terrorists conducted retaliatory attacks on February 3, 2026, killing at least 162 people in the Muslim-majority villages of Woro and Nuku in Kwara state. While the U.S. State Department issued a statement expressing its “deepest condolences to the families of those affected by this senseless violence,” no mention was made that the victims of one of the deadliest attacks in months were not Christian, but Muslim.

The administration’s national security strategy emphasizes an “America First” approach, indicating a willingness to accept countries as they are, with democracy and governance a low priority. The NSS fails to mention human rights. The focus on treatment of Afrikaners in South Africa and Christians in Nigeria, however, appears to be an exception to the NSS priorities, for reasons that the administration has yet to explain, and that don’t even appear to be consistent with the focus on relations with countries that are willing to “make deals” with the United States.

None of the aforementioned issues, from the goal of establishing influence in the global critical minerals market to selectively ignoring or paying attention to human rights in Africa, can be analyzed in isolation. Policies and actions have unintended consequences. The transactional approach to policymaking and a short-term focus can sow the seeds of a national strategy’s undoing.

Discerning the precise meaning of “America First” from the NSS is difficult. It begins by stating its goal of ensuring “that America remains the world’s strongest, richest, most powerful, and most successful country for decades to come,” and that the country needs “a coherent focused strategy for how we interact with the world.” It defines “strategy” as a concrete, realistic plan that explains the “essential connection between ends and means,” with an accurate assessment of what is desired and what tools are available, or can realistically be created, to achieve the desired outcomes. The NSS then goes on to list a number of things that the United States wants: protection from military attack and hostile foreign influence, full control over borders and entry of people into the country, a resilient national infrastructure, the world’s most powerful military, a robust nuclear deterrent, the world’s strongest economy, the world’s most robust industrial base, the most productive energy sector, to remain the world’s most technologically advanced country, to maintain America’s unrivaled soft power, and to restore and reinvigorate American spiritual and cultural health. This is a long laundry list of wants that immediately refutes itself by failing to establish the means to achieve these ambitious ends. In addition, administrative actions often work against achieving the ends. The goal of maintaining America’s soft power, for example, has been severely damaged by the dismantling of global engagement and its career diplomatic service, important instruments of soft power.

Specifically regarding American access to critical minerals, the revival of American industry, and its approach to Africa, there are several inconsistencies.

Critical minerals are essential to the U.S. economy. They provide necessary inputs to a wide range of applications, from clean energy technologies to defense systems. The United States is, however, dependent on foreign countries for the supply of these critical minerals, and has stated its aim in the 2025 List of Critical Minerals to reduce dependence on adversaries, such as China, and to expand domestic production. Currently, the United States is dependent on imports for a significant portion of its critical mineral needs, primarily from China. In 2024, for example, the United States imported 100 percent of 12 minerals on the critical minerals list and more than 50 percent of an additional 28. From 2019 to 2022, almost 75 percent of the rare earth compounds and metals essential to national defense were imported from China, which dominates production and midstream processing. While there are critical mineral deposits in the United States, exploiting those deposits is not simple. It can take an average of 29 years in the United States to bring a new mine into production. Full domestic self-sufficiency is neither achievable nor desirable for every mineral on the list, and it requires building resilient, reliable, diversified supply chains by partnering with trusted allies and friendly nations. The administration’s actions on tariffs and other issues, however, have alienated allies and created uncertainty in other nations (particularly in Africa, which is considered peripheral), thereby undermining the ability to establish “friend-shoring.”

Regarding Africa, the administration’s policy has put trade outcomes, private-sector investment, and bankable ‘deals’ at the center of U.S.-Africa engagement. This increase in U.S. economic diplomacy is intended to counter China and the European Union’s trade influence in Africa. Administration actions regarding Africa, however, have done little to advance these goals. As previously mentioned, the Trump administration has started feuds with South Africa and Nigeria, two of the continent’s largest economies. In addition, despite positive actions, such as continued support for the Lobito Corridor, a rail and road network connecting inland mining sites to Lobito Port in Angola, and support for extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), as part of his global tariff actions to force better trade relations, Trump imposed a 15 percent tariff on 13 AGOA-eligible countries, and a 30 percent tariff on South Africa, effectively eliminating any AGOA benefits.

In terms of increasing U.S. influence in Africa as a counterbalance to China, while bilateral, transactional activities might yield short-term gains, in the long term sustained influence is problematic.

The Trump administration does itself no favors by freezing out South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa, with a GDP of approximately $373 billion, and Nigeria, with a GDP of roughly $253 billion, are the first and fourth largest economies on the African continent. Egypt ($348 billion), Algeria ($267 billion), and Ethiopia ($205 billion) are ranked 2nd, 3rd, and 5th. Kenya, Angola, Tanzania, and Côte d’Ivoire also have substantial GDPs of $79 billion or more. The top four are expected to retain their ranking until at least 2030, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). South Africa and Nigeria have frequently clashed because both aspire to play a more decisive leadership role in Africa. With the end of apartheid in 1994 and Nigeria’s return to democracy after two decades of military dictatorship in 1999, bilateral trade between the two countries grew tenfold. While Nigerian citizens have a certain amount of xenophobia and suspicion of South Africa from the apartheid era, the country-to-country relationship is cordial, and despite the occasional hiccup, is likely to grow stronger, particularly in response to negative U.S. actions.

China is poised to take advantage of any decline in U.S. relations with these two strategic countries, as part of its deliberate strategy to deepen economic ties and project influence in the Global South. In recent years, it has focused on infrastructure development, industrial investment, and trade facilitation. There have, however, been reports that China has exerted its economic influence to pressure African governments on political decisions, which, along with some environmental issues, has caused blowback. In the past, this has been an area where U.S. soft power influence had an advantage. U.S. aid cuts in Africa cede influence to China, even without any action by China. Chinese investment in Africa had already eaten away at U.S. soft power influence before 2025, and is likely to expand further during the current administration, given its transactional and unpredictable approach to foreign policy.

The administration’s tariff policy, which has shaken some of Africa’s most vulnerable economies, has some African leaders wondering whether the U.S.-Africa strategy is only about securing access to the continent’s minerals and not about a mutually beneficial partnership. The administration’s efforts to broker peace between the DRC and Rwanda in early 2025, for instance, included a DRC offer of exclusive mineral rights for U.S. companies in exchange for U.S. security assistance against the M23 rebels. While the U.S.-facilitated peace agreement was seen as a step in the right direction, it did nothing to end M23 violence in the eastern DRC, where the mineral concessions are located. Without a stable, secure environment, however, it will be difficult for U.S. companies to operate in the region.

If the administration’s critical minerals goals are to be achieved, it must rethink its Africa policy. Among the issues that should be considered are:

The bottom line is that there is a fundamental contradiction between the focus on increasing American influence in the critical minerals market and viewing Africa as peripheral to America’s strategic interests. Africa holds approximately 30 percent of the world’s critical mineral reserves. These reserves are widely scattered across the continent, and access to and development of them will require a coordinated effort that also establishes stable, secure environments and benefits for Africans. African governments and organizations like the African Union (AU) have primary responsibility, but the United States, if it wishes to have influence in the future of this critical sector, must revisit its transactional, scattershot approach to the continent. Africa, while admittedly not a top strategic priority, must be brought into the fold and given a seat at the table.

Charles A. Ray, a member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, served as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe.

This article appeared originally at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).